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Migration Policy in Russia and Germany: 
Challenges and Perspectives  
(Conference Overview)
Marya S. Rozanova
This collective monograph includes expert materials presented by keynote speakers at “Labor 
Migration and Migrant Integration in Germany and Russia: A Comparative Approach,” an 
international conference which took place at St. Petersburg State University on April 9–10, 
2015.1 
Russia and Germany face similar challenges related to the issues of unprecedented 
demographic change, labor migration, and migrant integration, despite the fact that 
Germany has been a part of the process of global migrations for a relatively long peri-
od while Russia has only recently become integrated into the system. The structure of 
transnational migration flows in Russia is undergoing a gradual yet continual trans-
formation similar to that which occurred in Germany (and Western Europe) twenty to 
thirty years ago, and which heralded the transformation of Germany into an immigra-
tion country.
European, and particularly German, experience with regard to managing migration 
and migrant integration may be instrumental in forecasting future developments and stra-
tegic planning in the sphere of labor migration and immigration in Russia. In this context, 
a comparative analysis of Russian and German practices will prove to be extremely valuable 
for modern Russia. 
The conference offered a forum for the discussion of the following themes: 
•	 general labor migration trends in Russia and Germany 
•	 demographic change and the challenges of aging societies 
•	 the regulation of migration in the European Union at both EU and national levels, 
and the formation of new immigration countries
•	 issues pertaining to protection of social and economic rights of labor migrants 
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•	 specific features of migration and integration policies at the subnational level (the 
cases of St. Petersburg in Russia, and the Federal State of Hessen in Germany) 
•	 escalating migrantophobia and strengthening of positions of right-wing political 
parties and movements in the receiving societies 
The opening ceremony of the conference featured welcome messages by Stanislav G. 
Eremeev, the Dean of the Faculty of Political Science, St. Petersburg State University; Dr. 
Rudolf Traub-Merz, Head of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Russia; Reiner Haunreiter, 
Counselor of the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Moscow; Irina V. Ivanova, 
Member of the Legislative Assembly of St. Petersburg; Vadim Y. Okrushko, First Vice-
Chairman, St. Petersburg Committee on Inter-Ethnic Relations and Implementation of 
Migration Policy; and Vitaly D. Ilchenko, Aide to Chief, Office of the Federal Migration 
Service in St. Petersburg.
Leading academic researchers and practicioners in the field of demography, labor mi-
gration, migration policy, and migrant integration presented reports at the conference. 
Two presentations highlighted common demographic trends and forecasts in Germany 
and Russia. Dr. Vladimir I. Mukomel (Head of the Sector of Migration and Integration 
Processes Studies at the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences) spoke 
about “Labor Migrants in the Context of Russian Demographic, Economic, and Social 
Development Problems.” Dr. Olga R. Gulina (Director, Russian Institute on Migration 
Policy (RUSMPI)) presented her paper, “Demographic Component in the Right to Pension: 
Comparative Analysis of Russia and Germany.” Both presenters emphasized the need in 
both countries for a continuous and massive inflow of migrant workers in order to meet 
labor market demands in the decades to come.
In his presentation “How People Move in the Greater EU: Migration in Diverse Labor 
and Welfare Regimes,” Dr. Dietrich Thränhardt (Professor-Emeritus of Comparative Politics 
and Migration Research, University of Münster) used a comparative analysis of labor mi-
gration regulation in EU countries to illustrate that the debate on transnational migration 
should not be limited to the issues of soft and hard borders. Greater efficiency in labor mi-
gration management is not achieved by maintaining border control, but rather by managing 
the rules and regulations in place within these borders. Countries with under-developed 
regulatory frameworks are confronted by growing inequalities and social tensions that may 
lead to protest movements against migrants. Integration of migrants into national labor 
systems, on the contrary, allows for the prevention of discrimination and facilitates social 
consensus. While the EU is building an open labor market, labor systems at the country 
level are still formed on the basis of national and local practices and policies. Mechanisms 
regulating labor markets and public welfare systems have a critical impact on migration 
flows. Therefore, the future effect of immigration on social and economic systems may be 
either positive, making countries more stable and contributing to their dynamic growth, or 
negative, enhancing inequalities and having a detrimental effect on the economy. In short, 
it may be said that “immigration brings both challenge and opportunity.”
In his report, “Transnational Migration in Russia and the Potential for Integration,” 
Dr. Sergey Abashin (Professor of Migration Anthropology at the European University at 
St. Petersburg) presented trends of labor migration from countries in post-Soviet Central 
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Asia, which are the principal contributors of labor migration into Russia. Among the main 
traits of this migration are the following: economic motivation, low qualification of work-
ers, a cyclical nature, and the absence of migrants’ intentions to integrate into Russian so-
ciety. Currently, this model transforms itself as new factors and motives emerge, including 
changes in the composition and intentions of migrants, and the unfolding economic cri-
sis. Strangely enough, along with economic motivators, labor migration into Russia from 
Central Asia is also driven by a strong psychological factor: the fact that many Central Asian 
youth who lack work experience in Russia feel that they are missing out on a key aspect of 
personal and professional development. 
MP Alexey Etmanov (Deputy of the Legislative Assembly of Leningrad Oblast; Head 
of the Interregional Trade Union Workers Assoсiation), speaking on “Non-Standard 
Employment in St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast: The Replacement of Permanent Jobs,” 
stressed that the status and working conditions of migrant workers in Russia cannot be dis-
cussed without a reference to the general status of workers with Russian citizenship. Today, 
no political party in Russia genuinely represents the legitimate rights and interests of native 
Russian workers. Workers do not have the capacity to come up with efficient represen-
tation and often are prevented from passing their message on to policy-makers. Notably, 
the tools available to defend workers’ rights were largely limited after the adoption of new 
amendments to the Federal Law on Assemblies, Meetings, Demonstrations, Processions 
and Pickets in 2012. In reality, only single-person pickets are not classified by public au-
thorities, particularly the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) and the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs (Extremism Prevention Division), as unsanctioned protests and 
acts of opposition. Larger protests are often equated with civil disobedience (rioting) and 
extremist actions aimed at destabilizing the existing public order. Therefore, the develop-
ment of a balanced labor system for both local and migrant workers requires developing 
means of representing all workers’ interests, promoting their opinions, and allowing them 
to participate in decision-making.
Dr. Rudolf Traub-Merz (Director of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Russia), in his 
role as conference moderator, noted that current efforts should be focused primarily on 
mitigating unfavorable general working conditions for native workers in Russia, and sec-
ondarily on expanding migrants’ rights and safeguards. Addressing these issues is of the 
utmost importance to both local workers and labor migrants in both short- and long-term 
perspectives.
The presentation “Model of Integrated Support of External and Internal Labor Migrants 
in Russia” given by Gavkhar Dzjuraeva (Head of the Center of Migration and Law) high-
lighted Russia’s lack of an institutionalized system of comprehensive support for migrant 
workers and their families. Dzjuraeva built upon the positive example set by the Center 
for Migration and Law in providing legal assistance to migrants and taking active part in 
public and expert boards of policy-making bodies on migration (the Federal Migration 
Service, for one) to report on the status of migrant communities to those responsible for 
decision-making.
Dr.h.c. Jan Cremers (Senior Researcher at the Amsterdam Institute of Advanced Labour 
Studies, and at Tilburg Law School) presented his paper, “Labor Recruitment and Economic 
Freedoms in Europe,” which highlighted multiple ways in which internal market policies 
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of EU institutions pose a risk for the implementation of labor norms and frameworks for 
working conditions. 
In his presentation, “How to Safeguard Socio-Economic Rights for Domestic and Migrant 
Workers: Experiences from Germany and the EU,” Wolfgang Müller (Senior Advisor at IG 
Metall Bayern) detailed the main aspects of the EU’s labor market. He gave special attention 
to flaws in the regulatory frameworks set in place to attract migrant workers, citing that 
they are often opaque, ill-conceived, and ineffective. Müller asserted that in order to build 
a system which will include the rights and legitimate interests of both local German work-
ers and migrant laborers, the following conditions regarding immigration must be in place: 
safeguards against wage damping and exploitation of workers; access to the labor market for 
citizens of EU countries who are legally residing in Germany; equal opportunities for per-
manent residence for both EU citizens and citizens of non-EU countries who are long-time 
residents of Germany; and simple family reunification procedures for refugees. 
Maria Carciumaru, a staff member of the German Society for International Cooperation 
(Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH) spoke on the rele-
vant issues of public health in Germany. On one hand, she asserted, medical service provid-
ers are facing the challenge of an increased workload caused by an aging population; on the 
other hand, there is a deficit of qualified personnel, particularly first-tier medical workers. 
One possible response scenario involves regulated engagement of labor migrants (on con-
dition of temporary employment) based on short- and long-term projections of industry 
demands for qualified personnel. 
In his report “Managing Highly-Skilled Labor Migration in Germany: Law and Practice,” 
Dr. Hans Dietrich von Loeffelholz (former Chief Economist and Head of Research in the 
Federal Office for Migration and Refugees [BAMF]) discussed two major changes in labor 
migration management. The first of these changes was the progressive post-1998 attempt to 
move from ad hoc regulation of migrant recruitment (depending on the demands of busi-
ness) to a formal management system for labor migration. The second major change was the 
switch in 2005 from a system of migrant rotation to one of migrant integration as an integral 
part of migration policy. 
Dr. Barbara Laubenthal (lecturer for the Department of Politics and Public 
Administration at the University of Konstanz) presented her paper, “Changes in German 
Labor Migration Policies—the Interplay of the European and the National Level,” in 
which she demonstrated the impact of EU norms on migration legislation and practices 
in Germany, specifically how these norms facilitated the gradual liberalization of German 
practices. 
In his paper, “Multilevel Integration Policies,” Dr. Friedrich Heckmann (Director of 
the european forum for migration studies [efms] at the University of Bamberg; Professor 
Emeritus of Sociology) explained the multilevel integration model which has been method-
ically implemented at all levels in Germany–from federal to municipal. He stressed that the 
implementation of general, comprehensive integration policies at the EU and national levels 
(to include eleven basic principles of migrant integration)2 is more efficient than specialized 
local programmes for effecting migrants’ integration. 
Dr. Ingrid Wilkens (Head of the Unit of Integration Research, Hessen State Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Integration) presented her paper, “Integration Monitoring in Germany: 
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Empirical Analysis of Immigrant Integration Processes (With Particular Regard to the 
Federal State of Hessen),” in which she detailed one of the most successful cases of regional 
integration policies in Germany, concerning streamlining KPIs and developing an innova-
tive system of follow-up monitoring of integration policies. 
Two papers presented at the conference examined the ways in which the city of 
St. Petersburg has dealt with issues of migration. Dr. Valeriy A. Achkasov (Head of 
the Department of Ethnopolitology, St. Petersburg State University) discussed “Ethnic 
Diversity and Tolerance Issues in Major Russian Cities: The Case of St. Petersburg” and Dr. 
Marya S. Rozanova (Professor of Political Science, Russian State Hydrometeorological 
University) presented “Russia as an Emerging Immigration Country? Changing 
Approaches to Migrant Integration: From Tolerance to the “Migration Police” (The Case 
of St. Petersburg).” Both offered St. Petersburg as a classic example of shifts in Russian 
migration and integration policy in the context of transformation of national policies and 
regional elites. These changes have demonstrated that Russia is still not considered an 
immigration country, a fact that helps to explain the “sporadic nature” of regional policies 
regarding migration. The case of St. Petersburg also shows that Russia has yet to develop 
the conditions necessary to build an institutionalized system for consistently implement-
ing comprehensive migration and integration policies.
 Ferry Pausch (Executive Managing Director of the German Foundation for Integration), 
in his paper “Media Influence on the Public Perception of Migrants and Migration in 
Germany,” addressed the role that mass media plays in shaping public opinion on migration 
issues, which has a significant impact on political discourse, on political preferences of vot-
ers during elections, and on election results themselves.
Dr. Tamara V. Kuprina (Associate Professor at Ural Federal University) spoke about mi-
gration practices of Sverdlovsk Oblast in Russia in her presentation, “Migration Processes 
in Sverdlovsk Oblast.” She discussed the correlation between migrants’ countries of origin 
and their spheres of employment. She found that migrant workers from Central Asia have 
jobs in construction, utilities and household services (cleaning), and food services; China 
contributes to retail and agriculture; Vietnam, to garment manufacturing; Korea, to con-
struction; the Philippines and Thailand, to wellness services (massage salons); France and 
Italy, to the restaurant business. These increasing signs of a naturally-forming workforce 
and settlement segregation testify to the lack of effective regulatory tools for migration pro-
cesses. Moreover, not only migrants in Sverdlovsk Oblast but also their children are facing 
expulsion3 from broader social environments. 
In the paper “Expert Assessments of Migration Policy in Modern Russia (Example of 
Sverdlovsk Oblast),” Dr. Olga A. Kozlova (Head of the Center for Research of Socioeconomic 
Dynamics, Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences) and Dr. Elena B. Bedrina 
(Senior Research Fellow, School of Economics, Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of 
Sciences) described attitudes of the local migration expert community toward the issue of 
migrant workers. The authors found a predominance of negative attitudes toward migration 
among their group of respondents, with widespread concensus about the following points: 
•	 migration provokes an increase in inter-ethnic conflicts
•	 migrant flow leads to epidemiological risks (HIV, TB, etc.)
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•	 migration drives corruption within the agencies responsible for managing migration 
processes
•	 the use of cheap unqualified labor makes businesses reluctant to upgrade production
Probably the only “positive effect,” according to respondents, was that “migrants help 
the labor market fill non-prestigious jobs that local workers are unwilling to take.” 
In general, the expert presenters at this conference see Russia as a gradually emerging 
new immigration country, and identify certain basic characteristics of modern migration 
processes in Russia. These characteristics include:
•	 a predominance of transnational migrants coming from “the near-abroad” (primari-
ly Central Asia), who fill the deficit of workers in lower-skilled occupations 
•	 uneven distribution of migrant flows across the country
•	 high and sustained level of xenophobia in Russian society (particularly in the forms 
of ethnophobia and migrantophobia)
•	 within the Russian expert community and among high-ranking government officials 
of relevant government entities, the proliferation of ambiguous and often polarized 
views of the role that labor migrants will play in the growth of the Russian economy 
and of the prospects of migration policies 
•	 law enforcement agencies (and their representatives with professional backgrounds 
in law enforcement) have exclusive domain in the areas of implementing migration 
policy, a fact which explains the restrictive character and lack of transparency of 
these policies
•	 insufficient attention to the opinions of leading experts, as well as to European his-
torical migration experience in the process of migration policy implementation by 
relevant public authorities; as a result, governmental management of migration pro-
cesses often has a sporadic and inconsistent character
•	 lack of prerequisites for the implementation of a comprehensive institutionalized 
policy of migrant integration 
At the same time, it should be noted that Russia is witnessing a gradual upswing in en-
gagement with migrant communities, specifically at the level of civil society organizations 
and social institutions. Thus, field-specific non-governmental organizations are mainly fo-
cused on facilitating general support for migrant workers, while educational institutions 
(primarily schools) and cultural centres (including the “Houses of Nationalities”) support 
instrumental and socio-cultural adaptation of migrants and their children in Russian soci-
ety and work to preserve their ethnocultural identity.
The German migration experience is an especially valuable model for Russia as the 
country undergoes a gradual and painful process of becoming an immigration country. 
Beginning in the 1990s, changes in Germany’s immigration policy and strategy made it 
one of the most accessible destinations for migrants. The 2000s saw wide-scale reforms and 
capacity-building in the field of legislative regulation of massive labor migrant flows, with 
successful efforts made to develop an institutionalized system of immigrant integration into 
German society. Germany’s record of growth (both positive and negative) over the past 
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fifty years in the areas of migration patterns and policies promises to reveal relevant and 
valuable information for shaping the roadmap for the future development of migration and 
integration policies in Russia.
In turn, the Russian state’s extensive heritage of cultural diversity management and har-
monization of interethnic and interfaith relations, as well as its experience in building the 
foundations for civic cohesion all can offer valuable insight to a number of European Union 
countries, particularly Germany, whose receiving societies are currently experiencing rapid 
changes in ethnic composition.
The format of this conference (presentations by experts followed by further discussions 
by all participants, as well as panel-based roundtable discussions) was instrumental in creat-
ing an open and constructive discourse and positive dialogue between Russian and German 
colleagues regarding contemporary migration policy and practice issues.
Notes
1. The conference was co-organized by St. Petersburg State University (Faculty of Political Science, 
Ethnopolitology Department); Center for Civil, Social, Scientific, and Cultural Initiatives “STRATEGIA”; the 
Friedrich Ebert Foundation in the Russian Federation; and the european forum for migration studies (efms) at 
the University of Bamberg. Financial support provided by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Russia.
2. EU basic principles of migrant integration:
(1) Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents 
of Member States. 
(2) Integration implies respect for the basic values of the European Union. 
(3) Employment is a key part of the integration process and is central to the participation of immigrants, 
to the contributions immigrants make to the host society, and to making such contributions visible.
(4) Basic knowledge of the host society’s language, history, and institutions is indispensable for integration; 
enabling immigrants to acquire this basic knowledge is essential for successful integration.
(5) Efforts in education are critical for preparing immigrants, and particularly their descendants, to be 
more successful, active participants in society.
(6) Access for immigrants to institutions, as well as to public and private goods and services, on a basis 
equal to national citizens and in a non-discriminatory way is a critical foundation for better integration. 
(7) Frequent interaction between immigrants and Member State citizens is a fundamental mechanism 
for integration. Shared forums, inter-cultural dialogue, education about immigrants and immigrant 
cultures, and stimulating living conditions in urban environments enhance the interactions between 
immigrants and Member State citizens.
(8) The practice of diverse cultures and religions is guaranteed under the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
and must be safeguarded, unless practices conflict with other inviolable European rights or with 
national law. 
(9) The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the formulation of integration 
policies and measures, especially at the local level, supports their integration. 
(10) Mainstreaming integration policies and measures in all relevant policy portfolios and levels of 
government and public services is an important consideration in public-policy formation and 
implementation.
(11) Developing clear goals, indicators and evaluation mechanisms are necessary to adjust policy, evaluate 
progress on integration and to make the exchange of information more effective. 
3. Despite the general rate of migrant children at schools being 1.6 percent (around 2,000 persons), some 
schools are comprised of up to 30 percent migrant students.
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Chapter 1  
 
The Phenomenon of New Immigration Countries: 
Russia’s Case in the European Context
Vladimir S. Malakhov
Abstract
The chapter compares Russia with other “new immigration countries.” The author uses the expression 
“new immigration countries” to refer to structures of public discourse rather than structures of social 
reality. It is not so much the actual situation but rather the perception of it. The current unwillingness of 
Russian society to recognize the fact that Russia is becoming an immigration country would seemingly 
indicate a relatively high level of xenophobia. 
By comparing Russia with other new immigration countries the author concludes that its singu-
larity lies not in a higher level of xenophobia (this assumption cannot be verified) but rather in (1) 
the absence of political actors articulating a pro-immigrant position, and (2) the lack of institutional 
mechanisms in place to counteract migrant-phobia. Other factors that contribute to the unique immi-
gration situation in Russia include the predominance of migration flows from post-Soviet areas over 
immigration from the so-called “far abroad”; large spatial disparities (immigration flows are attracted 
to a very limited number of areas, or “immigration magnets”); and existing interethnic tensions in the 
receiving society itself.
Keywords: migration, immigration, immigration policy, new immigration countries, uneven devel-
opment, regional characteristics, public discourse
Introduction. Understanding the Concept of  
“New Immigration Countries”
The expression “new immigration countries” emerged in connection with the transforma-
tion of certain labor-exporting countries into destinations of workers from other coun-
tries. The countries in question are Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland. Previously associat-
ed primarily with population emigration, by the 1970s, these nations began to attract large 
numbers of immigrants, while still maintaining their status as “emigration countries.” By 
the 1990s the list of “new immigration countries” had grown to include states in Eastern 
Europe (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary) as well as some countries beyond the 
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European continent. Yet, strictly speaking, “new immigration” is a subjective idea. Often 
the actual inflow of immigrants into a country can be quite strong, and yet the public fails 
to acknowledge it.
France is a good example of this phenomenon. It is widely believed that France is a 
classic ‘nation state’ in which the majority of the population is composed of autochthonous 
individuals (those of French origin). However, research conducted in the 1980s showed 
that France has, in fact, been an immigration country since at least the nineteenth century. 
The massive inflow of foreign workers into France, encouraged by the state, dates back to 
the era of Napoleon III (between 1848 and 1870). With the adoption of the French Third 
Republic in 1870, the immigration of workers became a systematic and targeted policy. 
Policymakers liaised with major businesses to encourage the immigration of thousands of 
workers and created legal conditions which would allow them to become French citizens. 
By 1920 France had a larger population of migrants than the US. For every hundred thou-
sand people, France had 515 foreign-born individuals, while in the US this figure was only 
492 (Noiriel 1996). Throughout the twentieth century France experienced a constant flow 
of newcomers who subsequently became French citizens. Consequently, by the end of the 
1980s one-fifth of all Frenchmen had at least one third-generation immigrant relative (a 
grandfather or a grandmother) (Ibid.). Despite this long-term growth of the immigrant 
population in France, neither public nor academic perceptions of immigrants changed. In 
contrast with well-known immigration countries (US, Canada, Australia), France contin-
ued to be viewed as a culturally homogeneous ‘nation state.’
A less dramatic example is the role that immigration processes have played in the evolu-
tion of the German state, beginning with the massive influx of people, mainly from Poland, 
during the period of industrialization from 1870 until the end of World War I. Then, in 
the years following World War II, Germany experienced another unprecedented wave of 
immigration. Over 14 million people came into Germany between 1945 and the 1980s 
(Sassen 1999). A significant number of these people were “ethnic Germans”1 (Aussiedler) 
from Romania, Russia, Kazakhstan, other USSR republics, and beyond, while many more 
arrived in Germany as “guest workers” (Gastarbeiter); neither of these groups were seen as 
immigrants per se.
Since the scale of immigration was evidently underestimated, this led to an illusion 
that Germany was indeed a nation state (Nationalstaat) and to a hot public debate on the 
pros and cons of its transformation into an immigration country. Millions of people who 
came from southern Europe, Turkey, and Yugoslavia were permanent residents, and yet 
legally, officially, and in the public mind, they were treated as guest workers residing only 
temporarily in the German territory. During the decade and a half after the organized re-
cruitment of foreign workers ended (in 1973–1974), the German people realized that most 
“guest workers” (and, of course, their children) intended to remain in Germany long-term; 
however, the bureaucratic machinery continued to treat this category of the population as 
a distinct group. The citizenship law effective until the end of the twentieth century did not 
allow for the social inclusion of newcomers and their descendants. At the beginning of the 
1990s, many German intellectuals attempted to alert politicians and the general public to 
the discrepancy between existing laws and the widespread perception of these guest work-
ers in society.2 Unfortunately, it was more than a decade before their message was acted 
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upon. A new citizenship law was enacted in 2000, and 2004 saw the implementation of a 
new law on immigration, one which partly recognizes Germany’s transformation into an 
immigration country (Hollifield 2004). These days, a public consensus on this transforma-
tion is gradually beginning to emerge; the nature of national community is beginning to be 
viewed in civic rather than ethnic terms.3
By contrast, in Japan less progress has been made toward self-recognition as a “new 
immigration country.” There, the dominating beliefs about the nation state (where “na-
tion” is defined in terms of ethnicity and race) have yet to be challenged (Anisimtsev 
2004). To date, the question of Japan being a “new immigration country” has been posed 
merely within academic circles with almost zero reflection in political and public debate 
(Tsuda 2006). 
Russian debate on immigration in the 2010s has much in common with the German 
discussions of the 1990s, specifically regarding the persistence of public opinion (domi-
nated by resistance to the very idea of immigration for settlement) and the polarization of 
views among the ruling class. On one hand, top officials are sending signals that indicate 
recognition of the transformation of Russia into an immigration country by acknowledg-
ing the country’s need for regular population inflows from abroad—not only of temporary 
workers, but also of future citizens. On the other hand, there is also clear opposition to 
this circumstance and, consequently, a focus on the model of temporary migration. This 
is evidenced by the appearance and regular use of the word Gastarbeiter in contemporary 
Russian language. As recently as the early to mid-1990s, the Russian language did not in-
clude this word.
As the examples of France, Germany, and Japan have shown, one common feature of 
“new immigration countries” is an unwillingness of their societies to accept immigration. 
This does not necessarily mean, however, that all of these countries are characterized by 
higher levels of xenophobia or migrant-phobia than longer-standing immigration coun-
tries. There is no definite correlation between anti-migration sentiments in a particular 
country and the novelty of immigration into it. For example, in an old immigration country 
such as France, the level of migrant-phobia is higher than in Sweden, which became an im-
migration country over a century later. Incidentally, the success of right-wing populists pro-
moting the idea of an immigration threat is far greater in France than in Sweden (Swedish 
Democrats only recently broke the 5 percent barrier, whereas France’s National Front has 
been setting new records in popularity, at times ranking second and third in municipal and 
national elections).
Social surveys support the assumption that there is an indirect link between the gravity 
of social and economic challenges and the degree of anti-immigration sentiments. For in-
stance, when confronted with a severe economic crisis, Greece exhibited quite high anti-im-
migration sentiments. Far-right movements that feature migrant-phobia as a part of their 
platforms are quite popular there.4 Spain, which is also facing serious economic problems, 
has comparatively low anti-immigration sentiments5 and still does not have a truly influ-
ential far right party (Howard 2009). Hungary does have a right-wing party with a tough 
anti-migrant agenda and, although Hungary’s economic situation is no worse than that of 
its neighbors, this party stands a chance of becoming influential. In other Eastern European 
countries including the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia and others, those who agree 
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with the views of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán do not enjoy nearly as much 
support.6
Now, what about Russia? The media continually reports high levels of anti-immigra-
tion sentiment but, contrary to widespread belief, these levels are far from critical; in fact, 
they are generally no higher than anti-immigration sentiments in many Eastern European 
countries.7 It is important to understand that Russian public opinion is greatly influenced 
by media manipulations. The percentage of Russians who agree with extreme anti-migrant 
sentiments depends greatly on the current position chosen by the central television chan-
nels. Within a period of months, anti-migration sentiments may vary from minimal to ex-
ceedingly high. A good example is the concern shown by the people of Moscow regarding 
the “migration challenge” in 2013. The percentage of survey respondents who considered 
this issue a priority rose significantly mid-year and continued to grow in response to esca-
lation of the issue by the media serving the pre-election campaign of the mayor. In 2014, 
the issue of migration disappeared from TV screens which, of course, influenced public 
opinion; the bulk of respondents no longer thought that migration and migrants were the 
source of all of Moscow’s troubles.8 
Hence, the key Russian issue is not the level of migrant-phobia. Instead, Russia has 
something that makes it different from other immigration countries: the absence of public 
stakeholders with pro-immigrant views. Of course, Russia has pressure groups seeking to 
benefit from maintaining the most “liberal” vector in immigration policy,9 as does every 
other country with a market economy. But these groups prefer to remain in the shadows 
and avoid any publicity. Ordinary citizens are only receiving messages about the need to 
combat illegal migration by toughening existing limits and prohibitions. Any participants 
in the public debate about immigration who voice an alternative opinion are deliberately 
marginalized.
Russia in the European Context
Russia stands out from other new immigration countries in a number of respects, outlined 
below. 
(a) Predominance of Post-Soviet Migrations 
 In recent years, between 80 and 83 percent of all immigration into Russia has been from 
post-Soviet countries. In other words, as it pertains to Russia, the phenomenon of immigra-
tion refers to geographic mobility within the territory of the former USSR.
This being the case, it is necessary to reevaluate the exaggerated assertion that Russia is 
the “world’s second-largest immigration system,” an idea established by UN officials using 
standard criteria in their assessment of the demographic situation in post-Soviet Russia. 
These criteria dictate that all individuals living for at least a year outside the country of 
their birth can be considered immigrants (United Nations 1998). For Russia in the first 
decade of the twenty-first century, this meant that people permanently living in the Russian 
Federation who were born in one of the republics of the Soviet Union are also immigrants. 
Including these people resulted in a total immigrant population of 12 million—the sec-
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ond-largest in the world (after the USA with its 38 million immigrants). But only half a mil-
lion out of this number originated from “far-abroad” countries (that is, outside the former 
Soviet Union or FSU) while the rest were former Soviet citizens (Table 1). Not only were 
they born in the same country as Russians, but they do not differ from them in an ethnic or 
cultural sense. The majority are ethnic Russians who left the Soviet periphery as a result of 
political and economic turbulence. 
Table 1. Russia’s Population by Place of Birth, 2002 and 2010
2002 2010
Thousands Percent Thousands Percent
Total population  145,166.7  100.0  142,856.5  100.0
Russian Federation  131,608.7 90.7  127,116.4  89.0
Other countries  11,976.8  8.3  11,194.7  7.8
including:  
Armenia  481.3  0.3  511.2  0.4
Azerbaijan  846.1  0.6  743.9  0.5
Belarus  935.8  0.6  740.9  0.5
Estonia  67.4  0.0  57.0  0.0
Georgia  629.0  0.4  436.4  0.3
Kazakhstan  2,585.0  1.8  2,481.9  1.7
Kyrgyzstan  463.5  0.3  573.3  0.4
Latvia  102.5  0.1  86.7  0.1
Lithuania  86.2  0.1  68.9  0.0
Moldova  277.5  0.2  285.3  0.2
Tajikistan  383.1  0.3  452.2  0.3
Turkmenistan  175.3  0.1  180.0  0.1
Ukraine  3,560.0  2.5  2,942.0  2.1
Uzbekistan  918.0  0.6  1,111.7  0.8
Other countries  466.2  0.3  437.5  0.3
Territory not indicated  1,581.2  1.1  4,545.5  3.2
Source: Author’s calculations based on Federal State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation (Rosstat), pro-
cessed by Nikita Mkrtchtyan (Mkrtchtyan and Karachurina 2013).
The predominance of natives from post-Soviet countries in immigration flows into 
Russia has become even greater in recent years. The share of migrants from far-abroad 
countries (China, Vietnam, Turkey) has been decreasing since 2007, dropping from 50 per-
cent to 15–16 percent (Florinskaya et al. 2015, 66).
(b) Spatial Disparities 
Another feature specific to Russia is huge geographical disparities. Moscow and St. 
Petersburg (including their regions) receive 80 percent of immigrants into Russia. There 
is a nearly identical pattern of internal migration and immigration: both Russians from 
depressed regions and foreign workers head for the same “migration magnets.” Again, the 
central and northwestern regions attract many more migrants than do other regions. In 
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2012, Moscow accounted for 20 percent of all work permits and 19 percent of purchased 
patents. The recruitment of highly qualified workers (who do not need a work permit) in 
Moscow is 86 percent (Florinskaya et al. 2015, 77). 
(c) Ethnic Diversity 
Last but not least is the multiethnic character of Russia’s population. Being the center of “the 
affirmative action empire” in the Soviet era, Russia developed a unique form of organizing 
the political environment through territorialization and institutionalization of ethnicity. Some 
regions of the Russian Federation are organized as “self-determined” territories of particular 
ethnic groups, in which the language and cultural rights of these groups are guaranteed by 
law. This means that immigrants coming, for example, to Tatarstan must study the Tatar lan-
guage, and those coming to Udmurtia must study Udmurt. The institutionalization of eth-
nicity has resulted in a perception that particular regions of the Russian Federation are terri-
tories “belonging” to certain groups. Of course, they are not legally owned by anyone other 
than “the multinational Russian people,” but in public perception, Chechnya is the land of 
Chechens, for example. Similarly, Adygeya is the land of Adyghs, and Dagestan is embraced 
by Avars, Lezgians, Kumyks, and over two dozen additional ethnicities living in an organized 
co-existence built on principles resembling “consociational democracy” (Kisriyev 2002). This 
situation makes social communication difficult between people from North Caucasus and 
local residents of Central Russia and West Siberia. There have been many conflicts between 
domestic “migrants” and locals when people living in predominantly ethnic Russian regions 
demanded that authorities “deport Caucasians” (actually, citizens of the same country) to 
their “historic homeland.” In Russia, then, attitudes described as migrant-phobia and usually 
addressed to immigrants are often aimed at Russian citizens. In other words, immigration in 
Russia involves the overlapping of immigration-related social and psychological problems, 
issues of interethnic tensions, and the internal antagonisms in society.
The Structure of Russian Public Discourse on Immigration
As previously mentioned, pro-immigrant sentiments are highly unpopular and tend to be 
marginalized. Conventionally speaking, these opinions can be considered to be either hu-
manistic or liberal-pragmatic (Malakhov 2014).
“Humanists” are focused on the moral aspects of migration including, but not limited 
to, inhuman treatment of migrant workers from the near-abroad; systematic discrimina-
tion; and the responsibility of the former imperial center with regard to immigrants from 
regions that were formerly a part of the Soviet Union. Humanistic viewpoints are typically 
held by human rights activists,10 as well as a short list of journalists11 and experts.12 Needless 
to say, their messages do not receive positive feedback in the sociocultural mainstream.
“Liberal pragmatists” discuss the ways in which immigration benefits both society and 
the state (with economic benefits considered first and foremost) and the shortsightedness 
of migration policies that prevent those benefits from being realized.14 While the liberal 
pragmatic viewpoint does not experience as much backlash as the humanistic one, neither 
does it enjoy wide support.
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On the contrary, anti-immigration viewpoints are deeply rooted and receive support 
from both officials and civil society. Anti-immigration rhetoric is expressed through three 
conventional concepts: modernizationist, conservative-statist, and culture-fundamentalist. 
Modernizers insist that the use of low-qualified immigrant workers resists changes in the 
Russian economy to meet new demands. Businessmen who have unlimited access to cheap 
labor performed by disenfranchised migrants have little incentive to make use of technolog-
ical upgrades and innovations. “Modernizers” are quite well represented, both in pro-gov-
ernment circles14 and among opposition politicians and journalists.15
Conservative statists focus on the national security threats associated with immigration 
including, but not limited to, criminal activity; the spread of dangerous diseases; tacit activ-
ities of foreign governments through diasporas; and the escalation of interethnic conflicts. 
For this reason, their utmost concern lies with the idea of permanent immigration; thus, 
they support only temporary migration (with the sole exception of highly qualified special-
ists).
Supporters of the cultural fundamentalist view are primarily concerned with preserving 
“cultural purity” (or “spiritual safety,” as they like to call it). It is the opinion of cultural fun-
damentalists that the diverse cultural backgrounds of immigrants are a threat to the cultural 
cohesion of Russian society. While the meaning of “cultural cohesion” in the context of the 
ethnic and confessional heterogeneity of Russian society is a concept in need of clarifica-
tion, supporters of cultural fundamentalism tend to avoid this and erroneously describe the 
Russian population as uniformly Orthodox Christian. 
Of course, there are no distinct margins separating these three viewpoints. Any one may 
adopt rhetoric of the other two.16 It is the primary goal of each that is the most important. 
Modernizers’ highest priority is the development of society and the economy (xenophobic 
overtones are a secondary element in their argumentation); the focus of conservative statists 
is to preserve the political status quo; and cultural fundamentalists are most concerned with 
conservation of Russian culture and the ethnocultural alienation of Central Asian migrants 
from the receiving population.17
Conclusion
Like all new immigration countries, Russia lacks a public consensus on both the need for 
immigration inflow and the necessity of migrant integration. Referencing a high degree 
of anti-migration sentiment among citizens, a significant number of elites are in favor of 
refusing migration from the outside (with the sole exception of a small number of highly 
qualified specialists). Large-scale acceptance of foreign workers is considered valid only in 
the form of temporary migration (as “guest workers,” or Gastarbeiter). Against this back-
drop, making sound political and legal decisions that would facilitate the social inclusion of 
newcomers is, at best, highly unlikely.
Migrants from the former Soviet Republics account for the bulk of immigration flows 
into Russia. This means that most external migrants are people who recently belonged to 
the same sociocultural space as current Russian citizens. While differences between Russian 
citizens and post-Soviet newcomers will certainly grow as time passes, for now they are 
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less severe that differences between immigrants into the European Union and the receiving 
populations there.
In many respects, Russia does not fit the model of the ‘nation state’ that has developed 
over the past 150 years in Western Europe. A former empire, Russia is much more polyeth-
nic (multinational) than even the most ethnically diverse European states. The main issue, 
however, is not population diversity but rather a lack of understanding of the nature of 
Russian statehood, both among members of civil society and the elites. What is the Russian 
Federation in its current form—a nation state, a peoples’ union (with ethnic Russians being 
the “state-building people”), or an empire? Fierce disputes over these definitions did not 
subside following the collapse of the USSR; and they became even stronger after political 
changes in the Ukraine.
This uncertainty about Russia’s political identity is evidenced in the way Russian cit-
izens treat migrants from post-Soviet republics. Some Russian people are critical of the 
sovereignty of countries that appeared as a result of the Belovezha Accords of 1991. These 
citizens uphold the image of Russia as a civilization center within the same frontiers as the 
Soviet Union, if not the Russian Empire. Further, the majority of Russian people today are 
deeply disapproving of migrants from former Soviet republics coming to work in Russia. 
By rejecting these people, Russians are triggering discourse about Russia as a nation state 
with distinct and well-protected borders. Yet, this nationalist discourse does not in any way 
match imperial perceptions. If Russia is to be an imperial center, it must be prepared for the 
influx of people from its periphery, and to exhibit imperialist behavior toward migrants; 
namely cultural openness and tolerance of differences. Unfortunately, it seems that this tol-
erance does not exist in Russian public opinion today.
Notes
1. As descendants of Germans (including those who left fragmented into numerous independent states 
Germany in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries), they were considered part of the German ethnic nation, 
often regardless of their limited German proficiency. De jure, this group was officially considered to be “reset-
tlers” rather than immigrants. De facto, however, most of these people faced the same adaptation challenges 
caused by differences in socialization that other immigrants did. 
2. In 1994, a group of German intellectuals published the fundamental Manifesto of the 60 urging the re-
view of the existing perceptions regarding the German national community (Bade 1994). See also: (Balke 1993; 
Leggewie 1993; Bade 1996; Schiffauer 1997).
3. This is evident in mass media, films and literature, academic discourse and the growing number of MPs 
with migration origins at all levels of governance. One example is My Work, My Language, My Country by Omid 
Nouripur, a German politician of Iranian origin (Nouripur, 2007).
4. The notorious Golden Dawn party openly advocated fascist ideals (the number of its mandates in parlia-
ment is not big, though, and after a criminal investigation into the killings of migrants revealed the involvement 
of Golden Dawn’s leaders, its ratings fell considerably). 
5. The recent available report by Pew Research Center shows that the number of Spaniards who believe that 
migrants are an asset to their country (47 percent) is greater than those who feel that migrants are a burden (46 
percent). In wealthy Germany the ratio of optimists to pessimists is 66 percent to 29 percent, and in troubled 
Greece this ratio is 19 percent to 70 percent (Pew 2014). See also (Malakhov 2015). 
6. The Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz) won the parliamentary elections in 2010. Having received the 
Prime Minister’s portfolio, its leader Viktor Orbán had a significant stake in deepening the refugee crisis that 
began at the end of summer 2015.
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7. Vladimir Mukomel presents some optimistic data obtained from social surveys in his book (Mukomel 
2013). 
8. It is significant that in the period of July through October, 2013 and again in November of that same year, 
the percentage of Russians who believed that illegal migrants from the near-abroad should be deported reached 
over 70 percent, and the percentage of those willing to aid in their legalization and assimilation dropped to 15 
percent. However, in July 2015 the percentages of those against and those in favor of migrants became equal (40 
percent each) (Gudkov and Pipiya 2015).
9. “Liberal” for this particular matter means closing one’s eyes to the wide scale of illegal employment.
10. The Center for Civic Action led by Svetlana Gannushkina, the Forum of Resettlers’ Organizations with 
its permanent president, Lidia Grafova, and Gavkhar K. Dzjuraeva, head of the information and law center 
Migration and Law, should also be included in this list. 
11. Almost all journalists covering migration issues from the humanistic standpoint contribute to the 
Novaya Gazeta or to the magazine Migration: XXI Century, or to the web editorial Gazeta.ru. See, e.g., (Zharkov 
2015).
12. See: (Abashin 2014; Tyuryukanova, Florinskaya and Azhgikhina 2012). 
13. Vyacheslav Postavnin, former deputy head of the Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation 
and current president of the foundation Migration: XXI Century, and Valery Tishkov, former Director of the 
Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, are two of the most prominent voices for this group (Postavnin 2013; 
Tishkov 2005). It is worth noting that liberal and pragmatic argumentation and humanistic views are not mu-
tually exclusive. For example, Tishkov has recently stated that Moscow residents should not only insist that 
migrants have to learn Russian but should also learn migrants’ languages themselves (this could facilitate inter-
ethnic consensus and the building of a tolerant environment). 
14. E.g., Valery Fadeyev, editor in chief of Expert magazine in Russia.
15. The most well-known among these include charismatic protest leader of the “creative class,” Alexey 
Navalny, colleague of assassinated politician Boris Nemtsov; leader of the Democratic Choice party Vladimir 
Milov; and popular columnist and radio presenter Yulia Latynina.
16. Such argumentation capacity is illustrated in the publications of Russian author and politician Mikhail 
Delyagin.
17. See publications by Mikhail Remizov and his colleagues from the Institute for National Strategy. 
There is a particularly strong focus on the Muslim identity of natives from this region with a total disregard of 
three aspects: (1) the degree of secularization that Central Asian societies underwent in the period from the 
1920s until the end of the 1980s; (2) the secular nature of the governments that appeared after 1991; and (3) 
the incomprehensive Islamization in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in the historic period preceding the Soviet 
times.
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Labor Migrants in the Context of Russian 




The chapter describes current demographic, economic, and social factors that affect flows of labor migra-
tion into the Russian Federation, as well as major trends in the transformation of the composition of labor 
migration from post-Soviet countries. For Russia, labor migration will be a key means of compensating 
for decreases in the labor force which are foreseen for upcoming decades. As a result, among traditional 
problems that migrants face at the local labor markets (access to the labor market, competition against 
local workers, and discrimination practices), one of the main challenges both for Russia and the sending 
countries is the inefficient use of the human capital of the labor migrants. At the same time, current mi-
gration policies do not include a comprehensive approach towards migration, and thus cannot overcome
the challenges the Russian society and economy will in both mid- and long-term perspectives. The author 
concludes with a justification of the fact that for Russia there are no other policy options but integration.
Keywords: labor migrants, adaptation, integration, labor market, employment, xenophobia, human 
capital, overqualification
Introduction
In the international community, addressing migration challenges has become very import-
ant for social and political stability and for the economic and demographic development of 
both the host and sending countries. The subject of the massive flows of labor migrants into 
Russia at the beginning of the century has become an integral part of the sociopolitical and 
economic environment and social discourse. 
There are several questions which must be considered when discussing migration. What 
are the trends of labor migration in Russia? To what extent are these trends determined by 
specific features of the economic and demographic development of the country? From a 
long-term perspective, what challenges connected to the inflow of labor migrants are the 
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most important for Russian society? What problems do migrants face in the labor markets? 
This paper will explore these issues.
Major Trends in Labor Migration in Russia in the 2000s
Russia is a major host country: there are approximately 11 million foreigners who are tem-
porarily or permanently living within its borders. This number does not change significant-
ly from year to year, but there are seasonal differences (Romodanovsky and Mukomel 2015, 
10). 
The vast majority of migrants come to Russia from the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS countries). Thirty-six percent of this group are young people between the ages of 
18 and 29. Taking into account that some foreign citizens come to Russia for other purposes 
(tourism, transit, business, and other short trips) and excluding those of unemployable age, 
we see that over two-thirds of the total number of migrants come here to work. 
Not until the 21st century did post-Soviet Russia begin to experience significant exter-
nal labor migration. In 2000, 213,000 foreign citizens were officially employed; in 2008 there 
were 2.4 million employees. 
Migration flows have undergone a rapid transformation in several ways. First, at the 
beginning of the century, about half of all labor migrants came from outside the CIS, but in 
2012 that number dropped to 8.1 percent. Changes in the structure of jobs and increasing 
demands for workers with various qualifications contributed to a change in the composition 
of migrants, and massive numbers of workers from Central Asia began to enter the Russian 
labor market. According to the Federal Migration Service, between 2000 and 2014 the per-
centage of Central Asian workers in Russia increased from 6.3 percent to 82.5 percent of all 
labor migrants from post-Soviet states (Figure 1).
Second, the seasonal pattern of labor migration has changed. Unlike previous years, 
in which there was a clear upsurge of labor migrant inflow in early spring and an exodus 
in autumn after the working season, inflow in recent years has remained stable in both 
spring and autumn. The peak period has shifted to September through October, when 
young migrants just out of schools and other educational institutions enter the Russian 
labor market.
Third, seasonal migration has been replaced by long-term and circular migration. 
According to a mass study of 8,500 foreigners, 40.8 percent are long-term (permanent) mi-
grants who have been in Russia for over a year. Thirty-eight percent are “circular migrants” 
who arrive and leave on a regular basis. A relatively new phenomenon first observed at the 
turn of the century, circular migration has now become a massive and likely irreversible 
process. As a result, seasonal migrants now account for an insignificant number of total 
migrants.2 
Fourth, labor migration is currently undergoing a process of “feminization.” Some 
migration flows are already dominated by women, specifically those from Moldova and 
Ukraine. The percentage of women is also increasing among migrants from Central 
Asia. 




























Figure 1. Percentage of Migrants from Central Asia among Official Foreign Employees in the 
Russian Federation, 2000–2014 (percent)1 
Source: (Romodanovsky and Mukomel 2015, 10).
Why Russia Needs a Foreign Workforce:  
Demographic, Economic, and Social Contexts
In Russia, there is a consistent and increasing demand for workers. The large-scale decline 
in the working-age population that began about fifteen years ago has created a new situation 
in local labor markets. The latest forecast (medium scenario) by the Russian Federal State 
Statistics (Rosstat) predicts that between 2016 and 2030 the population will increase by 0.9 
million, with the number of people of working age decreasing by 5 million. Massive migra-
tion is built into this forecast—net migration for this period is expected to be 4.9 million 
people (Figure 2). 
Deficits in the labor force cannot be remedied by demographic policy measures (even 
under the most favorable conditions, the results of recent policy changes will not be seen 
until 2025) or compensated for by an increase in labor productivity. Even very efficient de-
mographic policies would not ensure long-term population growth; according to the most 
optimistic (high) scenario by Rosstat, the maximum aggregate birth rate in 2030—1.833—
will not be enough to replace the population, much less increase it (Federal State Statistics 
Service of the Russian Federation 2015a). 
Migration must be a key means of compensating for the decreasing labor force and for 
preventing depopulation in Russia in upcoming decades. Migrants are attracted to Russia 
by higher salaries and standards of living,3 and by the availability of jobs. Even during the
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Figure 2. Dynamics of Total Population/Working Age Population, Net Migration Included, 
2016–2030 (Medium Scenario) (thousands)
Source: (Federal State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation 2015a).
current economic crisis, the overall unemployment rate in Russia has been quite low, in-
cluding in the regions that host maximum numbers of migrants.4 
However, in the process of solving the issues mentioned above, other serious social and 
cultural challenges are emerging: the majority of migrants come from patriarchal societies 
(primarily Central Asian states) with different cultural traditions and standards of behavior. 
These differences can irritate members of the host community, leading to widespread xe-
nophobic sentiments in Russian society that are mainly focused on migrants belonging to 
visible ethnic minorities. 
The massive inflow of ethnically-varied labor migrants will be a real challenge for Russia 
unless migrants can adapt to the Russian environment and integrate into society, especially 
if they plan to stay in Russia and raise a family there. Isolation of migrants from the host 
society can only lead to an increasingly negative attitude by the host community.
Current integration policy has some sociocultural conditions, such as the integrational 
potential of the host society, the adaptive capabilities of the migrants, and the practices of 
social interaction between the population and authorities of the host country and its mi-
grants. 
Along with specific measures aimed at the adaptation and integration of migrants, it 
is also necessary to educate host communities that express negative attitudes towards mi-
grants. When Russians are asked if their country needs migrants, and if yes, what kind of 
migrants—permanent, temporary, or both—most people reply that migrants are not needed 
at all. This negative sentiment was expressed by 39 percent of respondents; 26 percent were 
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in favor of temporary labor migration, and 15 percent supported permanent migration. 
Only 11 percent of Russians think that the country needs all kinds of migrants. Prohibition 
of permanent residency for migrants from other countries would be supported by 52.7 per-
cent of respondents and 45.8 percent would support a ban on temporary stays.5 
Nevertheless, there is no alternative to the current integration policy. The most sensitive 
problems for labor migrants—tough access to labor markets, discriminatory pay practices, 
poor working conditions—should be addressed in a more appropriate and responsible way. 
Migrants in the Labor Market
The main areas of economic activity for labor migrants are in wholesale and retail; con-
struction; and utility, social, and private services. Seventy two percent of occupations held 
by migrants are in these sectors.6 
In the Russian economy, retail, construction, social and utility services, hotels, and 
restaurants are the spheres of employment which are largely filled by labor migrants. There 
are several reasons for this. First, jobs in these fields are normally characterized by irregular 
working hours or otherwise inconvenient schedules. Second, most of these spheres offer 
lower salaries. Third, there are often unpleasant working conditions—hard, dirty, danger-
ous, and demeaning—and turnover rates are extremely high; in hotels and restaurants more 
than half and in retail and construction about half of employees are replaced within one 
year. Jobs in these areas are unpopular among the host population, which facilitates the 
employment of migrants. 
These days, however, employment of labor migrants is becoming more diversified, and 
they are more often taking jobs that they cannot leave immediately and return to after some 
time as, for example, in retail. Employers seek out workers who will remain on the job for 
longer periods. As a result, the behavior of labor migrants is becoming similar to that of 
Russians: if they value their job, they try to plan trips to their home countries that take into 
account both their own and their employer’s preferences, and their vacations do not exceed 
one to two months. 
A significant number of migrants perform jobs that do not require any special qualifi-
cations. Only 10 percent of Russian workers acquire jobs that do not require specific qual-
ifications, compared to over 40 percent of labor migrants from CIS countries. Of course, 
workers who do not have education, qualifications, work experience, and who either do not 
speak Russian or speak it poorly are not eligible for the best jobs. These are mainly labor 
migrants from Central Asian countries, and many of them have only a secondary education. 
It comes as no surprise, then, that more than the half of the migrants coming to Russia are 
employed under worse terms than in their home countries. The problem is that migrants 
who are indeed qualified specialists are often offered the jobs that do not require any qual-
ifications.
A number of foreign workers do have sufficient education, high qualifications, and work 
experience, but they generally are not sought-after in the Russian labor market. Seventy one 
percent of migrants who worked in their home countries perform different jobs in Russia; 
60 percent of them had to change their professional spheres. It is a shame that 34 percent 
of migrants with higher education and 45 percent with specialized/professional secondary 
education are engaged in work that does not require special qualifications (Mukomel 2013a, 
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30, 32). The problem of human capital underutilization is becoming relevant for Russia as 
well as for the sending countries.
In the EU countries where excess qualification (overqualification) of workers is con-
sidered to be a social and economic problem hindering the integration of migrants 
(Conclusions 2010), the overqualification rate7 among migrants from non-EU countries is 
35 percent for men and 38 percent for women (Huddleston, Niessen and Tjaden 2013, 55). 
According to the aforementioned study by HSE, in Russia the overqualification rate among 
male migrants is 82 percent and among female migrants, 79 percent.8 
The key factor influencing migrants’ downgraded job quality is unofficial employment 
in the absence of legal work permits. More than a half of labor migrants are employed unof-
ficially in Russia, and less than 40 percent of migrants have written contracts with employ-
ers (it needs to be said that many of the contracts that are in place have no legal validity).
There are many myths and stereotypes concerning labor migrants; for example, that 
they are willing to work for very little money. Multiple studies show that, as a rule, migrants 
earn as much overall as local workers. This is why they go to regions that offer good sala-
ries: the Moscow region, Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad Oblast, gas and oil-producing 
regions, and major industrial centers of the Urals-Volga region. It also explains why it is 
counterproductive to redirect them to other regions. The difference between migrants and 
local workers is that migrants must work much more intensively than local workers; their 
working week is around 60 hours long. The longest hours are in agriculture, retail, the hous-
ing and utilities sector, hotels, and restaurants, particularly for unqualified workers.
Another myth is that employers are interested in unofficial employment in order to save 
money on salaries. While there are without a doubt times when an employer would rather 
hire an illegal worker for a one-time, short-term, unqualified job (load a garbage truck, tidy 
up, etc.), these cases are exceptions. Before this year it was extremely difficult for entrepre-
neurs (especially in the small business sector) to legalize workers, and they were forced 
to hire illegal workers even at the risk of enormous fines. It is also unclear whether hiring 
illegal workers actually saves money; studies show that illegal workers earn approximately 
the same as legal employees.
A third myth is that migrants compete with local workers. A survey focused on labor 
migrants and Russians engaged in similar jobs demonstrated that most workers (both for-
eigners and Russians) believe that citizenship is not a determining factor for employment 
(Summary 2013).9 Professional qualifications, willingness to work for lower salaries, rec-
ommendations, and even speed of response are much more important. Some employers 
confirm this by saying that they would employ the most suitable candidates regardless of 
their citizenship. While the majority of Russians and labor migrants believe that there are 
no differences in their salaries, more than a third believe that Russians are better paid. Both 
groups agree that foreigners are more likely to be fired first (Table 1).
These days, relationships between Russian and foreign workers are quite stable and can 
be characterized as complementary rather than competitive. The only groups labor migrants 
can possibly compete with are internal migrants who are highly motivated and prepared to 
work hard.
A fourth myth is that migrants communicate exclusively with each other within the 
frameworks of diaspora organizations. In fact, according to surveys, over 70 percent of
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Table 1. Distribution of Answers to the Question “Who Would Be Fired First, among 
Russians and Foreigners?” (percent)
If the employer has to fire someone, who would that be, a Rus-
sian or a foreigner? Russians Foreigners Average
More likely to be a Russian 11.6 6.9 9.3
More likely to be a foreigner 37.5 44.4 40.8
It has nothing to do with their citizenship 50.9 48.7 49.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: (Summary 2013). 
them have never heard about official ethnocultural organizations. Just like Russians, they 
turn to their inner circles for help: family, relatives, and friends, and only after that to com-
patriots or to a mosque.
One last myth is that migrants who have limited Russian language proficiency work 
exclusively with their compatriots in closed groups. This is far from true; most migrants 
work either in mixed labor collectives (46.0 percent) or together with local workers (9.9 
percent). Their coworkers form an environment that helps them adapt to local realities and 
to the host population. Only 27.0 percent work with compatriots and 10.4 percent with mi-
grants from other countries, and 5.2 percent are self-employed. The most ethnically “sealed” 
sectors are likely agriculture (54.0 percent work with their compatriots) and construction 
(44.0 percent). 
Overall, migrants are enthusiastic about their future in Russia: 27 percent intend to stay 
in Russia permanently (one in three long-term migrants). Even among newcomers, every 
sixth or seventh of them demonstrates the same attitude. 
Conclusion
With regard to labor migrants in Russia, studies have defined several layers of problems 
whose solutions will require different approaches and changes in both legislation and law 
enforcement. These problems must be solved; otherwise the inflow of labor migrants com-
ing from societies with different cultural traditions and norms of communication will be-
come a monumental challenge for the country’s future. 
The transformation of migration flows accompanied by large-scale movements of 
permanent and circular migrants must be acknowledged. This, in turn, implies necessary 
changes in adaptation and integration policies and labor market regulation. Further, the 
“feminization” of migrant flows and growing numbers of children require that special atten-
tion be given to these socially vulnerable groups of migrants. Migration policy is becoming 
more closely related to social policy, which means the appearance of new functions and 
goals as well as new challenges.
According to the results of surveys by leading Russian sociological centers, xenophobic 
sentiments in Russian society decreased in 2014. With the introduction of patents for em-
ployment by individual persons in 2015, there appeared a new, quite pragmatic and trans-
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parent procedure for granting migrants access to local Russian labor markets, and condi-
tions are becoming more favorable for the adaptation of labor migrants and for the integra-
tion of those who plan to stay in Russia. 
The processes of adaptation and integration of foreigners are highly influenced by both 
institutional and non-institutional factors of socialization of the host society. Groups who 
have a stake in migration policy can both help and hinder the successful adaptation and 
integration of migrants. These groups include governmental and local authorities; business-
es (including shady entrepreneurs); and members of the receiving society, diaspora, and 
migrant networks. Developing an efficient migration policy implies taking into account 
the interests and distribution of powers of all groups, considering the realities of migration 
processes, and readjusting instruments of regulation depending upon the transformation of 
migration flows. 
Notes
1. The decline in the percentage of migrants from Central Asian countries in 2014 is explained by the 
increased number of Ukrainian and Moldavian citizens who obtained patents during that year. Since 2015 the 
legislation on legal employment of foreign citizens who come from countries supporting a visa-free regimen 
with Russia has changed. The assignment of quotas for work permits allowing employment by legal entities was 
replaced by patents for employment of foreigners by legal entities, in addition to so-called patents that allow 
official employment by private individuals. 
2. Social research and analysis of migration profiles, adaptation problems, and migrant integration for 
the National Research University “Higher School of Economics” (HSE) was carried out by the Center for 
Ethnopolitical and Regional Studies (CEPRS), guided by the author. 8,499 migrants in eight Russian regions 
were interviewed at the end of 2011. According to the Central Data Bank for Registration of Foreign Citizens 
and Stateless Persons, these regions accounted for 54 percent of migrants legally employed in the Russian 
Federation. For more information, see (Mukomel 2013b, 10). Hereafter, unless otherwise specified, the refer-
ences are to the present study.
3. In 2013, Russia was number 57 among all countries in the human development index, whereas most 
sending countries were in the second hundred: Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Moldova were in the 
133rd, 125th, 116th, and 114th places respectively (Human 2014, 226).
4. In Moscow in the first quarter of 2015 the unemployment rate calculated using an ILO method was 1.6 
percent, in the Moscow region 3.1 percent, in St Petersburg 1.9 percent (Federal State Statistics Service of the 
Russian Federation 2015b). These regions account for the half of migrants who have work permits. 
5. Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) Project, MegaFOM survey, October 2011, 24,500 respondents 
(Mukomel 2013b, 8–9). 
6. Classification according to the All-Russian Classifier of Types of Economic Activities (OKVED).
7. The overqualification rate is calculated as a share of workers taking jobs with low and medium qualifica-
tions (occupations in groups 4–9 of the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88) among 
workers with higher education (Huddleston, Niessen and Tjaden 2013, 72). 
8. In reality, due to the differences in educational systems, overqualification rates in Russia are even higher. 
(Among migrants in Russia only those with at least some higher education were included, while in the EU coun-
tries they additionally considered those with tertiary education—an analogue of Russian professional secondary 
education.)
9. Survey by the Center for Ethnopolitical and Regional Studies (CEPRS) and the Center for Social and 
Labor Rights (CSLR), respondents: 750 Russian workers and 750 labor migrants. The survey was carried out by 
Levada-Center in May–June 2013 in 22 Russian regions using the method of CEPRS and CSLR.
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Transnational Migration in Russia  
and the Potential for Integration1
Sergey N. Abashin
Abstract
This chapter highlights modern labor migration from Central Asia to Russia within the framework trans-
nationalism. The author focuses on such attempts of maintaining transnational ties as circular trips, the 
cultivation of the idea of “home” and “return”, maintaining of various types of communication, as well as 
transfers of money, and gifts. The author comes to the conclusion that integration practices are not exclud-
ed from the repertoire of strategies of migrants coming from Central Asia, and possibly in the future they 
will become dominant. For now, these migrants maintain strong ties with countries of origin, and they are 
investing significant financial, social and emotional resources to support them.
Keywords: migration, transnationalism, integration, mobility, cross-border transfers, Central Asia
Introduction
In Russia in 2014, amendments were made to the Federal Law On the Legal Status of Foreign 
Citizens in the Russian Federation,2 to introduce a Russian language and Russian history ex-
amination requirement for migrants seeking a work permit. It is my assertion that this type 
of examination is an essential tool needed to help attract migrants and integrate them into 
Russian society. 
Since the State Migration Policy Concept of the Russian Federation through to 20253 
was approved in 2012, this idea has been the official rhetoric of the Russian authorities. 
This Concept declared that foreign migrants should be welcomed as “one of the sources for 
population increase” in the country and as a source for satisfying “the needs of the Russian 
economy” for “workers in priority groups in terms of profession and qualification.” Further, 
the Concept stated the necessity to “create an infrastructure that helps adapt and integrate, 
including centers for informational and legal support, and courses of Russian language, 
history and culture.”
Russian migration policy is primarily focused on efforts to attract, legalize, and inte-
grate migrants; however, it would also be good to take into account their interests, plans and 
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strategies. It is my belief that integration discourse in Russia embraces a number of unclear 
assumptions and expectations based on a widespread belief that migrants from Central Asia 
will necessarily strive to stay in Russia permanently in order to receive the social benefits 
available in a more developed country. A sound integration strategy will become a neces-
sary means of incorporating newcomers into a new environment. 
However, reality clearly contradicts such assumptions. Even Central Asian migrants 
who have lived in Russia for several years do not demonstrate any distinct wishes to immi-
grate to Russia and become Russian citizens. Moreover, all of their practices and narratives 
are focused on maintaining close relations with their countries of origin, to which they 
definitely plan to return after a certain period of time. These migrants do not want to give 
up their identities; they choose continuous mobility and have no desire to assimilate into 
Russian culture and society.
A number of anthropologists specializing mainly in migration from Latin regions 
(South America and the Philippines) to the United States have proposed the term “trans-
nationalism” to refer to the contradiction between the concept of the migration phenome-
non, on one hand, and actual migration practices on the other. Nina Glick Schiller and her 
colleagues defined transnationalism as “… the processes by which immigrants build social 
fields that link together their country of origin and their country of settlement. We call this 
process ‘transnationalism’ to emphasize that today many immigrants are building a social 
sphere that expands beyond geographic, cultural and political boundaries (...) The main 
element of transnationalism is the variety of involvement options that a transmigrant has 
both at home and in the host societies” (Basch, Glick Schiller, and Blanc-Szanton 1994, 8). 
In this chapter I propose that the concept of transnationalism has merit as either an 
additional or alternative model of studying foreign labor migration in Russia.4 Using the 
example of migration from Central Asia, I intend to draw attention to well-known facts 
regarding migration that, in my opinion, do not quite fit into the analytic discourse of inte-
gration expectations. 
My task is to redirect the research focus for integration strategies toward maintaining 
transnational relations. The term “transnational relations” refers to circular trips (the con-
cepts of “home” and “return”); types of communication; and transfers of money, images, and 
presents. The facts considered in my research were gathered from the following sources: offi-
cial statistics published by the Federal Migration Service and the Central Bank of the Russian 
Federation; recent publications on migration in Russia; and observations and interviews 
with migrants and their families conducted by me and my colleagues during a project enti-
tled “Transnational and Translocal Aspects of Migration in Modern Russia” (Abashin 2014). 
Trends and Specific Features of Transnational Migration from 
Central Asia
Desire to Stay
One question to consider is whether survey answers provided by migrants regarding their 
willingness to permanently immigrate to Russia can be taken at face value. In other words, 
how often do migrants who express a desire to settle permanently in Russia actually follow 
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through? We encounter a number of difficulties when interpreting and comparing existing 
sources. 
Some surveys (conducted with migrants of different backgrounds) show that approxi-
mately 27 percent of migrants indicated that they would like to stay in Russia permanently 
(Mukomel 2012, 254). However, it is doubtful whether the answer to a simple survey ques-
tion can be considered an actual decision that will be carried out. Many factors must be 
considered when making any decision involving a major lifestyle change. Circumstances 
often change during the decision process, necessitating a change in plans. This is true for 
those who, according to surveys, plan to “stay in Russia,” as well as for those who indicate 
that they do not have such plans. Extended interviews with labor migrants from Central 
Asia show that they tend to be constantly searching for the best situation, and thus change 
their plans often. We must also take into account that the actual behavior of a person may 
be the result of complex interactions within their cultural networks (influences of common 
behavioral norms; opinions of relatives, friends and family; and the general interest of the 
family) rather than their own desires. This is particularly true of migrants from villages, 
small towns, or city suburbs in Central Asia.
One factor influencing willingness to immigrate permanently may be that migration is 
a collective family decision. Statistics provided by the Federal Migration Service (Table 1) 
indicate that in general, migrants from Central Asia consist of a relatively high number of 
young men compared to women, children, and aged persons.5 It should be noted, however, 
that not all of them are labor migrants and that they are of different ethnicities from within 
the Central Asian region. These statistics illustrate that individual migration by young men 
is more prevalent than family migration, a fact that is also confirmed by data gathered from 
observations and interviews. One notable exception is Kyrgyzstan; because women in this 
Central Asian country are less controlled, twice as many women migrate from here than 
from other areas of the region. 
Table 1. Total Number of Migrants from Central Asia to Russia (Data from August, 4, 2013, 
August 4, 2014, and August 6, 2015) (millions and percent)
Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan
2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015
Total 0.54 0.59 0.52 1.06 1.17 0.98 2.3 2.55 2.13
Under 17 years 10% 15% 18% 7% 12% 12% 5% 6% 7%
18 to 29 years 37% 46% 46% 35% 48% 47% 32% 47% 47%
Over 55–60 years 3% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1% 1% 3% 1.5% 1.5%
Women 40% 35% 40% 16% 14% 16% 18% 17% 18%
Source: Author’s calculations based on data of Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation.
Often some members of a family will migrate, while others remain in their home coun-
try. Even those women and children that could be considered as family members in migra-
tion, cannot be described as proper family migration. Married couples sometimes migrate 
to Russia with some of their children, while leaving other children at home in the care of 
relatives. These cases cannot truly be considered “family migration.” Migration statistics 
show a higher number of “children”—especially boys aged 15–17 who come to Russia to 
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work, and should thus be defined as labor migrants. Many sociological and anthropological 
studies of migrant women have indicated that a large number of them are divorced (either 
officially or virtually), widowed, or single. The latter is particularly true among Kyrgyzstani 
women (Tyuryukanova and Abazov 2009, 27–32; Tyuryukanova and Florinskaya 2011, 
34–49; Kasymova 2012).
It can be said that most migrants are focused on creating and maintaining families in 
their home countries, even when they are away from home. For young single men, trips to 
Russia are a part of life; experience and money earned during periods of migration demon-
strate maturity and readiness of young men to create their own families. Wedding rituals 
include expenses covered by those earnings and are symbols of their “stay there (in Russia)” 
(Rahmonova-Schwarz 2012, 103–119). On the contrary, for marriage-eligible girls from 
Tajikistan (with the exception of Pamiri Tajik women)6 and Uzbekistan migration is regard-
ed as risky in terms of marriage strategies, so their stays in Russia are strictly limited. Again, 
Kyrgyzstani girls are the exception. Their behavior is not as strictly controlled, and they 
sometimes start families with other migrants while living in Russia. 
Return of Migrants
A key indicator of the transnational character of migration is the regularity and duration of 
the “migrate/return home” cycle. Because there are no reliable “migration cycle” statistics 
available from official sources, statistical assessment of this phenomenon is provided by sur-
veys. In his research, Vladimir Mukomel specifies three categories of migrants (regardless of 
their countries of origin) (Mukomel 2012, 239–240): 
•	 permanent, who “almost never leave Russia, with the exception of rare trips to their 
homelands”
•	 circular, i.e. “regularly coming to and leaving Russia” (including seasonal migrants) 
•	 newcomers
In Mukomel’s survey, 40.8 percent of respondents fell into the permanent migrant cat-
egory; 38 percent (including 11.6 percent seasonal) were classified as circular; and 21.2 
percent were newcomers. He suggests that approximately 8–9 percent of circular migrants 
were unaccounted for in the survey because they were in the “return home” phase of the 
migration cycle (Mukomel 2012, 241). The problem with this classification system and the 
resulting numbers is that permanent migrant status required only a one-year period of con-
tinuous residence in Russia. In reality, a single year may not be long enough to differentiate 
circular migrants from permanent ones, since circulation can involve longer periods or be 
uneven in time. 
Interviews and observations indicate that migrants from Central Asia demonstrate 
great variations in the frequency and duration of their trips to Russia. Almost all migrants 
return home from time to time, with the vast majority doing so once every twelve to eigh-
teen months. Studies show that this is true, with some variations, for family migrants, mi-
grants with permanent jobs, and even those who have already obtained Russian citizenship. 
The idea of eventually returning to the homeland is a key concept in the Central Asian 
migrant narrative. It serves to justify difficulties and humiliations, and to reinforce the bo-
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nuses they will receive in the end. I would note that the idea of returning home is not unre-
alistic. There is a considerable amount of return migration, whether as a result of successful-
ly reaching their goals or of any of a number of negative circumstances, such as illness, old 
age, family circumstances (for instance, death of a parent at home and the obligation to take 
care of the other one), or deportation and the subsequent ban on reentry into Russia. There 
is also a periodical rotation of migrants: one returns home only to be replaced in Russia by 
his children or younger brothers. 
The concepts of home abandonment and the need to return home are perpetuated by 
pressure from the outside. In contrast to official declarations to attract foreigners, rhetoric 
by the public, politicians, and mass-media in Russia presents migration as negative and 
migrants as “strangers” or “guests” that the country ideally should get rid of. Local popula-
tions remind foreigners that they will never belong here. Politicians and authorities from 
migrants’ home countries are also concerned about maintaining control over people leaving 
the country—for example, public figures from Central Asian states more and more often go 
to Russia to propagandize. Official rhetoric in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan dictates that mi-
gration is a temporary and unfavorable phenomenon, and that migrants should eventually 
return home. In Uzbekistan, the topic of migration is a taboo in public spaces, which is an 
indication of the predominantly negative connotations of this phenomenon.
Money Transfers
Transnational relations are not merely represented by back and forth movements between 
countries, but are also maintained through intensive cross-border communication, remit-
tances, and the transfer of goods and images.
According to labor migrants, their main purpose for migrating to Russia is to earn mon-
ey to send home. It is the opportunity to earn more (and send as much as they can back to 
their home countries) that makes exchanging sedentary life for mobility worthwhile. Living 
and working strategies employed by migrants while in the host country are geared toward 
maximizing income while minimizing expenses. These strategies apply to activities such 
as searching for work, renting accommodations, and paying for food, entertainment, and 
transportation. 
Official statistics presented by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Table 2) 
show a rapid growth in money transfers (excluding cash and unofficial transfers) by indi-
viduals from Russia to Central Asia in 2012–2013. This growth is a result of increases in 
both the number of migrants and size of their income. The increase in migrants’ incomes 
served as a direct incentive for many other residents of Central Asian countries to search 
for employment in Russia and to stay there as long as possible. It should be noted that this 
factor is unsustainable and reversible. If incomes decline (as happened in 2014 following the 
devaluation of the ruble), many migrants may choose to return home, and many potential 
migrants may opt to avoid the risk and stay at home.
Transferring money back home is a priority task for migrants. These funds are accumu-
lated for many years and are regarded as strategic investments for the future. They may be 
used to launch a business in the home country (or between countries); to pay for children’s 
education; or to increase property capitalization by buying a car, a plot of land, a house or 
a flat, or by property renovation or construction (Zotova 2012; Reeves 2012). These kinds
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Table 2. Transfers by Individuals from Russia to Central Asian Countries, 2012–2014 
(billions of US dollars) 
Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan
Years 2012 2013 2014 2012 2013 2014 2012 2013 2014
Transfers, total 1.86 2.1 2.06 3.65 4.17 3.85 5.69 6.69 5.65
Transfers by non-residents 0.69 1.13 1.19 2.55 3.31 3.01 4.88 5.84 4.89
Source: (Central Bank of the Russian Federation 2015).
of spending are seen as socially important, normative, and obligatory for confirming and 
reinforcing personal and family status. Money is sometimes spent in a very emphatic and 
redundant manner, indicating that “prestige” can be much more important than functional-
ity (Ilkhamov 2013; Rubinov 2014). Having spent years in Russia in very poor housing con-
ditions with limited privacy (Brednikova and Tkach 2010; Rocheva 2015), migrants dream 
of buying their own, more luxurious property. Such disproportion between what they have 
at the moment and what they plan to get adds to their determination not to spend the mon-
ey in Russia but rather spend their earnings in their home countries.
The social dimension of money transfers is directly related to the topic of communica-
tion and exchange between the migrant and his family in his home country. Economic ben-
efits are not the only motivation for people to leave their homes. Other motivating factors 
include seeing new places, having new experiences, solving family problems, and escaping 
the control they may have experienced at home. Along with money transfers, they actively 
transfer goods and gifts, symbols, and images, and share experiences, pictures, and memo-
ries via telephone or Internet communication. The practice of inviting Russian friends and 
employers to visit the home country may also be considered a transfer of symbols of “pres-
tige”; however, this requires further study. Each type of communication reinforces trans-
national relations and evokes emotion and a sense of intimacy, even at long distances. It is 
worth noting that such communication is facilitated, for example, by low mobile service 
rates offered especially for labor migrants by Russian mobile providers that usually have 
branches in Central Asian countries.
Social Relations with People at Home
The topic of transfers leads us to a key question—what social significance does migration 
have in the migrants’ sending societies in Central Asia? This question is not really relevant 
to the concept of integration, but it is a very important part of the concept of transnation-
alism. The ‘Russo-centric’ viewpoint is focused on how migrants enter existing migrant 
communities in Russia, how they interact with members of these communities, and what 
new relationships they develop. The extent of migrants’ inclusion (and exclusion) in these 
communities is important to the integration agenda, but the indicators of these extents 
remain disputable (Demintseva and Peshkova 2014; Varshaver, Rocheva, Kochkin and 
Kuldina 2014). 
Conversely, the agenda of transnationalism is based on the question of what position 
and networks migrants maintain in their home country and how they reintegrate upon 
returning home. Understanding this reintegration allows us to see the life, behavior and 
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identity of the migrants more vividly, from different angles and perspectives. Migrants not 
only keep in touch with family and friends at home, transfer money, visit home, and plan to 
return at some point, but they also remain active members of the community (or communi-
ties) they belonged to before migrating. They may even maintain very important positions 
there, despite the fact that they are not physically present. Such membership can be partially 
explained through the concepts of obligation, competition, and networking. 
A trip to another country is one part of a set of obligations that migrants have toward 
their relatives. They are obligated to provide their families with everything they might need. 
In the case of young men, this is a considered a social duty or commitment—a need to 
demonstrate their “manhood” to the community by facing difficulties (like a rite of initi-
ation) in order to prove that, for instance, they are ready to create and support their own 
families (Massot 2013). Today such commitments are a part of the socialization process for 
all community members. Young men are encouraged to fulfill them, and are criticized if 
they refuse. Migration now plays an important role in fulfillment of these obligations and is 
regarded as a cultural norm, even by small children. 
Participation in migration can be viewed as social competition in the migrants’ home 
community. Desire to earn more and in order to afford more “prestigious” and “fashionable” 
belongings becomes a sort of game, and each community member wants to participate to 
test their abilities and best (or at least tie) the others. A neighbor or relative who has become 
successful as a result of migrating becomes a role model for other migrants, and an unsuc-
cessful one helps him to justify his own competence and success. Through this ’concept of 
competition’ the community accepts the migrant’s model of behavior and strives to compete 
by engaging in cross-border movement, keeping up communication so that every member 
can see, assess, and compete with others even at a distance. 
Finally, it is necessary for migrants to remain invested in their social status at home not 
only to maintain their good names, but also to reinforce and possibly extend those social 
networks (family, neighborhood, friendships, etc.) to which they belong. These networks 
consist of various relationships involving mutual attachment, trust, and willingness to help 
one another. Not only do they provide guaranties of support, both for migrants in case of 
their return, and families at home, but they also serve to support migrants while they are 
away from home, where these networks “follow” them (Fofanova and Borisov 2013). We 
can see some interesting dependencies here. For example, the more legal issues migrants 
face regarding working and living in Russia, the more they need the support of their social 
networks from home. Therefore, it is to their benefit that they invest more money and effort 
into maintaining their membership in those networks back in Central Asia. 
The transnational perspective allows us to see close relations between the migrant and 
his native community as well as the connection between relatives and friends in both his 
home and host countries. Even those who have never migrated or who no longer do so, who 
lost their jobs in Russia, or have been banned from entry in some sense also live a “migrant” 
life. They depend on money transfers from migrants and even compete for the right to re-
ceive and spend this money. They receive images and goods that come from other countries 
(mainly Russia); these images both attract and disturb them. They keep a close eye on what 
is happening “there,” where their relatives live or where they may go at any moment. At the 
same time, migrants returning home share a variety of migration experiences from Russia, 
40 SERGEY N. ABASHIN
Kazakhstan, South Korea, Turkey, and Arab and European countries, among others. These 
experiences are compared and discussed; each has its own value, both material and symbol-
ic, and its own characteristics of time and communication.
Conclusion
One question that still needs to be addressed is whether the concept of transnationalism can 
replace the concept of integration, or whether the two concepts are complementary. It may 
be the case that transnationalism better describes some features of the transition between 
the home country and location of migration, when a migrant is no longer at home, but is 
not integrated into the new society. 
Despite the fact that the transnational lifestyle involves close relations between migrants 
and their home countries, integration practices are still on considered important strategies 
for Central Asian migrants. They learn the Russian language, explore urban and rural spac-
es, and develop relationships with the local population. Some even become Russian citizens. 
Members of Russian society are also gradually adjusting to migrants living amongst them, 
and interact with them despite political and public discussions of migration which include 
strong xenophobic sentiments. 
Transnational practices themselves are very diverse and unstable, varying in both in-
tensity and duration.7 Proponents of transnationalism do not deny these facts, but rather 
emphasize the need to take them into account and to study all connections that migrants 
have in both their home and host countries. In this paper I have placed more focus on con-
nections with the home countries because these connections have not been closely exam-
ined in migration studies thus far. 
We should also remember that large-scale migration from Central Asia to Russia is rela-
tively new, so we cannot speak of sustainable trends. The factors that impact processes from 
economics and demography to politics and culture are very diverse, and each has its own 
multidirectional fluctuations. It is likely that we can expect, in nearly equal amounts, an in-
crease in the obstacles for migrants entering Russia as well as a cumulative effect, occurring 
when migrants stay in Russia on a massive scale and bring their families. The latter is quite 
possible with the next generation of migrants from Central Asia. 
Moreover, it is notable that behavior models of migrants from different countries and 
regions vary considerably. For example, migrants from Kyrgyzstan demonstrate more will-
ingness to integrate into Russian society than those from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. We can 
assume that after some time we will see more fractional differentiation among them, and 
various population groups will develop migration strategies in very different ways.
Taking all of these issues into account, we can make the following statement: at this 
time, migrants from Central Asia have more or less maintained long-term employment 
and residence in Russia, while at the same time maintaining (and not breaking) very di-
verse, regular and intensive relations with their home countries, with the rhetoric of “re-
turn” being dominant. The strategy of Central Asian migrants is based on preserving and 
even intensifying those relations with home, and they invest considerable material, social, 
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and emotional resources into this practice. The strategy of full integration into the Russian 
society, in turn, exists in certain form, but is less relevant. 
In my opinion, this situation is best described in terms of the concept of transnational-
ism, which has been successfully applied to migration activities all over the world. Viewing 
Central Asian migration into Russia from a transnational perspective allows us to see it 
as less predetermined and more open for multidirectional changes, less dependent on the 
policies of any one country, and more complex from the point of view of the interests of mi-
grants themselves, whose personalities and different life contexts are becoming increasingly 
important for understanding migration processes. 
Notes
1. This chapter is based on a collective research on «Transnatsionalnye i Translokalnye Aspekty Migratsii v 
Sovremennoy Rossii» [“Transnational and Translocal Aspects of Migration in Contemporary Russia”] (headed 
by Dr. Sergey Abashin) that is carrying out at European University at St. Petersburg (St. Petersburg, Russia) as a 
part of the Russian Science Foundation grant No. 14–18–02149, 2014–2016. 
2. Federal Law of the Russian Federation № 357 On Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian 
Federation (the Amendments of November 24, 2014). 2014. Rossiiskaya Gazeta [Russian Newspaper], November 
27. Accessed May 2, 2015. http://www.rg.ru/2014/11/27/inostr-dok.html.
3. State Migration Policy Concept of  the Russian Federation through to 2025. President of Russia. 2012. 
Accessed March 18, 2015. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/15635.
4. In foreign historiography, the concept of transnationalism is actively applied to post-Soviet countries. For 
example, see Rahmonova-Schwarz (2012). 
5. In the sex-age structure of the Central Asian countries women account for approximately 50 percent, 
children under 14 years—around 30–35 percent, young men from 15 to 30 years—around 30percent, retirees 
over 60 years—around 4–5 percent (Sherbakova 2014).
6. In Pamir (Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region of Tajikistan) the Ismailism branch of Islam is dom-
inant; it allows less strict rules for women than in other branches. 
7. See the critics of the concept of transnationalism for lack of attention to these factors (Waldinger 2015).
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Recruiting and Regulating Policies:  










The chapter examines the side effects of internal market policies pursued by EU institutions and the threat 
that they pose to working conditions and labor standards. Based on the results of a three-year project 
with labor inspectors, the author concludes that monitoring cross-border labor posting and recruitment 
through external service providers is problematic. Non-compliance, a lack of cross-border competence 
and cooperation, the difficulty of tracing circumvention in cross-border situations, and the weakness of 
the existing sanctioning mechanism all have led to frustration on the part of rule-enforcing institutions 
and other stakeholders.
Keywords: EU internal market, economic freedoms, freedom of establishment, free provision of ser-
vices, posting of workers, labor inspectorate, labor standards, cross-border labor recruitment
Introduction
Since the European Community’s inception, its member states have developed joint notions 
on social policy. Following the creation of the Internal Market project in the mid-1980s, 
the European Commission argued that joint flanking social policies were needed to ensure 
social cohesion in this market project dominated by economic and financial reasoning. 
This chapter presents selected parts of the social acquis that are relevant for the trans-
national recruitment of labor; in particular, rules concerning social security coordination 
and the pay and working conditions of temporary posted workers.1 It examines key issues 
related to the freedom of establishment for firms, the deregulation of the “business envi-
ronment” and the free provision of services. Given the problematic relationship between 
economic freedoms and workers’ rights in a context of cross-border labor recruitment, it 
is questionable whether the aim to balance short-term economic and financial concerns 
against longer-term imperatives of expanding employment opportunities and of ensuring 
social progress has been achieved. A final section addresses problems regarding the depri-
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vation and the enforcement of social rights and recent European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
judgments that might lead to a clarification of some of the problems.
The EU Acquis Relevant for Transnational Labor Recruitment
Social Security and the Free Movement of Workers
A key provision of the 1957 Treaty of Rome,2 which established the European Economic 
Community (EEC), was the free movement of citizens and workers (Articles 48–51). The 
Treaty laid the basis for the rights of residence, labor, and equal treatment for all European 
citizens within all member states. This granted European citizens the right to seek employ-
ment in any other EEC member state. The guiding principle for free movement was lex 
loci laboris, which means that the regulations of the new country of residence would apply. 
Workers coming from other member states obtained the right to be treated equally as na-
tional workers in the host country (Cremers 2012). 
Though the form and contents of social security provisions are at the discretion of the 
individual member states, the coordination of national social security schemes became one 
of the first regulated fields of cooperation related to rights of free movement in the EEC 
(1958).3 This coordination is based upon the principle that persons moving within the EEC 
(now EU) are subject to the social security scheme of only one member state. The EU legis-
lator revised the rules for this coordination in a renewed framework (Regulation 883/20044 
and its Implementation Regulation 987/20095) beginning on 1 May 2010, but the premise 
remained that workers are subject to the rules of the country where the work is performed. 
Workers who move to another EU member state have the right to benefit from social securi-
ty programs as if they are citizens of that state (though benefits may not be obtained during 
the first three months of stay). 
One exception to this principle was included in the 1971 regulation (Regulation 
1408/716) regarding the “posting” of workers, a practice by which workers temporarily stay 
in another member state in order to provide services, but remain subordinate to the posting 
company in their home country. As a result, posted workers remained bound by the regula-
tions of their home country during their posting period, so that only one country’s legisla-
tion applied (Regulation 1408/71, article 14.1.a; now Regulation 883/2004,7 article 12.1). EU 
legislators decided during the 2004 revision to extend the maximum posting period from 
twelve to twenty-four months.
The relationship that has been constructed between posting and the free provision 
of services has made posting a significant option with regard to “regime shopping”8 tac-
tics aimed at obtaining lower social security payments. The link between the coordina-
tion of national social security systems and the framework for the temporary provision 
of services has led to a series of debates about the application of home country versus 
host country legislation. This is especially relevant for workers from EU countries who 
temporarily pursue activities in (several) EU member states other than their country of 
origin. Early indications of the practice of bypassing applicable rules through the estab-
lishment of letterbox companies led to questions related to the role of cross-border labor 
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recruitment in an open labor market, and to the (im)possibility of maintaining the lex 
loci laboris principle in the field of labor law and pay. Posting has become part of a “ma-
trix of complex, semi-legal and outright unlawful employment arrangements involving 
cross-border contracts” (Clark 2012).
Key questions remain as to whether the social security institution in the host country 
has the capacity and the competence to judge the bona fide standing of the posting, and 
whether a posting company can be defined as a genuine company with a registered office 
or place of business and real activities in another country. EU rules in the field of social 
security coordination refer to a business undertaking that ordinarily performs “substantial 
activities, other than purely internal management activities, in the territory of the Member 
State in which it is established, taking account of all criteria characterizing the activities 
carried out by the undertaking in question” (Article 14.2, Regulation 987/2009). 
The European Commission elaborated upon this in a practical guide (2011). For in-
stance, the expression “which normally carries out its activities there” refers to a business 
undertaking that ordinarily carries out substantial activities in the territory of the EU mem-
ber state in which it is established. If the undertaking’s activities are confined to internal 
management, the undertaking will not be regarded as normally carrying out its activities in 
that EU member state. 
Enforcement of these rules requires the transnational cooperation between competent 
authorities in all countries involved (including the home and host countries; a third country 
is often involved when the sending country is not the same as the home country). There 
must be a broad mandate and horizontal competences of the controlling bodies, sometimes 
beyond the border of their own discipline (social security, pay, contract and company law, 
and often taxation). It presumes the existence of reliable databases (to check compliance 
of social security rules and to research necessary information regarding labor standards, 
among others) and the installation and adequate functioning of institutions that supply 
information, prevent fraud, and monitor regularity. The EU has developed an electronic 
system (IMI) that may be used, but in practice the system can only facilitate the exchange 
of rather limited data. Control of posting regularity and the collection of evidence and sup-
porting documents are still hindered by poor registration and the lack of necessary compe-
tencies of the host country.
Pay and Working Conditions 
For pay and conditions of employment in the case of EU labor migration, the lex loci laboris 
principle is the starting point, and discrimination on the basis of nationality is prohibited. 
In theory, this means that workers who come on their own initiative to work in a country 
other than their country of origin have the same rights as citizens of the host country. They 
have the same possibilities deriving from these rights, whether through collective represen-
tation such as union membership or individual action. In practice, however, different forms 
of cross-border recruitment and temporary work abroad have been introduced which have 
created inequalities among workers. In some areas, EU legislation has been recently re-
newed, notably with regard to seasonal and third-country workers. And for workers in-
volved in cross-border commuting, a mixture of national case law and legislation have es-
tablished a certain acquis. 
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In the past, the position of posted workers with regard to applicable wages has often 
been ambiguous, given that workers posted abroad as temporary workers are not supposed 
to seek permanent access to the host country’s labor market, and rules for their pay and 
working conditions were lacking in most member states. Some countries had a regulatory 
frame that made their minimum-wage legislation and collective agreements generally bind-
ing for all workers in their territory. Belgium, for instance, had a combination of generally 
binding laws and collective agreements with respect to the working conditions of posted 
workers that foreign employers were required to follow. In other countries, however, collec-
tive agreements and the lex loci laboris did not apply to temporarily posted foreign workers.
There was no legal machinery in place for making the country-of-employment prin-
ciple apply across Europe until the enactment of the Posted Workers Directive (Directive 
96/71,9 hereafter PWD) in 1996. The initial objective for this contested piece of EU legisla-
tion was to ensure that national social policy frames and collectively agreed-upon working 
conditions were respected. It formulated a hard core of minimum prescripts in the field of 
labor standards and working conditions. EU member states could create additional man-
datory rules or public policy provisions within their individual territories, as long as these 
rules did not lead to discrimination or protection of their market (article 3.10). The first 
drafts of the PWD clearly stated that Community law “does not preclude Member States 
from applying their legislation or collective labor agreements entered into by social part-
ners and relating to wages, working time and other matters, to any person who is employed, 
even temporarily, within their territory, even though the employer is established in another 
State” (European Commission 1991, 11). Two court cases in the 1990s reinforced this idea. 
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled in the Rush Portuguesa case (ECJ C-113/89, 
199010) that “Community law does not preclude Member States from extending their legis-
lation, or collective labor agreements entered into by both sides of industry, to any person 
who is employed, even temporarily, within their territory, no matter in which country the 
employer is established; nor does Community law prohibit Member States from enforcing 
those rules by appropriate means.” The Arblade case (ECJ C-369/96, 199911) confirmed that 
provisions classified as public-order legislation are crucial for the protection of the politi-
cal, social, and economic order. Both rulings were seen as the confirmation of EU member 
states’ competence to define the regulatory framework for the protection of all workers who 
pursue their activities in the country’s territory. The PWD seemed to provide a possibility 
to apply, in a non-discriminatory manner, employment conditions in the form of public 
policy provisions. 
Problems soon emerged, however, as a relationship was established between tempo-
rary cross-border activities and the free provision of services. According to the ECJ and 
the Commission, it was not up to EU member states to unilaterally define the notion of 
public policy or to impose mandatory provisions of their employment law on suppliers of 
services established in another country. The ECJ stated that rules and requirements that are 
not specified in the PWD must be judged within the limits of the legislator’s definition of 
mandatory rules (Cremers 2010; Cremers 2013b). According to the ECJ interpretation, EU 
member states no longer had the unilateral right to decide on the mandatory rules applica-
ble within their territory, even if these mandatory rules would guarantee better provisions 
for the workers concerned. Thus, the ECJ, with the backing of the Commission, restricted 
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these rules in such a way that the guiding principles of the PWD were no longer effective. 
The ECJ created a situation whereby external service providers did not have to comply with 
mandatory rules that should be respected by internal service providers as imperative pro-
visions of national law. As evidenced by my previous work, I have always questioned who 
should decide which provisions in the social field should be respected: “the radical ECJ 
interpretation of article 49 of the Treaty (now article 56 of the Lisbon Treaty) makes every 
national host-country mandatory provision in principle a restriction to the free provision 
of services” (Cremers 2011). My conclusion has been that the Internal Market is interfering 
directly with national regulatory frames. The Commission and the ECJ, not hindered by EU 
member states, have worked out an unrivalled deregulation agenda that puts the free provi-
sion of services first and shrugs off the original objective of the posting rules. 
The Proof of an Employment Relationship
Another problematic aspect of the monitoring and enforcement of cross-border labor 
recruitment is that of the applicable labor contract. The 1980 Rome Convention on the 
law applicable to contractual obligations (and its successor, Regulation 593/200812) stat-
ed that a contract “shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties.”13 Article 6 of the 
Rome Convention noted that the choice of jurisdiction governing the contract must not 
deprive the worker of otherwise mandatory protections (in the terms and conditions of 
employment).14 The impact of mandatory rules was further specified in Article 7 of the 
Rome Convention, which determined that, in cases in which “the situation has a close con-
nection” with a country, its mandatory rules (e.g., on labor standards) could be said to be 
in effect, provided that these rules applied “whatever the law applicable to the contract.” In 
considering whether to apply mandatory rules, the “nature, purpose and consequences” of 
application or non-application have to be considered.
Along the same lines, Consideration 34 of the 2008 Regulation adds, “The rule on indi-
vidual employment contracts should not prejudice the application of the overriding man-
datory provisions of the country to which a worker is posted in accordance with Directive 
96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning 
the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services.” This means that the 
definition of mandatory rules in any cross-border context becomes vital, as it determines 
which mandatory labor standards in the country where work is carried out have to be re-
spected, regardless of the terms and provisions directly related to the employment contract.
The Posting Directive refers explicitly to Article 6 of the Rome Convention: “the choice 
of law made by the parties is not to have the result of depriving the employee of the protec-
tion afforded to him by the mandatory rules of the law” (Recital 9). The Directive also notes 
that “effect may be given, concurrently with the law declared applicable, to the mandatory 
rules of the law of another country, in particular the law of the Member State within whose 
territory the worker is temporarily posted” (Recital 10). In article 2.2, the Directive makes 
explicit that “For the purposes of this Directive, the definition of a worker is that which ap-
plies in the law of the Member State to whose territory the worker is posted.”
This aspect has been neglected by the ECJ, especially in the cases where the ECJ has re-
stricted the competence to monitor the existence of a labor contract exclusively to the coun-
try of origin, as in the Laval case (ECJ C-341/05, 200715) and Commission v Luxembourg 
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(ECJ C-319/06, 200816). As a result, authorities in the country where the work is pursued de-
pend upon the competence and cooperation of the authorities in the worker’s home coun-
try. In the time it takes to reply to requests for information, the employer and the posted 
workers have often disappeared. Thus, systematic and effective control in the host country 
becomes an illusion. The European Commission seems to realize that this ECJ position 
contradicts the basic philosophy of the Posting Directive and has produced a form that 
could streamline the request for information, but the whole procedure has a non-binding 
character.
With regard to the employment contract, reference is made to another EU Directive, the 
Directive on an employer’s obligation to inform employees of the conditions applicable to 
the contract or employment relationship (91/533/EEC17). This Directive says that, when an 
employee is required to work in a country or countries other than the member state whose 
law and/or practice governs the contract or employment relationship, a written statement 
must be drafted before his or her departure. This statement must minimally include the 
duration of the employment abroad and the currency to be used for payment. Where ap-
propriate, the statement may also include a listing of benefits in cash or kind, and the con-
ditions governing the employee’s repatriation.
The Directive stipulates that workers must be in the possession of the necessary doc-
uments before departure. If employers have not provided the necessary documents, they 
have committed a regulatory breach. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that, at least in cases 
of non-compliance with Directive 91/533/EEC, Article 6.2 of the Rome Convention (now 
Article 8.4 of Regulation 593/2008) may apply—the contract is more closely connected with 
the host country. In the absence of relevant documents that prove the link between the 
sending state and the employment relationship of the posted worker, the protection of the 
involved workers must be guaranteed by the legislation of the country where the work is 
pursued. 
This emphasis has significant implications for the application of rights-based mobility 
regulation. Access to rights is determined through a complex web of national, EU, and in-
ternational obligations, and the ECJ’s limited focus on the PWD as a source of rights could 
be considered to be in opposition to the intentions of the legislators who drafted the direc-
tive. It could also have significant consequences for de facto access to or acknowledgement 
of rights: if securing workers’ rights is subject to non-binding requests for information be-
tween member states, implementation of rights regulation is unlikely to be successful.
The Freedom of Establishment and the Free Provision of 
Services
Developments in Company Law
Since the late 1990s, the objective of strengthening the protection of shareholders’ rights has 
gone hand-in-hand with the notion that company law “should provide for a flexible frame-
work for competitive business” (Report 2002). The deregulation policy characterizing cur-
rent national and EU company law reform has led to a situation of emerging transnational 
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legal pluralism that, in the end, could stimulate regime shopping within the EU. These days, 
regime shopping typically stems from competition between systems of private law (or at 
least of company law) (Cremers 2013a). Based on EU legislation and ECJ jurisprudence, 
freedom of establishment makes it possible for firms to be founded in accordance with the 
law of one EU member state and to have their registered office, central administration, or 
principal place of business in another. This type of business configuration is defined as the 
actual pursuit of an economic activity through a fixed establishment in another EU member 
state for an indefinite period. The relevant legislation in this area does not provide direct 
effective instruments to enforce genuine activities and to facilitate the fight against abusive 
practices. As a result, there is little effective control over whether or not an established sub-
sidiary is pursuing real activities. Companies can establish a considerable part of their legal 
frameworks in other EU member states without pursuing any activities there. 
The EU Treaty and ECJ case law place certain restrictions on free establishment if they 
are justified and proportionate under European law. In the Societé de Gestion Industrielle 
(ECJ C-311/08, 201018) judgment, the ECJ argued that European law did not affect the pos-
sibility of national legislation/measures to prohibit companies from invoking EU law when, 
in reality, these “wholly artificial arrangements” were designed to circumvent national legis-
lation (this constitutes abuse of the freedom of establishment by foreign companies through 
artificial arrangements in order to escape mandatory rules). The ECJ stated that national 
legislation was acceptable as long as it pursued legitimate objectives that were compatible 
with the Treaty and constituted overriding reasons in the public interest, such as the preven-
tion of abuse or fraudulent conduct, or the protection of the interests of groups including 
creditors, minority shareholders, employees, and tax authorities. A proportionality test of 
the national measure was added to the criteria to ascertain whether the provision at issue 
goes beyond what is necessary to attain the objectives pursued. The fact that a company was 
formed in a particular EU member state for the sole purpose of enjoying the benefit of more 
favorable legislation, such as flexible company law, taxation advantages, or easy registration 
rules, does not constitute an abuse—even if that company conducts its activities entirely or 
mainly in another state—as long as the protection of third parties’ interests is not at stake. 
But what about companies that conduct no business in their country of establishment but 
instead operate exclusively through subsidiaries (or even through the provision of services) 
in other countries? Whilst the correction of breaches must be addressed on a case-by-case 
basis, how can a worker confronted with a letterbox company derive rights from this com-
mon law?
The Cross-Border Provision of Services 
A key element for the determination of the applicable rules in cases of free service provi-
sion with temporary posted workers is whether companies are undertaking genuine busi-
ness matters. The notions of the “genuine” character of an undertaking, enumerated by the 
Commission’s Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, do not 
seem to have had any serious impact on the policy related to the freedom of establish-
ment developed by other Commission departments, in which the fight against “red tape” 
has become the guiding principle. The Directorates-General for the Internal Market and 
for Competition are firm promoters of the free establishment principle, including limited 
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possibilities for countries other than the country of establishment to control the genuine 
character of business undertakings. The dominant policy of the Commission is to ease the 
provisions governing the establishment of service providers, whether at home or abroad. 
Treating foreign undertakings differently can only be accepted on grounds of public policy, 
public security, and public health. In general, all other restrictions to freedom of establish-
ment must be objectively justified in accordance with the case law of the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ). The consequences of this approach are clear. Countries are discouraged from 
controlling foreign undertakings, and yet there is no strict guidance on how to deal with 
violations. At the same time, the Commission actively pursues infringement procedures 
any time a country creates “barriers to the free provision of services.” In the previously cited 
Laval and Luxembourg rulings, the applications of the host country’s labor standards were 
qualified “restrictions to the free provision of services”; additional domestic rules should 
not hinder this free provision.
Relevant legislation and ECJ jurisprudence in the area of the freedom of establishment 
do not provide directly effective means to combat abusive practices. Companies may install 
a considerable part of their legal frameworks into other EU member states without pursuing 
any real activities there. In 2010, a team of experts investigated the functionality of posting 
rules and identified a great divergence in transposition and application (Cremers 2011). The 
use of the posting mechanism ranged from normal, long-established partnerships between 
contracting partners to completely fake letterbox practices aimed at labor-only recruitment.
Problems occur as soon as cross-border labor-only subcontracting is presented as the 
provision of services. Groups of workers are recruited via agencies, gangmasters, letterbox 
companies, advertising, and informal networking. Posting, then, has become one means of 
recruiting “cheap” labor and subsequently withholding rights that can be derived from EU 
law related to genuine labor migration.
A concentration of posted workers in the lower echelons of the labor markets poses 
serious risks, such as the distortion of competition, the erosion of workers’ rights, and the 
evasion of mandatory rules. Employment conditions, in particular wages offered to posted 
workers, if not subject to proper monitoring and enforcement, may undercut the minimum 
conditions established by the host country’s law or negotiated under generally applicable 
collective agreements. This, in turn, undermines the organization and functioning of local 
labor markets.
Economic Freedoms and Workers’ Rights in The Context of 
Cross-Border Labor Recruitment
Proper implementation and enforcement are key elements guaranteeing the effectiveness of 
EU rules related to labor recruitment and migration (European Commission 2007; 2008). 
Over the years, the Commission has neglected problems related to the questions of business 
legitimacy, the existence of and control over labor contracts, and compliance with corre-
sponding working conditions. ECJ rulings, on the other hand, have restricted necessary 
control and enforcement to the business undertaking’s country of origin. In some cited 
 Labor Recruitment and Economic Freedoms in Europe 55
rulings, the application of and control over labor standards of the host country were seen as 
administrative burdens that placed restrictions on the free provision of services. The fight 
against these “administrative burdens” prevented systematic and effective control in the 
host country. At the same time, identifying the regularity of posting by the country where 
the work is carried out depends on the cooperation of the home country. And, as mentioned 
above, receiving replies to information requests takes time, and by then employer and work-
ers have often disappeared. 
In 2012–2013, a transnational project, “Posting of workers: Improving collaboration 
between social partners and public authorities in Europe,” was conducted by the National 
Institute of Labor, Employment and Vocational Training (INTEFP), a French umbrella or-
ganization of labor inspectors. The project’s findings confirmed that fraudulent posting is 
used to circumvent national regulatory frames of pay, labor, working conditions, and social 
security in the host state. In particular, the following irregularities were identified:
•	 cross-border recruitment via (temporary) agencies
•	 bogus self-employment in cases where the distinctions between a commercial con-
tract for the provision of services and a labor contract are blurred
•	 fake posting because control is inadequate or easily bypassed
•	 shifting to other industries where wages are lower and/or working conditions less 
favorable to workers (regime shopping)
•	 manipulation of free establishment (fictitious companies and arrangements) and of 
country of residence
•	 abuse of entitlements that are guaranteed by posting rules (working time, minimum 
wage, pay scaling not in line with skill level, absurd deductions)
Once irregularities were detected, the accumulation of breaches was the rule rather than 
the exception. 
Free Movement and the Enforcement of Workers’ Rights
In a 2004 research project on posting of workers, Cremers and Donders concluded that one 
weakness of employing cross-border recruited labor in the frame of the provision of ser-
vices was the difficulty of legally and practically verifying that a worker was correctly posted 
and under the scope of the PWD (Cremers and Donders 2004). The competence for deter-
mining liability in cases of fake self-employment and/or fake posting was blurred by ECJ 
rulings about home country versus host country responsibilities. The ECJ tended to view 
mandatory basic control in a host country as a barrier “for the free provision of services.” 
Along the same lines, and again referring to the primacy of economic freedoms, the compe-
tence for distinguishing posting by genuine employers from that by fake letterbox compa-
nies was delegated by the ECJ to the home country (often non-existing) of these establish-
ments. Thus, the correlation with economic freedoms, notably the freedom of establishment 
and the free provision of services, obstructed fundamental legal and political solutions. As 
mentioned before, after the launch of the Internal Market project, the Commission and the 
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ECJ, not hindered by EU member states, often gave primacy to the free provision of services 
over the lex loci laboris principles of the posting rules.
Reaction from member states was slow in coming; even member states targeted by ECJ 
cases refrained from bringing them to the attention of the Council of Ministers, which is the 
principal legislator responsible for employment and social affairs policies in all EU member 
states. In the Council, advocates of a liberalized labor market characterized by deliberate 
competition in the field of working conditions and pay clashed with representatives from 
countries who were in favor of creating a level playing field based on the existing national 
regulatory framework (the Rhineland or social model). The main driver for change was the 
European Parliament that forced EC president Jose Manuel Barroso, during the debates for 
his second term, to commit to an initiative for the enforcement of PWD principles. The re-
sulting enforcement directive emphasizes cross-border cooperation of the controlling com-
petent authorities. It must be transposed into national law by the member states in 2016.
The ECJ also seems to realize the negative effects that blunt economic reasoning can 
have on the functioning of the PWD. For instance, in a recent case in Finland in which 
Polish workers were being underpaid (C-396/13, 201519), the ECJ underlined that the terms 
and conditions of employment guaranteed to posted workers are to be defined by the law 
of the host member state (as long as these conditions are declared “universally applicable, 
binding and transparent”). In this case, the foreign subcontractor contended that the trade 
unions in the host country had standing to bring proceedings to the court, given that the 
employment relationship was based on the law of the home country. Thus, the ECJ had to 
decide whether the right to an effective remedy (as dictated by the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (2007)) of claims assigned by the PWD could be blocked by 
the rule of the home country (that prohibited the assignment of claims arising from the em-
ployment relationship). The ECJ ruled that the trade union in the host country was eligible, 
because its standing was governed by Finnish procedural law and the PWD makes clear that 
questions concerning minimum rates of pay are governed by the law of the host country.
Conclusion 
While national and cross-border cooperation must be improved, it is also necessary to free 
supervisory and enforcement mechanisms from the serious handicaps created by previous 
ECJ decisions. To do this involves a reinstatement of the goals of this part of the Community 
Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (1989). Although posted workers are 
technically prohibited from seeking access to the host country labor market, they cannot 
be deprived of the principles of rights-based migration policy. In order to both avoid social 
dumping and the distortion of competition for domestic service providers and to establish a 
level playing field for these service providers, a policy of fraud prevention and the anticipa-
tion of abusive practices is needed. However, such policy is still in its infancy, and thus the 
cross-border provision of services is being increasingly used as an alternate way to recruit 
“cheap” labor. By the same token, the freedom of establishment has created a new industry 
of incubators that can deliver ready-made companies that serve no other purpose than to 
circumvent national regulations, labor standards, and social security obligations. 
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In theory, the EU has begun to tackle this problem. However, exploited workers in for-
eign constituencies live and work far away from this theoretical dispute. Benefits derived 
from these highly abstract judicial deliberations are neither locally available nor easily ob-
tainable. Therefore, prevention must come via instruments that are labor-market oriented 
and shaped by the institutions that have created the conventional and legislative framework 
for industrial relations. In order to do justice to the purpose of the Posting Directive, respect 
for the regulatory framework (of labor standards and working conditions) in the host coun-
try must be restored. The host state must have the competence to determine whether the 
person can be classified as a worker. Collective bargaining must be recognized as an import-
ant method for achieving labor standards in the workplace, including for posted workers. 
In cases of conflicting regulations, workers’ rights should prevail over internal market rules.
Notes
1. According to a European Commission, “A “posted worker” is an employee who is sent by his employer to 
carry out a service in another EU Member State on a temporary basis.”
2. Treaty of Rome, 25 March 1957. Accessed August 14, 2015.  http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_
history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf.
3. Council of the European Economic Community. 1958. Regulation (EEC) No. 3 of 25 September 1958, 
O.J. No. 30 of 16 December 1958. Brussels.
4. Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
coordination of social security systems.
5. Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 lay-
ing down the procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security 
systems.
6. Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of the Council of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes 
to employed persons and their families moving within the Community.
7. Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems. 
8. In this context, “regime shopping” is the selection of a country by a transnational enterprise on the basis 
of the framework of employment law and industrial relations.
9. Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the 
posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services.
10. ECJ, Case C-113/89 Rush Portuguesa Ldª v Office national d’immigration [1990] ECR I-01417.
11. ECJ, Case C-369/96 Jean-Claude Arblade and Arblade & Fils SARL [1999]. ECR I-08453.
12. Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I).
13. The Posting of Workers Directive was formulated in 1996, before the revision of the 1980 Rome 
Convention was concluded (Regulation 593/2008). The reference in this chapter is mainly to the 1980 number-
ing of the articles. 
14. Regulation 593/2008 states in this respect that the “choice of law may not, however, have the result of 
depriving the employee of the protection afforded to him by provisions that cannot be derogated from by agree-
ment under the law that, in the absence of choice, would have been applicable” (Art. 6.2).
15. ECJ, Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet [2007]. ECR I-11767.
16. ECJ, Case C-319/06 Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxemburg [2007]. 
ECR I-04323.
17. Council Directive 91/533/EEC of 14 October 1991 on an employer’s obligation to inform employees of 
the conditions applicable to the contract or employment relationship.
18. ECJ, Case C-311/08 Societe De Gestion Industrielle (SGI) v Belgian State [2008]. ECR I-00487.
19. ECJ, Case C-396/13 Sähköalojen ammattiliitto ry v Elektrobudowa Spółka Akcyjna [2015].
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Managing Highly-Skilled Labor Migration in 
Germany:  
Law and Practice
Hans Dietrich von Loeffelholz
Abstract 
A dramatic increase in the influx of refugees and asylum-seekers from civil-war-torn countries of the 
Middle East into Germany has resulted in an intensification of immigration management in that country. 
Since 2005 immigration and integration have come to be viewed in Germany as “two sides of the same 
coin.” Future immigration and integration of immigrants, particularly refugees and asylum-seekers, will 
pose huge challenges for the country, while also presenting opportunities in all social areas. 
Successful implementation of immigration and integration policies into the labor market, education 
policies, and social policies is essential. It is also necessary to address education and housing policies with 
the goal of improving the schooling of young immigrants and creating better housing market conditions. 
A pending demographic and economic shift over the next one or two decades, not only in Germany 
but also in most other EU member states (particularly Eastern and Southeastern Europe), will necessitate 
the welcoming of qualified labor immigrants as a whole, without neglecting humanitarian commitments 
to asylum-seekers and refugees. 
Keywords: migration, labor migrants, migration management, immigration and integration, demo-
graphic challenges, welcoming culture
Introduction
In recent years Germany has received increasingly large numbers of asylum-seekers from 
the Western Balkans and refugees from Iraq, Syria, and other civil-war-torn regions of the 
Middle East and Northern Africa. As a result, issues of humanitarian and economic im-
migration, migrant integration, foreseeable demographic changes, and their implications 
for the labor and housing markets have become important topics of political debate. These 
issues are of concern to all levels of government of the German federal states, but particu-
larly the cities and local communities, which see the day-to-day effects of immigration. In 
these areas, providing accommodations for immigrants in already-tense housing markets 
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and supplying them with the usual necessities pose daily challenges for mayors and citizens. 
One special challenge involves educating minors, often unaccompanied, from very different 
regions and cultural backgrounds. 
Another factor impacting recent public debate in Germany is the uneven inter-European 
resettlement of migrants and their desire to stay in a small number of countries (Germany, 
Sweden and Austria among the EU countries, and non-EU countries Switzerland and 
Norway). In the Spring and Summer of 2015 the European Commission addressed this un-
balanced distribution for the first time. The Commission has appealed several times for sol-
idarity within the EU regarding issues of immigration; however, it has been successful only 
to the point of gaining acknowledgement from EU leaders that immigration and integration 
issues should be a joint task for all 28 EU member states, and that all EU countries should 
accept the responsibility of receiving migrants and providing them with daily necessities. 
These discussions have concentrated primarily on the issue of asylum-seekers from the 
Balkans, many of whom are gypsies facing discrimination; on young people with dim job 
perspectives in their home countries; and on refugees from war-torn regions. Gypsies and 
young people tend to leave their (relatively) underdeveloped European countries because 
they are disappointed by snail-like economic growth. Although these countries may be can-
didates for EU membership in the future, current work opportunities for citizens remain 
limited. 
In the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011, refugees began fleeing their destroyed 
homes and cities in search of a safer and better life in relatively quiet and peaceful countries 
of Europe. It is no surprise that they are drawn to European countries. As early as 1957, 
the Treaty of Rome laid out four fundamental freedoms guaranteed to all Europeans: the 
free movement of persons, goods, services, and capital. The Treaty of Amsterdam, adopted 
in 1997 by a Council comprised of the Heads of State of various EU nations, declared the 
Union an “area of freedom, security and justice,” a situation for which refugees and asy-
lum-seekers are now searching. 
Simultaneously, migration policy has come under increasing pressure from the German 
corporate economy and from important small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs; in 
German, Mittelstand). German business leaders considering the long-term forecast for their 
companies anticipate a shrinking labor force due to an aging population. Therefore, they 
are demanding new laws regulating both short-term and long-term labor migration that 
will aid in managing the economy, especially with respect to increasing global competition 
among export-oriented businesses.
This chapter will address a wide range of economic themes in relation to the immigra-
tion of several different groups, and will show how immigration, integration, and other 
policies have been affected by these challenges.
In addition to the aforementioned issues, another aspect of immigration is gaining 
greater attention in public debates: how the fiscal dimensions (costs and benefits) of immi-
gration and integration affect taxpayers. Even at the local level questions are being raised 
about who is footing the bill for the rapidly increasing housing and provision costs for mi-
grants, as well as who is reaping the benefits of their integration into society. These issues 
are gaining importance and political meaning especially in capitalist, globalized Western 
societies in which the uneven (re)distribution of income and wealth is a hot topic.
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It is also interesting to observe how immigration and integration legislation has devel-
oped in Germany and the European Union in the past, and how it will continue to evolve 
with respect to short- and long-term economic development and the demand for qualified 
employees. This is also true of the EU Blue Card, a visa for highly qualified employees from 
outside of the EU, which was originally passed in 2009 by the European Council (Council 
Directive 2009/50/EC),1 and adopted by German lawmakers on August 1, 2012. The appli-
cation of EU directives to non-EU immigrants is becoming increasingly important, despite 
the fact that within the “free” EU, labor immigration of unemployed young people and ap-
prenticeship-seekers from GIPS (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain) Mediterranean countries in 
crisis are welcomed by SMEs and the corporate economy. 
Migration is also necessary for macroeconomic reasons, particularly the lack of an ex-
change rate and lack of business-cycle policy in the countries at issue within the Eurozone. 
Equally important is the fact that the demand for qualified immigrants and for better inte-
gration into the labor market is increasing in Germany and in the EU as the whole; this is 
a result of the remarkable ageing of the population and consequential shrinking of the po-
tential workforce. From an economic point of view, specific labor market and demographic 
criteria are becoming more important (Loeffelholz 2010a, 214–228; Loeffelholz 2012, 5–6) 
as a result of increasing global competition for the “best and brightest” among immigrants 
(Martin 2013, 151). 
In order to facilitate the understanding of current immigration and integration policy 
in Germany, I will begin this chapter with a brief history of immigration since the end of 
World War II (WWII), followed by an explanation of changes in German immigration law 
from the German Green Card (2000) to the EU Blue Card (2012). Next, I will examine labor 
migrants in general, and highly qualified persons and their families in particular. I will out-
line the ways in which the results of relevant research projects can be used for advising gov-
ernment executives and legislators. I will focus on the short-term and long-term demand 
for highly qualified employees in the context of demographic change resulting from a rapid-
ly aging German population. I will address the questions of what possible role immigration 
and integration might play in coping with these economic and social challenges, and what 
to do on both private and public levels to help temporary migrants become permanent im-
migrants. Finally, I will conclude with some implications for immigration and integration 
policy as they relate to of other policy areas. 
A Brief History of Migration in Germany since WWII
It is important to examine the immigration of foreigners and of Germans whose ancestors 
had lived for a long time, often for centuries, as German minorities in Eastern Europe, and 
who have now moved “back” to Germany as a result of changed political circumstances fol-
lowing the war. Figure 1 is a graphic representation of the net migration (difference between 
immigration and emigration) in Germany in the context of business and political develop-
ments over the past 70 years (1947–2014).
Immediately following the end of WWII, Germany—formerly the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG)—became an immigration country, an event which had numerous effects 
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and implications for German society’s attitudes towards foreigners and immigrants. Since 
1945, Germany has witnessed eight phases of migration, each with distinct economic and 
labor market implications (for the local level in the metropolitan areas in Germany, see 
(Loeffelholz 2016a; Loeffelholz 2016b)):
(1) 1945 (end of WWII) to 1961 (erection of the Berlin Wall): expulsion of ethnic 
Germans from regions of the former German Reich in Eastern Europe and from 
the German Democratic Republic.
(2) 1955 to 1973: recruitment of foreigners as “guest workers” to meet the specific 
demands of the “German Economic Miracle.” 
(3) 1973 to 1985: between these years, the recruitment of “guest workers” actually 
resulted in the opposite of its intended effect (less immigration into Germany), in 
that guest workers brought their spouses and children into Germany from their 
home countries, thus increasing the migrant population.
(4) 1980s to mid-1990s: large influx of ethnic Germans, asylum seekers, and temporary 
civil war refugees from the Balkans. These migrations resulted from the Solidarnosc 
movement in the 1980s, Perestroika and Glasnost in 1985, German Unification in 
1990, and the Balkan wars which began in 1992. 
(5) 1995 to 2005: political consolidation phase resulting from an important change in 
German government in 1998 and the ensuing paradigm shift in immigration and 
integration policies. The German Green Card was introduced in 2000 to address the 
issue of IT and communication technology experts migrating from outside the EU.
(6) 2005: phase of migration management and integration based on new national and 
EU legislation, including the German Immigration Act (Zuwanderungsgesetz) 
(2005) that established a system of integration courses (German language courses, 
for example). During this phase, more than 15 EU directives were transposed into 
German law. 
(7) 2004, 2007, and 2012: expansion of the EU to include more Eastern and Southeastern 
European countries led to new labor sources (after a waiting period of up to seven 
years, during which time free movement of labor migrants was restricted), migration 
for education purposes, and family immigration into Germany during this phase.
(8) Since 2010: rapid increase in migration of asylum-seekers and refugees from 
war-torn countries in the Middle East and poor countries in Northern Africa. 
Applications from these types of migrants rose from 45,000 in 2011 to 800,000 in 
2015—a twentyfold surge in only four years, and twice the number from 1992.2 
Besides illustrating the eight politically-based phases outlined above, Figure 1 also 
demonstrates that ups and downs of the German economy have been an important factor 
in attracting immigrants to Germany. It is easy to see that Germany appeared less attractive 
to migrants during downturns in the German economy that occurred in the 1960s, 70s, 80s, 
and 90s, as well as during the downswing due to the bursting of the global dot-com bubble 
at the beginning of the first decade of the new millennium. Negative net immigration oc-
curred due to an increase in general unemployment, which translated to fading economic 
opportunities for newcomers in the labor market. 
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Between 2006 and 2014 the inflow of migrants into Germany amounted to more than 
a million per year. Of the 1.1 million in 2014, nearly two-thirds were from within the EU, 
particularly from the southern member states hit by economic crises; only 170,000 were 
asylum-seekers and refugees. Outflow from Germany during this time period was stable at 
around 700,000 persons per year (Figure 2). Official data for 2015 is not yet available; but if 
the estimated number of asylum-seekers and refugees is 800,000, the inflow into Germany 
for 2015 could equal approximately 1.8 million migrants.3 This number comprises 2.2 per-
cent of the total German population, or 22 new migrants per 1,000 inhabitants. In relation to 
other European countries, these numbers correspond only to countries such as Switzerland 
and Malta (19 and 17 immigrants per 1,000 inhabitants, respectively) (Bundesamt 2016, 
127). 
According to the EU-wide data of EUROSTAT, considering only refugees and asy-
lum-seekers, the four EU countries who received the most initial applications in 2014 were 
Sweden, with 7.7 applications per 1,000 inhabitants; followed by Hungary (4.2 applications); 
and Austria and Malta (3.0 applications each). Denmark ranked fifth, with 2.6 applications 
per 1,000 inhabitants, and Germany fell into sixth place, with 2.1 applications per 1,000 
people. In 2015, Germany could see an increase to 3.7 applications per 1,000 inhabitants. 
Switzerland and Norway, both non-EU member states that belong to the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA), rank in-between with 2.7 and 2.1 applications per 1,000 inhabi-
tants, respectively (data updates are available from EUROSTAT 2015).
Figure 2: Migration Inflows and Outflows in Germany, 2006–2014 (thousands)
Source: Author’s calculation.
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Paradigm Change in Labor Migration Policy and Steps Taken 
Towards the EU Blue Card 
As mentioned above, the fifth phase of post-WWII migration, from 1995 to 2005, witnessed 
a major change in German government. Helmut Kohl’s Christian Democratic-Liberal coali-
tion, in power since 1982 and responsible for German unification since 1990, was outvoted 
in the fall of 1998. The Gerhard Schröder government of Social Democrats and Greens in-
troduced a remarkable policy change by acknowledging, for the first time in recent history, 
the economic need in Germany for permanent labor immigration and integration of more-
or-less highly qualified immigrants from outside the EU. It introduced the German Green 
Card in March 2000 for IT and communication technology experts, who had become more 
and more sought-after during the global dot-com boom. The need for external technology 
workers in Germany was also driven by a shortage of appropriately trained domestic pro-
fessionals. 
Following the Green Card, the German government proposed a new Immigration 
Act (Zuwanderungsgesetz), which was passed by the Bundestag in 2004 and took effect on 
January 1, 2005. This legislation outlined the management of labor immigration according 
to economic and labor market interests as well as the introduction of integration programs 
at the federal level. Such programs included, among other offerings, German language 
courses for newcomers as well as for immigrants already living in the country. 
It also introduced immigration and integration research at the Federal Office for 
Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, or BAMF). The purpose 
of the research was to evaluate past and current policy measures in order to improve the 
management of immigration from non-EU countries.4 The BAMF further evaluated the ef-
fectiveness of newly-introduced integration courses. The effect of the new immigration law 
was to emphasize to the public that, going forward, “immigration and integration are (to be 
treated as) two sides of one coin.”5 
Further modifications of German immigration legislation included the transposition of 
the EU directive on researchers (2007)6 and other directives into German legislation; the law 
of labor immigration management of 2008;7 and the EU Blue Card8 and other facilitations 
for foreign graduates and labor immigrants from non-EU countries,9 which were enacted in 
2012 (Loeffelholz 2013a, 202–207).
Since 2013 other sectoral (labor market-related) directives and directives facilitating the 
international exchange of qualified staff have been negotiated between the EU Commission 
and EU member states.
These modifications were the result of several events and actions, namely the paradigm 
change in 1998; the summit of the EU Council in Tampere in 1999, which increased the 
competence of the EU Commission in the areas of immigration and integration of im-
migrants; and evidence-based research on migration and integration policy10 (Loeffelholz 
2011, 30–35; Loeffelholz 2013b, 99–105). 
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The Role of Research in Labor Migration and Integration Policy 
The German government has played an active part in the negotiation of EU directives re-
lated to managing immigration of highly skilled persons into the European Union. This is 
particularly true with respect to the sectoral directives that were passed in Brussels between 
2007 and 2012, and were subsequently incorporated into German legislation. Since then 
hundreds of visas for researchers and thousands of EU Blue Cards for very highly skilled 
immigrants and for students from outside the EU have been issued by German authori-
ties, in accordance with the Immigration Act (Table 1). The Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) underscores that Germany has implemented the 
most liberal resident law among the industrialized member states of the OECD.
The past ten years have seen profound study and scientific analysis of the educational, 
social, and demographic profiles of these immigrants and their families, including their 
willingness to stay, settle down, and naturalize. Researchers have also examined the nature 
and extent of the differences between highly qualified immigrants from industrialized (i.e. 
OECD) countries and those from countries located within emerging markets in Europe 
and Asia (Loeffelholz and Schimany 2013, 7–18). Meanwhile, immigration and integration 
research in Germany has been well established and has been welcomed by policy-makers 
at both national and EU levels; this research has made important contributions to political 
practice in the form of evaluations conducted in relevant research projects. Evidence-based 
studies have helped to shape immigration and integration policy. 
Table 1. Visas and Work Permits Issued for (Highly) Qualified Migrants Newly Arrived to 
Germany from Outside the EU, 2009–2014
German Residence Act11 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Section 18. Employment 25,053 28,298 36,049 28,149 22,775 29,696
of which:
Section 18c. Qualified skilled workers 8,405 9,941 11,291 8,826 8,252 9,925
Section 18c subs. 1. Qualified employment12 14,005 17,142 23,288 18,891 14,212 19,130
Section 18 subs. 4. Qualified employees in 
public interest
811 747 624 397 308 385
Section 19. Highly qualified foreigners













Section 20. Researchers 140 211 317 366 444 397
Section 21. Self-employed foreigners 1,024 1,040 1,347 1,358 1,690 1,781
Total of (highly) qualified immigrants 26,386 29,768 38,083 31,674 29,063 36,578
Source: Author’s calculation based on official data of the Central Register of Foreigners (Ausländerzentralregister). 
Results of this research (Heß 2009, 23–75) include the following:
•	 Countries contributing the largest numbers of highly qualified migrants include the 
USA, the Russian Federation, China, Turkey, and India.
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•	 Motives, professions, and degrees of willingness to stay, settle down, and naturalize 
differ significantly between migrants from highly developed OECD or G7 countries 
and those from countries with emerging markets or from underdeveloped regions. 
Migrants from more developed areas typically plan to come to Germany without 
their families and work on a short-term basis. Those from less developed areas plan 
long-term immigration and bring their families, particularly to avail their children 
of the benefits of the German general and vocational education system. 
•	 Immigrants, even self-employed entrepreneurs, are satisfied with their daily life and 
economic opportunities in Germany. However, they are critical of the lack of good 
job options for their partners. Therefore, the ability to enter the labor market upon 
arrival is a far more important criterion for immigration into Germany than the 
availability of social transfer. Only a very small number of immigrants are targeting 
the social system in Germany. 
Possibly due to better immigration management aimed at enhancing the labor market, 
the net inflow of qualified and highly skilled workers into Germany from countries both 
within and outside of the EU has increased slightly since 2010. It should be noted that 
management of labor immigration from outside the European Union has improved with 
respect to two issues: the short-term demands of the business cycle and the labor market, 
and demographic challenges that Germany and other EU countries will face in the next 
two decades. Immigration management in Germany is focused on both short-term and 
long-term economic and labor market interests and the demands. It follows EU directives 
related to immigration; two examples are the Directive for researchers of 2005 (Council 
Directive 2005/71/EC) and the Directive for highly qualified persons (EU Blue Card) of 
2009 (Council Directive 2009/50/EC). More than 27,250 EU Blue Card holders (more than 
90 percent of all Blue Cards issued in the EU) were living and working in Germany at the 
end of 2014. Since the Blue Card was introduced in Germany on August 1, 2012, 10,357 of 
these visas have been issued by German embassies to highly qualified immigrants who ap-
plied in their home countries. For this reason, the Blue Card is recognized in Germany as a 
“success model.” The OECD is right to underscore that Germany has implemented the most 
liberal and attractive resident law within its industrialized member states.
It is also important to recognize that labor immigrants in Germany today are better 
educated and trained—according to the higher requirements of the modern global econo-
my—than in the past (during the recruitment period from the middle of the 1950s to the 
beginning of the 1970s). Many of today’s immigrants have taken an academic and/or voca-
tional exam, and are determined to stay longer in Germany together with their families, as 
research by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) has shown.
In stark contrast to the 1990s and the beginning of this millennium (Loeffelholz 2010b, 
113–130), immigrants to Germany are now finding a robust and a salient labor market con-
sisting of 44 to 45 million people (out of 81.1 million inhabitants as of September 30, 2014). 
Of these, more than 43 million are employed—more than ever before in German history. 
Thirty million are engaged in full-time or part-time work secured by general social insur-
ance. People with an immigration background13 constitute one-fifth of the labor force; the 
same proportion applies to the number of immigrants with respect to the entire population 
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(20.3 percent on September 30, 2014, of which about 9 percent are people with only foreign 
citizenship).
Immigrants are attracted to Germany by conditions such as a high employment partici-
pation rate, extremely low general unemployment rate (on average, 5.0 percent in 2014) and 
low unemployment rate among youths (according to NEET,14 7.1 percent as of June 2015), 
most of which are consequences of fundamental labor market and social reforms enacted ten 
years ago by the Schröder government. However, accessing the German labor market is not 
as easy as it appears due to high language and cultural barriers. A differentiated, increasingly 
sophisticated, and export-oriented German labor market requires not only highly skilled 
professionals but also high linguistic competence among immigrants in their work envi-
ronments. They must earn these competencies through language courses and/or on-the-job 
training before they can achieve sustainable integration into the labor market in Germany. 
With the introduction of integration courses in 2005, Germany began investing in the 
language competence of newcomers as well as immigrants already in the country. These 
courses have been customized to meet the varying needs of immigrants who have come 
from different regions and cultures of the world. Within the span of a decade, German tax-
payers have spent 1.5 billion euros on language integration programs for immigrants. In this 
regard, policy in Germany is oriented to the principle “Integration requires Investment,” the 
goal of which is to avoid huge future costs at both the individual and societal levels. One 
recent research project (a longitudinal study, “Integrationspanel”) carried out by the Federal 
Office for Migration and Refugees to study the effectiveness and sustainability of these 
courses has shown that they are a good investment in the human capital of immigrants, the 
economy, and society as a whole (Schuller, Lochner, and Rother 2011). 
This also holds true within the framework of the European Social Fund, a Federal Office 
for Migration and Refugees program established in connection with the MobiPro-EU proj-
ect of the Federal Government of Germany. Created as an initiative of European solidarity, 
it targets apprentices from EU member states that are experiencing economic crises. It also 
addresses young job-seekers from these countries, where youth unemployment is extremely 
high. Initial projections were that 139 million euros would be spent annually from 2013 
through 2016 to help 5,000 to 10,000 persons. In 2014, the program was extended to 2018 
and augmented to 560.1 million euros.
Overall, widespread change in German convictions about immigration and integra-
tion since the beginning of the 1990s has led to positive changes in immigration policy. 
Increasing numbers of asylum seekers and refugees have caused immigration and integra-
tion to be viewed as “two sides of one coin.” New policies are directed toward the integration 
of newcomers and their families, who should be seen as important members of the labor 
market and society, and who should be encouraged to stay in Germany on a long-term ba-
sis. Integration approaches are being increasingly implemented by all levels of the Federal 
Republic: federal, state, and local. These approaches involve the development and imple-
mentation of a culture that both recognizes and welcomes immigrants into larger society 
and encourages them to stay. 
In the next ten to twenty years, German society will face significant demographic chal-
lenges as the first post-WWII generation of “baby boomers” from the 1950s and 60s retire 
from the labor market. The idea is gaining ground that the immigration and integration of 
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ambitious and highly qualified immigrants could help society remain cohesive by mitigat-
ing the challenges of a shrinking and ageing population.
Demographics and the Long-Term Role of Immigration 
Demographic and sectoral changes in Germany, along with economic dependence upon 
the export and technology industries, are expected to create a long-term demand for highly 
qualified employees. Without immigration, the labor force could potentially decrease over 
the next ten to twenty years, from 45 million persons today to 38 million in 2025 and 34 
million in 2035. These numbers will depend on the employment rate, age of retirement 
(minimum retirement age of 67, although possibly higher as a result of increasing longevi-
ty), and number of immigrants per year (Figure 3).
Employees in M(athematical), E(ngineering), N(atural science), and T(echnical) profes-
sions (expressed in German by the acronym MINT) are expected to become particularly scarce. 
Regional, professional, and specific shortages will increase, not only for the corporate economy, 
which can take care of itself and recruit from the global labor market, but also for SMEs. 
Additionally, an ageing population will increase the demand for healthcare and long-
term care, which will result in an increase in the need for better-educated and higher-paid 
staff in the these challenging sectors of the labor market.
In order to address these challenges, both internal and external options must be made 
available. Internal options concern the population of Germany as a whole, including people 
with a migration background (estimated to equal at least 20 percent of the total population). 
The following internal issues will need to be considered:
•	 providing more and better education
•	 reducing the dropout rate in schools, training programs, and universities (Loeffelholz 
2014, 26–34)
•	 increasing employment participation rates of women and older people
•	 providing lifelong learning and qualification opportunities
External considerations include:
•	 recruiting highly qualified immigrants from outside the EU
•	 offering attractive labor conditions
•	 offering dual career programs
•	 granting simpler and earlier access to German citizenship 
For political reasons, the ratio of internal to external options is 9:1. This is because the 
readiness of German society to accept new immigrants remains limited despite the long 
history of immigration in the western, northern, and southern parts of Germany. Even 
though external options are few, they are still difficult to fulfill; this is evidenced by the fact 
that, in the past ten years, immigrants from outside the EU have averaged only 32,000 per 
year (see Table 1). In order to attract more immigrants, the German government enacted 
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legislation in the summer of 2012 to allow the recognition of foreign qualifications (the so-
called Recognition Law).15 This was an important step to achieving better integration into 
the labor market. 
According to projections made by labor authorities and research institutions, demo-
graphic changes over the next two decades will necessitate an average annual immigration 
of 27,000 to 54,000 skilled workers until 2025–35. It will also be necessary to increase labor 
participation of the resident population by including second and third generation immi-
grants. This may be achieved by prolonging the active working phase of older individuals 
and further reducing unemployment and underemployment. Effecting these changes would 
result in adding 250,000–500,000 workers annually to certain sectoral, regional, and voca-
tional labor markets. 
Reaching these targets will require fine-tuning migration and integration policies with 
regard to the national labor market. It will also be necessary to adjust social, education, and 
economic policies, with the goal of increasing economic growth. Consistency among policy 
areas is essential with respect to economic efficiency. Germany has realized this to a large 
extent in the past decade with the labor market and social reforms begun in 2004, and has 
plans to continue to address these issues in the near future.
Figure 3: Various Scenarios of Employment Potential16 in Germany, 2015–2035 (millions)
Source: Author’s calculation based on (Bertoli, Brücker, and Moraga 2013).17 
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Despite these efforts, it is not enough to acquire workers from the global labor mar-
ket by taking legislative action and promoting informative campaigns such as “Make it in 
Germany.” Steps must be taken in the private domain as well in order to encourage tempo-
rary migrants to become permanent immigrants. It is necessary, then, to ensure the cohe-
sion of German society in an increasingly intercultural environment. Public measures are 
necessary in order to establish a welcoming culture in Germany.
In addition, it is important to create an atmosphere of cooperation between all author-
ities and administrations that participate in the immigration and integration process, in-
cluding those at the local level, where integration into the public and private infrastructure 
is taking place.
In the long run, achieving a high level of social cohesion will serve to increase German 
society’s appreciation and acceptance of cultural diversity. Immigrants should be seen as 
assets rather than liabilities. One way to foster this kind of positive attitude is through edu-
cating the German public about all aspects of the immigration and integration of newcom-
ers. Evidence-based research conducted by universities, independent research institutes, 
foundations, and government entities such as the BAMF is indispensable for combating 
widespread prejudices against immigrants. These prejudices concern the role and economic 
influence of immigrants on the domestic labor market with regard to wages, employment, 
and work conditions of the indigenous people; fiscal implications for the taxpayers; and 
their impact on social insurance systems and on the cohesion of society in the face of de-
mographic changes.
Conclusion 
Since 1998 sustainable labor migration management has become more widely practiced, 
both nationally and worldwide, in response to specific demands of the economy and the 
labor market. Focus has shifted from short-term, ad-hoc measures created in response to 
the ups and downs of the business cycle to a more long-term perspective. 
By 2005 immigration and integration had come to be recognized in Germany as “two 
sides of one coin,” a belief which replaced the view of migration as a “rotation system” of 
short-term labor migration. In the future, immigration and the integration of immigrants 
will both pose challenges and offer huge opportunities in all areas of German society. This 
will become particularly true as the demographic environment shifts as a result of shrinking 
and ageing of the German population. 
It is essential that migration and integration policies work in tandem with labor market, 
education, and social policies. It is not possible for immigrants to integrate into a closed 
labor market characterized by protection for insiders and exclusion of outsiders (newly ar-
rived immigrants). Further, it is necessary to address education and housing policies in or-
der to improve the schooling of young immigrants and the market conditions under which 
immigrants can rent appropriate apartments. 
However, regulating labor immigration with respect to economic interests is not enough 
(Loeffelholz 2011, 30–35; Loeffelholz 2013c, 131). Because significant demographic and 
economic changes are forthcoming in the next one or two decades, not only in Germany but 
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also in many other EU member states (particularly in Eastern and Southeastern Europe), 
it is also necessary to develop a culture that welcomes qualified immigrants into society as 
a whole, without neglecting humanitarian commitments to asylum-seekers and refugees. 
National legislation on labor migration and integration must foster these positive attitudes 
towards immigrants to a greater extent in the future than it has done in the past. 
Notes
1. Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country 
nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment.
2. At that time policy makers reacted by passing a highly-debated compromise between the main political 
parties of the Bundestag related to asylum-seekers and ethnic Germans; the result of this policy change was a 
decrease in new migrant applications to less than 150,000 four years later (1996).
3. This poses the question of whether they—mostly young people—are permanent immigrants or tempo-
rary migrants who will leave Germany when the crisis in their home countries comes to an end and high youth 
unemployment there will be on the decrease. 
4. It is important to underscore that the new legislation was only applicable to non-EU immigrants; for 
immigrants from other EU countries, free movement for labor or educational migrants and their families is 
guaranteed and therefore not “manageable.”
5. Statement made in 2005 by the former Federal Home Secretary Dr. Schäuble in a discussion on immigra-
tion law in the German Parliament (Bundesministerium 2005).
6. Council Directive 2005/71/EC of 12 October 2005 on a specific procedure for admitting third-country 
nationals for the purposes of scientific research.
7. German Act on the Residence, Economic Activity, and Integration of Foreigners in the Federal Territory 
(Aufenthaltsgesetz) (2008).
8. Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country 
nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment.
9. German Assessment and Recognition of Foreign Professional Qualifications Act (Gesetz ueber die 
Feststellung der Gleichwertigkeit von Berufsqualifikationen) (2012).
10. More information about BAMF projects: (Bundesamt 2015).
11. Act on the Residence, Economic Activity and Integration of Foreigners in the Federal Territory 
(Aufenthaltsgesetz) (2008).
12. Section 18c subs. 1. A foreigner with a German or foreign higher education qualification which is rec-
ognized or otherwise comparable to a German higher education qualification and whose subsistence is secure 
may be granted a residence permit for the purpose of seeking a job commensurate with this qualification for 
a period of up to six months. The residence permit shall not entitle the holder to pursue an economic activity.
13. The official definition of persons with a migrant background as given by the German Federal Statistical 
Office is: “anyone who has immigrated into the present territory of the Federal Republic of Germany after 1949, 
any foreign citizen born in Germany, and any person born as a German citizen in Germany who has at least 
one parent who is an immigrant or was born as a foreign citizen in Germany” (Statistisches Bundesamt 2007).
14. Not in Employment, Education or Training. 
15. According to the most recent report on the Recognition Law 2015 (passed by the government on June 
10, 2015), between April 1, 2012 and December 31, 2013, 26,466 applications for the recognition of foreign 
exams were made; a very good result for a relatively new law (Anerkennung 2015).
16. Employment potential consists of employed and unemployed persons and the hidden labor market 
reserve (Stille Reserve).
17. See also the most recent study by (Fuchs, Kubis, and Schneider 2015).
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Demographic Component in the Right to Pension: 
Comparative Analysis of Russia and Germany
Olga R. Gulina
Abstract
Rapidly aging populations have posed social and economic challenges to the pension systems of both 
Germany and Russia. These issues have gained the attention of the media, academic experts, and govern-
ment officials, and have incited significant policy debates. 
These days the labor abilities and performance of one generation of the workforce impact the size and 
quality of pension contributions for the next generation. Pension is a feature of social and economic life 
across both countries, but the amount and quality of this social guarantee varies considerably.
This chapter analyzes similarities and differences between Russian and German pension systems and 
explores the possible impact of migration inflow on reducing state social responsibilities for pension funds 
in both countries. 
Keywords: right to pension, demographic scenarios, migration, Russia, Germany
Introduction
Russia and Germany are classified as social states, as defined by legislation in both countries 
(Article 7, paragraph 1, the Constitution of the Russian Federation;1 Article 20, paragraph 1, 
the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany2). This means that state policy is geared 
toward creating worthwhile living conditions for persons of all ages. The concept of social 
payment for aged and disabled persons originated with Otto von Bismarck, who served as 
Chancellor of Prussia during the late 19th century. He introduced a system of obligatory 
employer-funded benefit payments to be made to employees for injuries, pensions, and 
disabilities. 
On June 15, 1883, Reichstag adopted the Law on Health Insurance for Workers.3 This 
law required all workers whose annual income exceeded 2,000 Reichsmarks and their fam-
ily members to receive health insurance coverage. Two-thirds of the contributions to this 
coverage were made by the employer, while the worker contributed the remaining one-
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third. This health insurance guaranteed thirteen weeks of payments equaling fifty percent 
of the worker’s daily salary. 
One year later, on July 6, 1884, Reichstag adopted the Accident Insurance Law.4 On June 
22, 1889, six years after the first law was enacted, von Bismarck successfully lobbied his most 
important piece of social welfare legislation through Reichstag: the Invalid and Old Age 
Insurance Act.5 For the first time in Prussian history, disability and old age pensions were 
guaranteed for all persons over 70 years old. It is remarkable that all of these laws, though 
amended, are still in place today.
In contrast with Germany, the tradition of state-mandated pensions in Russia has a 
much shorter history. In the Russian Empire such payments were considered “monarchical 
favors” and were regulated by the Statute on Pensions and Lump Sums of 1828 for state ser-
vants (both military and civilian) (Rakitskaya 2000). The pension system for workers, public 
servants, and collective farmers (kolkhozniki) emerged in Soviet Russia in the 1920s, but 
did not assume its final form until the 1950s and ‘60s (Sinyavskaya 2010). Social payments 
to soldiers and workers were the major concern of the Soviet government. As a result, the 
Soviet Republic issued the Ordinance “On Payment of Percentage Surcharges to the War 
Disablement Pensions” in 1917 and the Ordinance “On Adoption of the Provision on the 
Social Maintenance of Workers” in 1918 (Shakhbazov 2007). Six years later, in 1924, pen-
sions based on length of service were introduced for research workers and professors of 
workers’ education institutions (‘rabfaki’). In 1925, these benefits were extended to include 
teachers from urban and rural schools. 
The modern Russian pension system consists of a set of regulations, including the Federal 
Law on Labor Pensions,6 the Federal Law on State Pension Provision,7 the Federal Law on 
Mandatory Pension Insurance,8 and the Federal Law on the Investments for the Financing 
of the Funded Component of a Retirement Pension.9 This system guarantees payment of the 
following types of pension: old-age, labor, state-provided, and non-state-provided.
Recent shifts in the age demographic in both Russia and Germany due to increases in 
the elderly population (a phenomenon referred to as a “fast-aging population”) have high-
lighted the importance of efficient pension systems. It comes as no surprise that the modern 
concept of the responsibilities of the social state is undergoing a serious transformation in 
both countries. Making such reform is difficult because “it affects substantial entitlements 
and involves a continuous search for goals and values” (Müller 2003, 2). What follows is an 
exploration of ways in which the modern social state might guarantee pension rights for its 
citizens, and how migration inflow could affect these social responsibilities. 
The Pension System in Germany and Russia
The German and Russian pension schemes are based on three pillars, each having a dis-
tinct function and allocation (For more detailed information, see (Becker 2004, 2; Schelkle 
2013)): 
•	 universal/general (public-pay-as-you-go, PAYS), which is designed to cover pen-
sioners’ major expenses provided by the state
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•	 savings, which offers an addition to the general pension by means of an investment 
regulated by the worker for the purpose of gaining extra income
•	 voluntary insurance, which implies that the worker has some personal savings and 
regulates its volume
In any country the financial stability of its pension system and the legal protection of 
pension savings are ensured through several means. Contributions from the working pop-
ulation support the universal/general part of the pension system, while reasonable invest-
ments on the financial market and/or obligatory control of companies that place their shares 
on financial markets help to ensure pension savings. Protection of these contributions and 
savings during periods of financial uncertainty and crises is a compulsory responsibility of 
the state (a funded part of the pension system).
In both countries the universal part of the pension covers pension savings of all em-
ployed, self-employed, and unemployed workers. The universal part is formed by employ-
er’s and employee’s contributions as a percentage of salary; self-employed workers make 
payments on a progressive scale. 
Regarding the funded portion, Larry Willmore proposes that in modern societies the 
second pillar is an unnecessary component of the pension system (Willmore 2001), although 
the majority of Western experts hold the opposite view. They conclude that the savings part 
of a pension is not only an additional stabilizing mechanism for the universal portion, but is 
a necessary component that promotes living standards for retirees that are similar to those 
they maintained during their working life. This is why it is very important to maintain the 
second pillar of the pension system—the savings component (Ross 2007).
Retirement Age
Russian legislation defines retirement age as 55 years of age for women and 60 years for 
men. In Germany retirement age is 65 for both genders. Recent debates among Russian 
experts and in the media have focused on the possibility of increasing the retirement age 
in that country. There are two opposing views on this question. Some experts and officials, 
including economist Vladislav Inozemtsev, Deputy Prime Minister Olga Golodets, and 
Minister of Labor and Social Affairs of the Russian Federation Maxim Topilin, believe that 
“the increase of the retirement age would postpone a ‘positive’ economic change...” and that 
“low pensions are caused not only by demographic factors, but also by special economic fea-
tures.” (Inozemtsev 2015). Others, including Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, Minister of 
Finance of the Russian Federation Anton Siluanov, and Former Minister of Finance Alexei 
Kudrin, support the initiative, seeing it as a way to overcome the current crisis.10
Germany, with its extremely low fertility rate and high life expectancy, faces a simi-
lar dilemma.11 Over the long term, it will become necessary for the German government 
to consider increasing the retirement age to 74 years (Kaiser 2015). Despite the pension 
reform of 2005, this issue will remain valid at least until a massive inflow of refugees and 
asylum-seekers comes to Germany. The European Commission forecast states that the on-
going demographic trends will result in a decline in the population of the 28 EU member 
states to 492 million by 2030, and 467 million by 2045. Increasing lifespan and decline of 
the young population will significantly alter the age demographic, so that by 2050, the ratio 
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of 30–year olds to persons over 65–year old is expected to be 2:1. At the moment the ratio 
is 4:1 (Davies 2013). 
Demographic Scenarios for Germany
Studies conducted by the Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and 
Spatial Development (Bundesinstitut für Bau-, Stadt- und Raumforschung) demonstrate 
a dramatic ageing of the German population (Schloemer, Bucher and Hoymann 2015). 
By 2030–35, the number of persons over the age of 80 is expected increase in most parts 
of Germany. For example, the percentage of people aged 80+ in three major cities in 
Brandenburg will be as follows: 68.9 percent in Potsdam, 69.9 percent in Frankfurt (Oder), 
and 72.5 percent in Cottbus. Demographic forecasting of Berlin’s population predicts 92.8 
percent of inhabitants in this age group by 2030 (Table 1). 
Table 1. Population of German Cities over Age 80 by 2030–2035 (percent)










City  People Aged 80+ (percent)
Frankfurt (Oder) 69.9








Source: (Schloemer, Bucher and Hoymann 2015).
Similar data are represented in the 2012 Bertelsmann Foundation studies, which did not 
take into account current humanitarian migration flows into the country. The authors of 
the study claim that the average age of German citizens will be 48.1 by 2030, a decline from 
45.3 in 2012. By 2030 the average age in some states in Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western 
Pomerania, and Saxony-Anhalt will be 53 years. The most serious changes are expected in 
the town of Suhl in Thuringia, where this average age could reach 56 years. There will be 
around 6.3 million people aged over 80 years in Germany by 2030 (a 50 percent increase 
from 2012). In addition, some cities may see even higher numbers. Preliminary calculations 
show that inhabitants of Berlin who are over 80 years of age could account for three-fourths 
of the total population by 2030 (Bertelsmann 2015) which may overload the social support 
system, especially those aspects related to social and medical care expenses.
For Germany, migration is inevitable, and is actually an essential part of the country’s 
social system. Mario Ohoven, President of the German Association for Small and Medium-
sized Businesses, presumes that Germany will need five to seven million new workers over 
the next ten years. Data gathered by the Bertelsmann Foundation’s also confirms that an an-
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nual inflow of 500,000 labor migrants could satisfy Germany’s economic and labor market 
needs by 2050 (Fuchs, Kubis and Schneider 2015).
Three Demographic Scenarios for Russia
In 2014, Federal State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation updated the demographic 
forecast for Russia and presented three possible demographic scenarios. They presented 
low, medium, and high demographic scenarios which differ significantly from one another 
in terms of migration gain (the breakdown of migration inflow and outflow) (Table 2). 
Table 2. Changes in Population Size by Low, Medium and High Scenario (thousands)*
Years
Low Scenario Medium Scenario High Scenario
Popula-
tion at the 
Beginning 
of the Year 
Changes for the 
Year
Popula-
tion at the 
Beginning 
of the Year 
Changes for the 
year
Popula-
tion at the 
Beginning 
of the Year 














2020 146,850.7 -137.3 222.2 147,904.4 175.3 321.9 148,849.3 430.0 421.4
2025 145,404.6 -490.3 211.8 148,341.6 -36.9 338.9 150,704.0 276.7 466.1
Source: (Federal State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation).
* Population projection includes population of the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol.
According to the low scenario, the Russian population will be 145,404,600 by 2025, and 
will experience a migration gain of only 211,800 people. The medium forecast indicates a 
population of 148,341,600, with a migration gain of 338,900. The high scenario predicts 
150,704,000 people and up to 466,100 in migration gain.
In all three scenarios net migration is a significant variable. However, the low and me-
dium scenarios imply general depopulation (a decline of 490,000 people in the low scenar-
io and 36,900 people in the medium scenario) and indicate migration inflow as a way to 
maintain the current population size (Federal State Statistics 2015). Experts also predict an 
increase in the average life expectancy in Russia by 2025: 72.5 in the low scenario; 74.3 in 
the medium scenario; and 76.1 in the high scenario (Federal State Statistics 2015). Rising 
life expectancy means more retired people, which leads to an overloaded pension system.
Most specialists believe that the Russian economy and labor market will become in-
creasingly dependent on migrant workers (Tyuryukanova and Zayonchkovskaya and 
Florinskaya). The Institute of Demography at the Russian National Research University 
“Higher School of Economics” pronounced a decline in the labor force by eighteen to nine-
teen million people in 2025, (Rossiyskoe Ekonomicheskoe Chudo 2007). If the projections 
of Sergey Aleksashenko, the World Bank Senior Expert on Russia, are accurate, there will be 
2.5 retired persons per one working person in Russia by 2022 (Aleksashenko 2015).
When comparing Germany and Russia with regard to migration, it is important to note 
that migration in Germany has a different nature. In Germany, migrations for humanitarian 
reasons are prevalent, while short-term labor migration is the dominant trend in Russia. 
Migrants entering Russia are not interested in long-term residency; rather, they come for a 
certain period of time to earn money. 
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Conclusion
The demographic scenarios and socio-economic challenges presented above suggest that 
the share of the working-age population in both Germany and Russia will begin to decrease. 
This in turn will create changes in the structure of pension contributors and beneficiaries 
that may have a negative impact on national social (pension) systems and on society in gen-
eral. In the case of Germany, it is clear that current migration inflow into the country could 
be a good fit for the demographic and economic needs of the country. However, further re-
search is needed to learn how German experiences with and attitudes toward humanitarian 
migration inflow may be applicable to Russian migration practices.
Notes
1. The Constitution of the Russian Federation of December 12, 1993 (the Amendments of December 
30, 2008). Rossiiskaya Gazeta [Russian Newspaper] 2009. January 21. Accessed June 12, 2015. http://rg.
ru/2009/01/21/konstitucia-dok.html.
2. Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland vom 23. Mai 1949 (BGBl. S. 1), zuletzt geändert durch 
Artikel 1 des Gesetzes vom 23.12.2014 (BGBl. I S. 2438).
3. Gesetz betreffend die Krankenversicherung der Arbeiter. Vom 15. Juni 1883. Rechtssetzung in Deutschland 
1867—1918. Accessed September 14, 2015. http://www.rechtssetzung.de/N655.html.
4. Unfallversicherungsgesetz. Vom 6. Juli 1884. Inklusion als Menschnrecht. 2015. Accessed August 15. 
http://www.inklusion-als-menschenrecht.de/data/user/Dokumente/Gesetze/1884_unfallversicherungsgesetz.
pdf.
5. Gesetz betreffend die Invaliditäts- und Altersversicherung. Vom 22. Juni 1889. Deutsches Reichsgesetzblatt 
Band (13): 97–144. 
6. Federal Law of the Russian Federation №  173 “On Labor Pension in the Russian Federation” (the 
Amendments of December 28, 2013; June 4, 2014). Rossiiskaya Gazeta [Russian Newspaper] 2001. December 
20. Accessed June 12, 2015. http://rg.ru/2001/12/20/zakonpensii-dok.html.
7. Federal Law of the Russian Federation № 166 “On State Pension Provision in the Russian Federation” (the 
Amendments of July 21, 2014). Rossiiskaya Gazeta [Russian Newspaper] 2001. December 20. Accessed June 12, 
2015. http://rg.ru/2001/12/20/pensii-dok.html.
8. Federal Law of the Russian Federation № 167 “On Mandatory Pension Insurance in the Russian 
Federation.” Rossiiskaya Gazeta [Russian Newspaper] 2001. December 20. Accessed June 12, 2015. http://rg.
ru/2001/12/20/pensstrah-dok.html.
9. Federal Law of the Russian Federation № 111 “On the Investments for the Financing of the Funded 
Component of a Retirement Pension in the Russian Federation“ (the Amendments of June 29, 2015). Rossiiskaya 
Gazeta [Russian Newspaper] 2002. July 30.
10. Such debates are not characteristic of the Russian legal framework and have had negative results in other 
countries. For example, in 2012 a positive demographic balance and high birth rate in France caused the French 
Parliament to adopt the Act on Raising the Retirement Age, which increased age of retirement from 65 to 67 
years on general basis and from 60 to 62 years for specific groups (Legifrance 2012). This was viewed as a “step 
back” because President François Mitterrand had decreased the retirement age from 65 to 60 only a few years 
before (Bonoli 2000, 131–133).
11. Relatively positive birth rates are shown by France (2.01); UK (1.96); Finland (1.83); and Sweden (1.90). 
In 2002, average fertility rate in EU-27 member states was 1.46, and in ЕС-8 member states that joined in 2004 
it was approximately 1.3. In the past decade, the situation has improved insignificantly, with the exception of 
Cyprus, Luxembourg and Portugal. Some researchers believe that if the 2002 trend remains, in 100 years the EU 
population may decline to 120 million (Bloom 2009).
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Abstract
This chapter examines the differences between general and specific integration policies, and argues that 
general policies are more important for migrant integration than special immigrant integration policies. 
Using Germany as an example, the author highlights the role of the modern welfare state and discusses 
integration policies at the following levels: The EU level, the national level, the federal state (Länder) level, 
the local level and the neighbourhood level. 
Keywords: EU directives, intercultural policies, integration policies, inter-group relations, National 
Integration Plan, police and migrants, role of cities in integration
Introduction
To secure one’s life in modern societies depends primarily upon participation in general 
societal institutions such as education and training, labor market entrepreneurship, welfare 
institutions, the housing market, and the health system. Ready access by migrants to these 
institutions that have been created for the general population is a determining factor for 
their successful integration. 
On the other hand, there is still a need for special migrant integration policies—such as 
counseling and language or orientation courses—that address certain needs that are specific 
to migrants. They are necessary for creating competencies among migrants which will facil-
itate their participation in these general institutions. This chapter will address both general 
and special migrant integration policies. 
To better understand integration policies and their actors, it is useful to discern be-
tween different levels of policies (Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration 
und Migration 2012). It is by far not enough to examine policies at the national level alone. 
We must consider a comprehensive approach at the following levels:
•	 the EU level
•	 the national level
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•	 the federal state (Länder) level
•	 the local level 
•	 the neighborhood (Gemeinde) level
I will describe some major developments for each level, concentrating on the relevant 
actors and their influence. 
The EU as an Actor in Intercultural Policies 
Beginning with the Tampere European Council in 1999 and continuing with The Hague 
(Den Haag) Program (2004) and The Stockholm Program (2009), the EU has assumed 
a stronger role in integration policies that affect its member states. Directives that must 
be transposed into national law are the strongest policy instruments the EU possesses. 
Directives 2000/431 and 2000/782 obligated member states to enact laws against discrim-
ination in general, and against racial discrimination in particular. To support its anti-dis-
crimination policy, the EU in 2008 established the Fundamental Rights Agency in Vienna, 
which monitors discrimination in the member states and advises the European Parliament. 
Directive 2003/1093 granted the right of safe residence status to third-country nationals 
after five years of legal residence. Safe residence status is a prerequisite for integration; the 
directive for family reunion from the same year also supports integration. In 2004 the EU 
Council of Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs proclaimed eleven basic principles for the 
integration of immigrants into the European Union.4 
In the following years the EU founded the EU Integration Fund for the fiscal period 
2007–2013, which supported measures, projects, and research in EU countries. More com-
prehensive support followed with the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF). Part 
of the money in these funds is distributed by the EU directly, and part by national agencies 
for migration and integration. Long before the integration funds were established, the EU 
Social Fund supported projects for disadvantaged groups, including migrants. Petra Bendel 
estimates that a process of convergence of integration policies in the different member states 
has been set in motion through a combination of binding directives and various methods of 
soft law coordination (Bendel 2010, 43).
The main influence on general and special integration policies, however, remains in the 
hands of the individual nation states.
The National Level 
In 2001 the Federal Government of Germany set up a commission to review the 
state of migration and integration. This independent Commission for Migration 
(Zuwanderungskommission) was made up of representatives of the most important groups 
in German society and declared in its final document: “There has been progress in the 
integration of immigrants … but there has been no systematic overall strategy, which has 
hindered the integration of immigrants. Reflecting today on the necessities of a future in-
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tegration policy, we should envisage an overall national concept for integration that serves 
the needs of the receiving society as much as the needs of the migrants” (Unabhängigen 
Kommission Zuwanderung 2001, 199).
The following are milestones of a new integration and diversity policy affecting intercul-
tural relations (Heckmann 2015, 247–250):
•	 the Nationality Act of 2000 (Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz)
•	 the Immigration Act of 2005 (Zuwanderungsgesetz)
•	 the General Act on Equal Treatment of 2006 (Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz) 
and the institutionalization of an anti-discrimination policy 
•	 the German Islam Conference (Deutsche Islam Konferenz) initiated in 2006
•	 the National Integration Plan of 2007 (Nationaler Integrationsplan)
•	 initiatives for monitoring and evaluating political measures 
The Nationality Act of 2000 established the principle of jus soli. The implication of jus 
soli for integration and diversity is that it allows for a new individual and collective identity: 
you can be a German without being the descendant of German parents. Jus soli in combi-
nation with the reduction of prejudice and racism makes possible a new, more inclusive 
national “we.” 
The Immigration Act of 2005 not only founded a systematic integration policy but offi-
cially accepted that Germany is an immigration country. This facilitated the establishment 
of a new societal definition and a new framing of the immigration process.
The General Act on Equal Treatment, which created an institutionalized anti-discrim-
ination policy, was not a national initiative, but was instead promoted by the European 
Union.5 Among other actions, this policy has resulted in the enactment of an anti-discrim-
ination law and the creation of a federal office for anti-discrimination. 
Recognizing that migrant organizations play an important role in integration policies 
is a critical aspect of the National Integration Plan. Through their participation in this Plan, 
major organizations and players in integration policies have committed to implementing a 
multitude of policies and having them monitored at fixed times.
The goals of the German Islam Conference are to define and improve relations between 
Islamic organizations and the German state. The Conference holds significant symbolic 
meaning in that it indicates that German authorities officially recognize Islam as a relevant 
religion in Germany.
The Role of the Federal States (Länder)
Germany has a federal system of government in which the individual federal states play 
a strong role. They receive a substantial part of German tax revenue and have their own 
police forces, which is reminiscent of the sovereignty they had before the foundation of 
the modern German nation state in 1871. Another trace of that sovereignty is the fact that 
each federal state has nearly exclusive competence in the area of education, including pre-
school, primary school, secondary school, and higher education. This means that, because 
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education is the primary key to participation and social mobility among the descendants of 
migrants, the federal states play a tremendous role in the integration process. Certain mea-
sures have been enacted to help immigrant children in school, such as transition classes for 
newly arriving children to learn the language and preschool language training, but on the 
whole the federal states have not yet developed a systematic method of educational support 
for migrant youth. In the past decade, however, particularly as a result of PISA (Program 
for International Student Assessment), the federal states have begun to accept their respon-
sibility in this area. 
With regard to intercultural policies as part of integration policies, the federal states are 
developing or have already developed programs for religious instruction of Muslims within 
the school system. Furthermore, the states are attempting to train and recruit more teachers 
with a migration background. Many single schools are willing to recognize the cultural di-
versity of their school population, for instance, by celebrating national festivals of different 
groups.
Besides education, policing is a major responsibility of the federal states, and relations 
between migrants and police are a major aspect of integration. 
Four types of policies can be found in this area (Lüken-Klaßen and Heckmann 2010, 
80–86):
•	 intercultural education of police officers
•	 recruitment of police with a migration background
•	 education of migrants about police actions and policies
•	 institutionalized dialogue between police and migrant organizations 
Gaining intercultural competence helps police understand conflict within a migrant 
community, between different migrant groups, or between migrant groups and the native 
population. 
The objectives of the other types of policies are focused upon increasing mutual knowl-
edge of both sides and have proven very effective. The federal states also support local inte-
gration projects financially, and some have installed integration ministries and integration 
laws.
The Role of Cities
“Integration happens at the local level” («Integration findet vor Ort statt») is a frequently 
heard sentence these days in Germany. In many larger cities and some medium and smaller 
ones, the population with a migration background is 35 to 40 percent. When developing 
migration policies, it is important to keep in mind that the younger the cohort, the larger 
the percentage of those with a migration background (Lutz and Heckmann 2010).
Policies directly addressing intercultural and interethnic relations that can be found in 
German cities are (Kommunaler Qualitätszirkel zur Integrationspolitik 2014):
•	 the development of a local integration concept (a)
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•	 establishment of political structures between cities and minorities (b)
•	 administrative adaptation to the needs of migrants and minorities (c)
•	 policies for improving inter-group relations (d)
(a) Local Integration Concept
Local authorities have responded to the new challenges of immigration by making integra-
tion policies a top priority. Very often the mayor takes a leading role in advancing integra-
tion policies. By now, most cities in Germany have developed a local integration concept 
(Leitbild) that describes goals, needs, resources, and measures to improve integration. In 
most cases, the integration concept is not devised solely by the city administration or by 
civic institutions, but rather in a participatory manner, meaning that interested citizens 
(both migrants and non-migrants), civil society organizations including migrant groups, 
and representatives of the city administration work together to develop the concept. 
(b) Determining Political Structure for Integration Policies:  
The Council, the Mayor, and Their Partners 
As the local parliament, a city’s council must either initiate basic statements and concepts 
concerning integration policies or sanction those initiated by other parties. As the body 
with fiscal responsibility, the council must also decide who within the administration will 
be responsible for designing and executing integration policies: (1) a special administrative 
integration policy unit or a department for intercultural affairs; (2) existing departments, 
which would share these responsibilities; or (3) a combination of these. The majority of 
German cities have decided to employ both methods. Additionally, the council must decide 
on funding for larger projects involving immigrant integration and support for migrant and 
minority organizations (Figure 1). 
Figure 1. The Structure of City Council and Intercultural Policies 
Source: European forum for migration studies (efms), University of Bamberg. 
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Positive relations between the council and migrant groups can be achieved by including 
migrants in the council membership or by creating a consultative body of migrants. While 
the proportion of persons with a migration background who hold elected positions is grow-
ing, it is still small; therefore, the prime articulation and representation of migrants’ inter-
ests at the local level is through a consultative body for migrants and migrant organizations 
and/or through single ethnic and minority organizations. 
In most cities relations between the “integration department” and single ethnic organi-
zations are informal and non-institutionalized. Contact may be initiated by either side, and 
the amount and frequency of contact depends upon the issues that must be addressed. Most 
cities in Germany have mapped migrant and minority organizations and financially support 
them either by direct funds or by the provision of resources such as workspaces. 
Mayors are key players in intercultural policies. A mayor’s position of authority in the 
city administration enables him or her to make intercultural policies a top priority. The 
mayor is influential in the council and has a voice in the local public media. The mayor also 
has the opportunity to be in close contact with different migrant ethnic and religious orga-
nizations and can consider their needs. 
(c) Adapting the Administration to the Needs of Migrants
This is also referred to as the intercultural opening of the administration and the creation 
of a welcoming culture. It involves, among other issues, making translation services avail-
able; recruiting personnel with a migration background; and adapting public regulations 
concerning housing and construction, food, dress codes, sports, slaughtering rituals, and 
burials. The improvement of intercultural competence among city employees through spe-
cial training measures is also part of these policies. 
(d) Policies for Improving Inter-Group Relations 
These policies are often initiated by civic organizations and are conducted in close concert 
with all involved parties. The following types of policies—all of which can be called policies 
of recognition—fall into this category:
•	 institutionalized intercultural and inter-religious dialogue
•	 intercultural contact programs
•	 encouragement of migrants’ participation in majority organizations or voluntary as-
sociations
•	 intercultural events
•	 anti-prejudice and anti-discrimination measures and campaigns
•	 intercultural mediation and public space management
Research has established that properly executed dialogue and contact programs help 
to improve intercultural relations. Intercultural events, or Interkulturelle Wochen, are a 
long-standing tradition in Germany; these events represent common activities of people 
from diverse backgrounds, and include activities such as football tournaments, music and 
the arts, and political discussions. 
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Cities often engage in anti-discrimination work and organize campaigns against preju-
dice. My hometown of Nuremberg, for example, is in the midst of organizing such a cam-
paign, using a campaign in Barcelona as a model. 
The Neighborhood Level (Gemeinde)
Cities are very complex and differentiated entities. Migrant integration often concerns cer-
tain neighborhoods more than others. Because these areas can contain many different types 
of social structures, it makes sense to analyze integration policies at the neighborhood level, 
and not just at the city level.
For example, neighborhoods and other public spaces including markets, public parks, 
public institutions, and street corners are important locations for different ethnic and re-
ligious groups to meet and interact. Because these spaces are enjoyed by many different 
groups in various ways, interactions in such spaces can be a source of conflict. Conflicts 
over the use of public spaces often revolve around excessive noise, the amount of rubbish left 
behind, or barbequing in park areas that lack suitable facilities.
A useful means of managing neighborhood intercultural conflicts is the establishment 
of mediation services. In many cases the city administration and neighborhood organiza-
tions create partnerships to better manage public spaces. 
Conclusion
It should be understood that the implementation of integration policies and measures at 
different levels of governance is an ongoing process in which particular profiles for federal 
states and cities have evolved. 
There is no single most effective measure for successfully handling diversity and in-
tegration; rather, a multitude of measures and policies on different levels of governance 
support peaceful relations between culturally diverse groups and bring about mutual rap-
prochement. Finally, we should remember that while cultural diversity can be a challenge, 
properly managed cultural diversity is also a source of strength for societies. 
Notes
1. Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin.
2. Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treat-
ment in employment and occupation.
3. Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals 
who are long-term residents.
4. European Council, 2618th meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council, “Common Basic Principles 
on Immigrants Integration,” 14615/04/ЕС, Brussels, November 19, 2004.
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5. General Act on Equal Treatment was adopted to implement the European Directives on the realization 
the principle of equal treatment.
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Integration Monitoring in Germany: Empirical 
Analysis of Immigrant Integration Processes  




It has been recognized in recent years that a well-thought-out integration policy is needed in Germany. 
In 2007 all levels of government—federal government, federal state governments, and municipal gov-
ernments—as well as civil society representatives and migrants agreed on the National Integration Plan 
(Nationaler Integrationsplan). One part of the Plan designated that integration monitoring, a special sys-
tem of continuous reporting, should be established nationwide. 
Integration monitoring is used to make the integration process visible through the use of social 
indicators. This chapter discusses the framework and principles of integration monitoring. It explains 
a possible means of deducing the indicators used in monitoring. It describes the data sources that are 
available in Germany, and gives special regard to the (German) concept of “migration background” 
(Migrationshintergrund), which is used to identify migrants. 
The chapter further outlines the German system of integration monitoring at the different levels of 
federalism. The 2015 Hessen Integration Monitor is used to illustrate theoretical findings (Hessen is a state 
in the middle of Western Germany). The conclusion indicates the continuing need for improvement of 
integration monitoring in Germany.
Keywords: integration monitoring, integration policy, social reporting
Introduction: Immigration into Germany
German history and culture have always been influenced by immigration and emigration 
due to the country’s location at the heart of Europe (for example, see: (Bundeszentrale 
2007)).
After World War II, a great wave of immigration occurred as a result of the flight or ex-
pulsion of German nationals from the former eastern territories of Germany, as well as eth-
nic Germans from Eastern European states. In the 1950s, 11.5 million refugees from east-
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ern regions were living in the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic 
Republic. The local population did not react always positively to them. However, integration 
ultimately succeeded. 
Rapid post-war economic growth in the Federal Republic of Germany created increasing 
shortages of unskilled labor in sectors such as industry and mining. Therefore, low-skilled 
laborers (Gastarbeiter, or “guest workers”) were recruited from Mediterranean countries. 
The original objective of the guest worker program was that these laborers would return 
to their home countries after one year, and newly arrived workers would take their place. 
However, the results of the program were different than what was expected by German pol-
iticians: many guest workers managed to stay longer. A ban on recruitment in 19732 meant 
that foreign workers who had left Germany were not allowed to return to resume work; 
subsequently, there was a surge in migration as family members came to join those workers 
who had yet to return to their home countries. 
On the basis of the classification by the OECD (OECD 2006, 18), West Germany may 
be considered one of the “European states with post-war labor recruitment.” Labor migra-
tion also took place in the German Democratic Republic, where contract workers came 
mostly from Vietnam. Given the different historical backgrounds of the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the German Democratic Republic, the composition of the immigrant popu-
lation in West and East Germany still differs today. 
In the 1980s, the percentage of immigrants to West Germany who were foreign workers 
decreased, while the percentages of ethnic German re-settlers (Aussiedler) and their fam-
ilies3 and of asylum seekers rose. The years from 1990 onward were initially characterized 
by humanitarian immigration. The number of these re-settlers (and their family members) 
increased after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, concurrent with the number of people 
seeking asylum from the wars in the former Yugoslavia. Around the turn of the millennium, 
immigration stagnated.
Since 2009, the influx of immigrants has increased significantly. Most of these recent 
immigrants are from new EU member states (Poland, Romania, Bulgaria), and they have 
better qualifications on average than immigrants in the past had. Their main reasons for 
immigration are work, marriage, and reunion with family members. 
Humanitarian reasons are also playing a growing role: According to the Federal Office 
for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, or BAMF), in 2015 
approximately 441,900 people (out of 1.1 million refugees) applied for asylum.4 The main 
countries of origin on the initial applications were Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Albania, 
Eritrea, and Pakistan (Bundesamt 2016, 4, 8).
Today, nearly nine percent of the German population holds foreign citizenship. 
Forty-five percent among them are EU nationals. All in all, foreigners come from 
about 185 different countries. In 2014 the largest shares of foreigners came from 
Turkey, Poland, Italy, Romania, and Greece (Statistisches Bundesamt 2015). Although 
the percentage of foreigners is relatively low, about twenty percent of the population 
has a so-called migration background (see subsection 5, “Framework for Integration 
Monitoring,” below). 
As already indicated, the migrant population is very diverse with regard to cultural 
background, qualifications, duration of stay, openness towards German culture, knowledge 
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of the German language, etc. Therefore, their needs with regard to integration measures 
vary as well.
Implementation of Integration Policy and Integration Monitoring 
in Germany 
The fact that Germany (especially the Federal Republic of Germany) has been an immigra-
tion country for years has not been sufficiently considered by politicians. Official statements 
at the beginning of the twenty-first century acknowledged that a large proportion of the 
population was immigrants, and German officials recognized that integration had not al-
ways been successful. Many migrants—particularly guest workers and their children—had 
vocational qualifications that were not sufficient for the demands of a modern service econ-
omy. Traditional immigration countries such as Australia or Canada attracted immigrants 
with professional qualifications, work experience, proven business skills, or substantial fi-
nancial resources; in West Germany, however, an immigration policy had been implement-
ed that dramatically increased the proportion of low-skilled workers in the population5 
(Kindermann and Wilkens 2014). 
It was against this background that German officials recognized the need for a well-
thought-out integration policy. A newly-formed organization, the Expert Council of German 
Foundations on Integration and Migration (Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für 
Integration und Migration), criticized contemporary policies for lacking both systematic 
longitudinal reporting on integration and regularly-conducted evaluation studies (Filsinger 
2014, 14). In 2006 the first National Integration Summit (Erster Integrationsgipfel) took 
place, the goal of which was to develop a dialogue with migrants (rather than about them). 
Discussion centered upon how to best move the integration process in Germany forward. 
In 2007 the National Integration Plan (Nationaler Integrationsplan) was presented to 
the public at the second Integration Summit (Bundesregierung 2007). All levels of German 
government—federal, federal state, and municipal—as well as representatives of civil soci-
ety and migrant groups participated in the plan development and agreed on a sustainable 
integration policy. Part of the Plan’s implementation was the annual Integration Ministers’ 
Conference (Integrationsministerkonferenz).6 
Explicit reference was made to the fact that integration concepts should be supported 
by integration monitoring (Ibid., 121). A continuous reporting system was to be established 
nationwide. 
Framework for Integration Monitoring
As stated in the National Integration Plan, “a prerequisite for the strategic alignment of 
integration work is the analysis of the current situation and historical development. … 
Monitoring is carried out with the aid of coherently defined statistical key figures that in-
form about the current state of immigrants’ integration into the respective host society. 
Furthermore, monitoring can be used to assess whether integration policy objectives have 
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been achieved, to help improve the quality of integration measures, and to ensure an effi-
cient use of resources.7 Detailed data on the group of people with a migration background 
should be collected and provided nationwide. The indicators must be selected so as to en-
sure that the data basis can be organized with a reasonable effort and expense” (Ibid., 121). 
In order for an integration monitoring system to be effective, it should be based on the 
following components:
(1) Logic
Integration monitoring is used to make the integration process visible through the use of 
social indicators. Though social reporting in Germany dates back to the 1970s, its use in 
policy-making is rather new.
One main goal is to understand integration in context; that is, to understand the im-
migrants’ situation in their host society (European Commission 2013, 42). In this man-
ner, monitoring is used for observation. When monitoring is systematically and repeatedly 
performed using the same definitions, indicators, and database, the results can be used to 
track social trends and identify possible undesirable developments. Depending on political 
demands, indicators may also be issued for different subgroups according to age, gender, 
level of education, or ethnic background. Thus, monitoring can be considered an “em-
pirically-based planning and decision-making basis” for integration policies (Hessisches 
Ministerium 2010, 9).
(2) Principles of Integration Monitoring
The following ten principles and recommendations should be followed when setting up 
a monitoring system (Wilkens 2009, 64; Hessisches Ministerium 2010, 9; Fuhr-Becker, 
Göttsche and Wilkens 2014, 9):
•	 The number of indicators should be limited in order to ensure a certain degree of 
clarity and comprehensibility. 
•	 Integration monitoring requires quantitative data of high validity. However, the data 
should be easy to collect in order to keep costs low.
•	 It must be ensured that the indicators are applicable to the target immigrant group(s).
•	 The indicators should be contrasted for migrants and the host society in order to 
have reference values. 
•	 Since integration is a process, time series should be mapped to trace trends.
•	 In order to make time series comparable, indicators should be collected continuous-
ly and consistently. Changes such as those of question wording or response catego-
ries make comparison difficult.
•	 Longitudinal data is preferable to cross-sectional data.
•	 Despite the focus on the principles of continuity and consistency, a monitoring sys-
tem should also provide flexibility to accommodate new indicators or new fields of 
political action.
•	 The reporting should be presented as clearly as possible in order to reach users with-
out methodological expertise.
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•	 Monitoring becomes more relevant when additional sub-analyses are performed 
because the integration process can differ across groups. Examples of sub-analyses 
include gender, age group, and group of origin.
(3) Defining Social Indicators
As defined by the European Commission, integration is usually viewed “as a dynamic, two-
way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of member states” 
(Common Basic Principle 1) (European Economic and Social Committee 2004). This 
means that not only should immigrants strive for integration, but residents, institutions, 
and authorities of the host society should also commit to it. 
All in all, integration can be considered an extremely multifaceted, complex process 
(Wilkens 2009). How can it be quantitatively measured? The theoretical background of in-
tegration monitoring is, for the most part, not clearly explained. The Federal State of Hessen 
uses the following concept: the objective of integration monitoring is to break down the 
complex process of integration into different components and to trace these components 
back to measurable indicators (see Table 1). 
In Hessen, a distinction is made between the structural component of integration (access 
to the core structures of the host society such as the educational system, the labor market, 
and the health care system), the social component (including a person’s social standing, in-
ternational marriages and partnerships, and membership in associations), the cultural com-
ponent (including proficiency in the host country’s language, religious practices, and moral 
concepts), and the identificatory concept (a local, regional, national, or bi-national sense of 
belonging).8 (For more details see (Heckmann 2015, 95–204)).
Each component consists of unique subject areas that can be understood as fields of 
political action, for example, access to education, education outcomes, health, language, 
or sense of belonging. Since the subject areas still can only be described but not measured, 
indicators are selected.
Table 1. Components, Subject Areas, and Indicators of the Integration Process in the Federal 
State of Hessen
Social Process: Integration
Component Subject Areas Indicators (Examples)
Structural Access to education
Access to gainful employment
Participation in gainful employ-
ment 
School attendance classified by  
migration background
Labor force participation rate by  
migration background
Unemployment rate by migration background




Number of children with a migration background
Personal judgment on health 
Membership in associations, etc.
Convicts with a migration background
Cultural Language Self-assessed language proficiency rating
Identificatory Sense of belonging Feeling content in Hessen
Source: Hessen Ministry of Justice, for Integration and Europe (Hessisches Ministerium 2013, 11).
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Several indicators are needed to describe the immigrants’ situation in one subject area. 
An indicator consists of one or more statistical parameters. Ratios expressed in the form of 
quotas, that is, a percentage of persons in a population, play a major role in this context. 
(For the indicators used in the Federal State of Hessen, see “Examples from the Current 
Integration Monitoring Report of Hessen”, below).
It must be remembered that the indicators are of differing quality. The most important 
reason for this is that some indicators have a stronger database than others. For example, 
indicators measuring the structural dimension of integration are usually very reliable in 
Germany. Definitions are clear in most cases, and the data is easily available because it fre-
quently relies on official statistics. In contrast, indicators based on self-assessment are often 
based on spot surveys and always contain a certain degree of inaccuracy and uncertainty 
(Fuhr-Becker, Göttsche and Wilkens 2014, 8).
(4) Data Sources
The main database for nationwide integration monitoring is the microcensus that has been 
conducted by the German Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Federal 
States (Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder) since 1957. The microcensus refers 
to a representative, multi-purpose sample survey that examines one percent of the entire 
German population (approximately 800,000 respondents) each year. This census contains 
statistical information on the population’s structure, economic and social situation, families 
and households, education, occupation, and housing situation. Since 2005 it has been pos-
sible to break down this data with regard to one’s ethnicity or migration background. The 
microcensus provides a very good database; as participation is mandatory, the response rate 
is very high.
In addition, various other data sources have been taken into consideration for moni-
toring (Integrationsministerkonferenz 2015, 3–12; Hessisches Ministerium 2013, 18). They 
include:
•	 Migration statistics (Wanderungsstatistik)
•	 Central register of foreigners (Ausländerzentralregister)
•	 Naturalization statistics (Einbürgerungsstatistik)
•	 Child and youth welfare statistics (Kinder- und Jugendhilfestatistik)
•	 School statistics (Schulstatistik)
•	 Higher education statistics (Hochschulstatistik)
•	 Vocational education and training statistics (Berufsbildungsstatistik)
•	 Unemployment statistics (Arbeitslosenstatistik)
•	 Police crime statistics (Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik)
•	 Criminal justice statistics (Strafverfolgungsstatistik)
The Hessen Monitor also uses the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP). This 
data source is an annual survey that was established in 1984 at the German Institute for 
Economic Research (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung) in Berlin. In 2013 it cov-
ered approximately 15,000 private households (roughly 30,000 people). In addition to a set 
of standard questions referring to subject areas such as household composition, career, fam-
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ily biographies, labor market participation, occupational mobility, income history, health, 
and life satisfaction, the questionnaires also include specific focus areas that vary from 
year to year. In contrast to any other previous data source, the SOEP provides information 
not only on cultural, social, and identificatory integration but also on diversity in Hessen. 
However, due to the sample size in the federal states, SOEP data can rarely be used for anal-
ysis on a federal state level.
(5) The Concept of Migration Background
The main problem regarding the statistical analysis of integration is that it is difficult to ob-
tain data on “migrants.” Most official statistics only distinguish people by nationality. This 
approach was sufficient for early social reporting but it increasingly is losing its accuracy for 
many reasons. For example, many Germans have experienced immigration, but, because 
they are German are not socially and statistically grouped with other “migrants.” Similarly, 
children who were born to foreigners in Germany are technically of German nationality, but 
they may still have difficulties with the German language and thus require further encour-
agement through the integration process. Additionally, the concept of nationality does not 
meet the increasing demand for information about diversity in society.
In order to take these factors into account, the Microcensus and other surveys now 
use the broader concept of “migration background” as extensively as possible. However, 
varying definitions of migration background exist. As a general rule, one has a migration 
background if he or she has immigrated, or if his or her parents or grandparents immigrat-
ed, after 1949.9 
However, child care and school statistics use different definitions. First, statistics con-
cerning child and youth welfare are collected on the basis of the migration status of the 
parents (parents’ nationality); that is, whether or not the child comes from a migrant back-
ground. The next question to be considered is that of the “language primarily spoken at 
home” (German/not German). As defined by school statistics, a migration background cov-
ers three features: the language mainly spoken at home, the child’s country of birth, and his 
or her nationality. The parents’ immigration experience is irrelevant for this definition.10
The varying concepts and definitions of “migration background” should be kept in 
mind when interpreting the indicators presented by German monitors, as these variations 
may significantly impede consistent reporting. One future goal for developing public statis-
tics is to adopt a single definition. 
The German System of Monitoring
Following the National Integration Plan, the Federal Government published its first mon-
itor, the Integrationsindikatorenbericht, in 2008. Its aim was to test the quality and infor-
mation value of about 100 indicators on migrants’ life situation. The report is divided into 
three parts. The first focuses on a description of the indicators, while the second contains a 
deeper analysis of matters of education, training, employment, poverty, social engagement, 
and health by the use of multivariate regression methods. The third part offers recommen-
dations for the further development of integration indicators (Beauftragte 2009, 14). 
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In a second report, published in 2012, the number of indicators was reduced to ap-
proximately 60. Statistical analysis showed that a considerable part of the differences in life 
situation between people with and without a migration background can be explained either 
by inequalities in social origin or by differing qualification levels (Beauftragte 2012, 18).
The Integration Ministers’ Conference established a working group called 
“Development of Indicators and Monitoring” which was open to all federal states. Its 
fundamental task was to come to an agreement on indicators, to check the available data 
sources, and to produce reports on integration monitoring on the federal state level. The 
first report on Integration Monitoring in the Country (Integrationsmonitoring der Länder) 
was presented at the Integration Ministers’ Conference in 2011 and compared the years 
2005 and 2008. It was updated in 2013 and again in 2015 (Wilkens 2015). The reports 
use approximately 40 indicators that had been tested in a pilot study. They correspond to 
the following subject areas: characteristics of the migrant population, legal integration, 
knowledge of the German language, child day care, education, labor market, subsistence, 
health, housing, crime, and intercultural openness. Special attention is given to the infor-
mation content of the indicators, their empirical relevance, and their methodical partic-
ularities. 
The indicators are calculated with the above-mentioned data sources and presented for 
several years. If possible, data points are differentiated with regard to gender, age group, and 
country of origin. This data is shown in Excel tables that can be viewed on the Internet (see: 
(Integrationministerkonferenz 2015)). 
A ranking of the federal states according to the key achievements of their integration 
policy could be possible but is explicitly left out as an aim of the Integration Monitoring 
in the Country (Integrationsministerkonferenz 2015, 7). The differences between migrant 
groups concerning their social background and their distribution among urban and rural 
areas are too large—especially between West and East Germany (see the “Introduction”). 
The Integration Monitoring in the Country provides a background against which each 
federal state can develop its own monitoring. However, only a few federal states (Hessen, 
North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony, Baden-Wuerttemberg) have taken advantage of it 
thus far. (For the Hessen Integration Monitor, see “Examples from the Current Integration 
Monitoring Report of Hessen” section below).
Cities and municipalities also play a tremendous role in integration policies; a well-
known German slogan is “Integration happens at the local level” (“Integration findet vor Ort 
statt”). Therefore, the National Integration Plan foresees a widespread introduction of inte-
gration monitoring (Bundesregierung 2007, 121). So far, many larger cities and municipali-
ties have set up a monitoring system (for example, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Munich, Hannover). 
One of the “pioneers” in this field (and a model for other states) was Hessen’s state capital of 
Wiesbaden, which installed its monitor in 2003.
Cities and municipalities must rely upon different data sources than those available at 
federal and state levels. On one hand, they cannot use the Microcensus due to the size of 
the sample; on the other, they may have interesting data on the local population in their 
civil registration systems. For example, the Wiesbaden monitor offers an indicator that 
shows the percentage of migrants who marry someone without a migration background 
(Landeshauptstadt Wiesbaden 2015, 50); this is an indicator that cannot be calculated 
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on the federal state level. However, because they are not able to use the Microcensus to 
show the proportion of the population with a migration background, cities have had to 
develop other methods. For several years, special software (“MigraPro”) has been used to 
analyze registration data regarding place of birth, type of German nationality, and other 
nationalities. It is important to note that this analysis is subject to strict data protection 
provisions.
Given the fact that the EU has also been involved in the development of so-called “Core 
(or Zaragoza) Indicators,” this concept could be considered an umbrella part of the German 
monitoring system. These core indicators correspond to a few relevant policy areas—em-
ployment, education, social inclusion, and active citizenship—that are also analyzed in 
German monitors. The use of these indicators is said to allow for improved comparability 
of national experiences and for the mutual learning process among the member states (see: 
(Council of the European Union 2010, Paragraph 29 and 30); for more details, see (Fuhr-
Becker, Göttsche and Wilkens 2014)).
Thus, in recent years, a consistent system of monitors has been developed which are 
meaningfully linked to each other—from the EU level to the local level (Figure 1):
Figure 1. Connection of Monitoring Systems 
Source: Author’s construction.
(a) See: (Eurostat 2011; European Commission 2013).
(b) Available in German: (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung 2009, 2012).
(c) Available in German: (Integrationsministerkonferenz 2015).
(d) Available in German: (Hessisches Ministerium 2010, 2013, 2015).
(e) Available in German: (Stadt Frankfurt am Main 2012).
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Of course, other institutions also conduct research on integration.11 The Expert Council 
of German Foundations on Integration and Migration publishes various annual reports on 
topics including the “Integration Barometer” (Integrationsbarometer). The Federal Office for 
Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge) includes a department 
that carries out research on migration, integration, and asylum. The Federal Government 
Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung 
für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration) publishes reports on foreigners on a regular 
basis (for instance, (Beauftragte 2014)). Furthermore, social reporting may place specif-
ic emphasis on migrants; for example, the National Reports on Education in Germany 
(Autorengruppe Bildungsberichterstattung 2010, 2014). All these reports and studies can 
be used to highlight and explain the results of monitoring.
Examples from the Current Integration Monitoring Report of 
Hessen
The Hessen Integration Monitor was updated in 2015 and consists of 50 indicators.12 The 
indicators are described in detail in the unabridged German edition, and extensive bibli-
ographical references are given to support these explanations. The basic indicators present-
ed in this chapter are taken from the core subject areas of any German monitor: demogra-
phy, education, and employment.
(a) Demography
Indicator A1 (Composition of the Hessian population) shows that the population with a 
migration background is, on average, younger than the population without a migration 
background (MB). In the under-six age group, the share of children with an MB in 2013 was 
nearly 50 percent; in major cities such as Frankfurt or Offenbach, it exceeded 60 percent 
(Figure 2).
A comparison of recent years demonstrates that the percentage of people with an MB 
has gradually increased (Figure 3).
(b) Educational Outcome
In Germany, school qualifications have a strong impact on further education and thus on 
opportunities in the labor market. Indicator B4 (graduation rate), which measures how 
many students leave school with a certain diploma, shows that a strong difference exists 
between students with and without an MB (Figure 4).
In 2014, students with an MB were less likely to leave school with a diploma than those 
without an MB (4.6 percent and 1.7 percent, respectively) or the lowest level high-school 
diploma (Hauptschulabschluss) (26.0 percent and 14.0 percent, respectively). They were less 
likely to achieve school graduation (Abitur) than students without an MB (22.7 percent 
and 44.8 percent, respectively), which grants them the right to study at higher education 
institutions. 
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Figure 2. Indicator A1—Composition of the Hessian Population in 2013, by Age Group and 
Migration Background (percent)
Source: Hessen Ministry for Social Affairs and Integration (Hessisches Ministerium 2015, 26).
. .
. . . .
..
Figure 3. Percentage of People with a Migration Background in the Hessian Population, 
2005–2013
Source: Author’s calculation based on the data of the Hessen Ministry for Social Affairs and Integration.
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Figure 4. Indicator B4—Graduation Rate, 2011–2014, by Type of Diploma and Migration 
Background (percent)
Source: Hessen Ministry for Social Affairs and Integration (Hessisches Ministerium 2015, 42).
Between 2005 and 2013, there was a trend among students with an MB toward attain-
ing higher education. However, significant differences between the two groups still exist. 
Disparities are closely linked to the social and economic disadvantages of many migrants 
(Autorengruppe Bildungsberichterstattung 2010, 87; Beauftragte 2012, 156). It is worth not-
ing that in both groups females perform better than males (Wilkens 2013).
(c) Employment and Unemployment
It is crucial for integration that migrants have their own gainful employment. Employment 
is a source of income and a means of interacting with the host society. 
Indicator B12 (gainful occupation rate) shows the percentage of gainfully active people 
within the working age population (between the ages of 15 and 65). The rate for people with 
an MB is 66.0 percent compared to an employment rate of 76.4 percent for people without 
a migration background. Since 2005 the rates have increased for both groups as a result of 
the good performance of the German economy (Figure 5).
Particularly striking is the fact that the occupation rate for women with an MB is very 
low (Figure 6). We know that this varies between countries of origin.







Figure 5. Indicator B12—Gainful Occupation Rate, 2005–2013, by Migration Background 
(percent)
Source: Hessen Ministry for Social Affairs and Integration (Hessisches Ministerium 2015, 59).
Note: * Beginning in 2011, the Integration Ministers’ Conference adopted a revised definition of “migration 
background” to be used for the collection of data, which has resulted in a slight discontinuity in the time series 




Figure 6. Gainful Occupation Rate in 2013, by Migration Background and Gender (percent)
Source: Hessen Ministry for Social Affairs and Integration (Hessisches Ministerium 2015, 60).
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The unemployment rate (indicator B18) for foreigners remains higher than the total 
unemployment rate for Germans (as is the case throughout all of Germany). A key reason 
behind this is the overall lower average educational attainment of foreigners. However, a 
positive trend was noticed between 2006 and 2013 for both groups: the unemployment 
rate for foreigners dropped from 22.0 percent to 14.9 percent, and the unemployment rate 
for Germans decreased from 8.5 percent to 5.5 percent. In the last two years, the rate has 







Figure 7. Indicator B18—Unemployment Rate, 2006–2013, by Nationality (percent)
Source: Hessen Ministry for Social Affairs and Integration (Hessisches Ministerium 2015, 72).
It should be noted that foreigners are more often unemployed long-term (that is, for 
more than one year), which reduces their chances of getting a new job.
(d) Poverty
Poverty affects different areas of life. Indicator B21 depicts the at-risk-of-poverty rate, which 
is defined as all those who live on less than 60 percent of the median income of the Hessian 
population. Thus, the at-risk-of-poverty rate measures inequality of income and must be 
viewed in conjunction with the total income in Hessen (it cannot be compared directly to 







Figure 8. Indicator B21—At-Risk-of-Poverty Rate, 2005–2013, by Migration Background 
(percent)
Source: Hessen Ministry for Social Affairs and Integration (Hessisches Ministerium 2015, 78).
* Beginning in 2011, the Integration Ministers’ Conference adopted a revised definition of “migration back-
ground” to be used for the collection of data, which has resulted in a slight discontinuity in the time series 
between 2009 and 2011. 
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People with an MB have a significantly higher risk of poverty than those without an MB 
(28.9 percent and 11.4 percent, respectively, 2013). 
What the diagram does not show is that women are more frequently at risk of poverty 
than men. The risk of poverty reflects the employment (and income) situation.
(e) Subjective Well-Being in Hessen
The feeling of being content is regarded as one of the indicators describing the identifica-
tory component. The data for indicator E1 (feeling content in Hessen) was collected in two 
representative surveys that were conducted by independent institutions on behalf of the 
Hessen government. 
The question was: “How content do you feel in Hessen?” The report found that 96 per-
cent of respondents with an MB and 95 percent of respondents without an MB feel “very 
good” or “somewhat good” (Hessisches Ministerium 2013, 121). 
As shown in the diagram, the proportion of people with an MB who stated they were 
content in Hessen has significantly increased between 2011 and 2013 (Figure 9). 
Figure 9. Indicator E1—Feeling Content in Hessen, 2011 and 2013, by Migration Background 
(percent)
Source: Hessen Ministry for Social Affairs and Integration (Hessisches Ministerium 2015, 116).
Conclusion 
The implementation of integration monitoring is a major step forward for social reporting 
in Germany and delivers key advantages to policy makers and public administrators. It 
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can be considered a part of the catch-up modernization of German integration policy. The 
monitors show considerable progress in the integration process.
However, some aspects remain to be addressed. The EU Commission’s definition 
of “integration” (see paragraph on Framework Conditions of Integration Monitoring) 
is considered outdated by some experts, who feel that the aspect of diversity has been 
omitted.13 Additionally, there is not just one way that integration is achieved; many dif-
ferent integration patterns can be observed in German society. The definition(s) and the 
use of the term “migration background” have been criticized as well because they point 
to a need for integration measures that may not exist for specific groups. Others criticize 
that relevant social factors—for example, social class or milieu—cannot be taken into 
account sufficiently or that monitoring does not take enough account of the migrants’ 
perspective. 
All in all, it should be kept in mind that two key strengths of a successful monitoring 
system are continuity and consistency. Therefore, changes should only be made after careful 
consideration, and always in accordance with these principles. 
Notes
1. This publication reflects only the author’s views.
2. The ban on recruitment, which was a result of the oil crisis that severely affected the economy, was en-
forced in the Netherlands and Belgium as well.
3. These groups had been living in Eastern European countries for centuries. Due to their German roots, 
they easily obtained German citizenship.
4. Currently, the accommodation of the refugees represents a big challenge, especially for cities and mu-
nicipalities.
5. To this day, the migrant population in Germany is six times more likely not to receive a certificate upon 
leaving school compared to those without a migration background (Integrationsministerkonferenz 2015, 48). 
This and other gaps in educational achievement are reflected in labor market outcomes; in 2013 unemployment 
among immigrants was two-and-a-half times as high as unemployment among non-migrants (Ibid., 71).
6. The principal goals of this conference are to develop integration policy based on concrete proposals 
and commitments; to reflect the range of integration activities of each federal state; and to improve upon these 
activities.
7. Likewise, the EU Commission claims that monitoring can be used for evaluating the results of integra-
tion policy. However, the author takes the view that monitoring cannot be equated with evaluation (see also 
(Filsinger 2008, 41)). 
8. In a paper on guidelines and recommendations for local integration processes published in 2007, the 
three local authorities’ associations of Hessen and the Hessen government agreed on using this concept for 
integration policy.
9. The official definition of persons with a migrant background given by the German Federal Statistical 
Office is: “anyone who has immigrated into the present territory of the Federal Republic of Germany after 1949, 
any foreign citizen born in Germany, and any person born as a German citizen in Germany who has at least 
one parent who is an immigrant or was born as a foreign citizen in Germany” (Statistisches Bundesamt 2007).
10. To add to the confusion, the Integration Ministers’ Conference agreed in 2014 to change the definition 
of the Microcensus slightly for the use of the Integrationsmonitoring der Länder (Integrationsministerkonferenz 
2015).
11. In general, social reporting in Germany has always been characterized by a multitude of agencies, con-
cepts, and ways of reporting. 
12. A concise version in English is usually available (e.g. (Ministry 2013)).
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13. The aspect of diversity was added in 2014 in the Council Conclusions: “… diversity is an enriching and 
permanent feature of European societies of which migrants are an essential part. All residents in the EU member 
states should respect diversity as well as basic values underpinning European societies…” (Council 2014).
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Ethnic Diversity and Tolerance Issues  
in Major Russian Cities:  
The Case of St. Petersburg 
Valeriy A. Achkasov
Abstract
This chapter focuses on the consequences of “Soviet heritage” on the national immigration policy in 
the largest cities in Russia. Special consideration is given to an analysis of the content and results of the 
Tolerance programs instituted by the St. Petersburg government between 2006–2010 and 2011–2015. In 
the conclusion of the chapter the author presents recommendations for improving the city’s immigration 
policy.
Keywords: immigration policy, Tolerance programs, national-cultural autonomy, xenophobia, eth-
no-nationalism
Introduction
Large cities are natural destinations for migrants. Throughout human history, multi-ethnic 
urban populations have learned to coexist, for the most part, within a common economic 
and political institutional system. However, the fact remains that these densely-populated 
areas witness the emergence of the majority of social problems. High population concen-
trations in urban areas have been the source of social stresses and social innovations alike, 
a situation which is at the same time both the strength and the weakness of modern cities. 
One problem faced by every large city today is unprecedented mass transnational immigra-
tion, which has created tough challenges related to the instrumental, economic, cultural, 
and social integration of migrants. 
Historically, Soviet government had long-standing controversial practices regarding 
ethnic communities, including political support of ethnonationalism; establishment of eth-
nonational quasi-states and autonomous republics and districts; practical implementation 
of the concept of “fraternity of peoples;” and creating a multinational state consisting of 
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ethno-nations. These practices resulted in a number of serious problems, which must now 
be addressed in order to build modern Russia into a unified civic nation.
Official discourse on national policies in Russia is influenced by the perception that 
ethnic communities represent a “collective individual,” a “social organism,” or a “unit of 
development” and that they have a singular will and make choices as a group. These beliefs 
were borrowed from Marxism and are deeply rooted in Eastern European romanticism. 
They have been extensively incorporated into Soviet social science theories of “ethnos” (Y. 
Bromley) and in official ideologemes regarding the “national question.” Viewed from this 
perspective, society is considered a “community of national communities,” or a sum of “col-
lective individuals.” 
A strategic goal of the state during the Soviet Era was to devise mechanisms that would 
ensure the balance of group interests. An important part of the political process was to 
establish these ideological and institutional arrangements of ethnic and ethno-territorial 
entities as subjects of Soviet law.
This explains why current official Russian national policies and discourse on related is-
sues are developing in two main directions. The first direction involves the declaration and 
pursuit of so-called regional/national interests—the cumulative interests of “indigenous 
peoples” or “titular nations.” As a rule, this idea is now publicly discussed in the context of 
countermeasures against threats of external mass migration. The second direction involves 
handling inter-ethnic conflicts, including the settlement of existing ones and the prevention 
of new conflicts. 
“National Policy” in Russian Cities: The Impact of the Soviet 
Legacy
In major Russian cities national policy is understood, first of all, in terms of patronage of 
ethnocultural associations (national-cultural autonomies). As a result, city officials coop-
erate with “a very limited group of ‘ethnic leaders’ who mainly try to satisfy their personal 
ambitions” (Filippov 2008, 7). These leaders, in theory, also represent the ethnic commu-
nities to which they belong. In reality, “…all discussions on united and structured ‘ethnic 
communities,’ and on their relations with the state that need to be ‘regulated’ are just a 
figment of imagination” (Filippov 2008, 7). Authorities might be pleased to view these 
“ethnic communities” as monolithic, and those people capable of directing the behavior of 
“community members” as their leaders. But this is just a fantasy that helps to cement the 
public’s idea that ethnic communities act as a collective entity, and should be held jointly 
responsible for their actions.
It is easy to appreciate the lack of understanding of “national policy,” since regional 
authorities find themselves trapped in imitational ethnopolicy. Renowned demographer 
Anatoly Vishnevsky writes, “Today the objective of any diaspora is not cultural isolation 
and preservation of cultural identity, but considerable facilitation of ‘immigrant’s access 
to a new social and cultural environment while preserving only those elements of cultural 
identity that do not interfere with this process, or sometimes giving up all of them…’. Now 
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diasporas should be focused not on isolating a newcomer from the host society, but on help-
ing him integrate as fast as possible” (Vishnevsky 2011, 93). However, there is another prob-
lem: academic literature does not provide an established definition of diaspora. Dominique 
Schnapper believes that the key attributes of diaspora are “minimal institutionalization of 
economic, political, and identitary contacts between different communities of a dissipated 
nation; sustainability of relations with the host society; a special form of focus on unity and 
‘return’, even if it has nothing to do with the reality” (Cited by: Tinguy 2012, 14). This defi-
nition implies that immigrants in Russia do not form diasporas. But if we consider Gabriel 
Sheffer’s definition—“a strong sense of identity; solidarity among community members; po-
litical, religious, or cultural self-organization at the group level; various contacts with the 
territory or country of origin” (Tinguy 2012, 14)—it becomes evident that there are some 
immigrant diasporas in Russia, but they do not include new labor migrants. 
Nevertheless, using the idea of diaspora to solve the problems of mass labor immigra-
tion into Russia was supported on the political level. In her open letter to the interim gov-
ernor of Saint Petersburg, MP Oksana Dmitrieva (“A Just Russia” political party) suggested: 
“There are some really easy ways to relieve the irritation among citizens about the current 
migration policies. You should make a social contract with all ethnic diasporas. They will 
sort out their internal problems through strict compliance with their national laws much 
faster than our valorous police” (Dmitrieva 2011). This “easy” solution to a complicated 
problem seemed very populistic. However, two years later, on October 23, 2013, President 
Putin incorporated a similar proposal into his address to the mayors of Russian cities.
The hope for help from diasporas and their leaders has been met with disappointment. 
For example, according to sociological studies, the Azerbaijani diaspora in Saint Petersburg 
has been shown to “include different social environments that are relatively closed and show 
little interaction. There are clear boundaries between at least two communities” (Panchenkov 
2008, 169). One of these communities consists of well-integrated residents who have gained 
a certain status in different spheres, and “in their free time can afford to be ‘Azerbaijanis’.” 
Some have turned their ethnicity into a hobby, and some into a profession. They claim to 
represent interests of “all Azerbaijanis of Saint Petersburg” and act as mediators between the 
“diaspora” and state/city authorities (Panchenkov 2008, 169). 
Valeriy Tishkov, among others, emphasizes the problem of the inhomogeneity of dias-
poras and the different representation of groups within national and cultural autonomies. 
He writes, “…often a group of people forming a national-cultural autonomy tries to repre-
sent interests of the whole nation. At the same time, in such organizations it is hard to estab-
lish democratic procedures for elections. This explains why national-cultural autonomies 
express opinions that might not be shared by thousands and tens of thousands of people. It 
often causes conflicts that can lead to serious consequences in polyethnic regions” (Tishkov 
2008, 16). As a result, many officially registered national-cultural autonomies and ethno-na-
tional organizations of immigrants from CIS countries experience non-transparent gover-
nance as well as poor integration of “new” migrants into their activities. Their character, to 
a large extent, can be defined as presentational. Many leaders use their statuses as a tool for 
personal, group (kindred, family, etc.), political, economic, and other purposes which, in 
turn, leads to negative consequences such as clientelism and corruption.
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According to Vasily Filippov, social activities of national-cultural unities in the Russian 
Federation are “based on competition for funding for the organization of various cultural 
events” (most often, organization of traditional popular festivals or concerts by amateur 
folklore collectives) as well as for offices, equipment, etc. In the end, many “national leaders” 
strive to become public officials through the ‘ethnocultural sphere’ (Filippov 2001, 190). 
Filippov also cites R. Bidzhamov, representative of the Association of Assyrians in Moscow, 
as saying “The question of legitimacy of national-cultural organizations is a very sore point 
for all of us. It is no secret that most of them are in fact considered interest groups or clubs; 
they are quasi-organizations that are not closely connected to the corresponding ethnic en-
vironment and are often managed by unprofessional, incompetent, and ambitious leaders 
who do not follow democratic procedures” (Filippov 2008, 7–8). It is for this reason that the 
hopes of many (including city government officials, certain sociologists, and leaders of the 
oppositional “A Just Russia” party) that ethnic diasporas will be able to solve the problems 
of mass migration in major Russian cities have proven to be deceptive. It is a mistake for au-
thorities to institutionalize the right of leaders of national-cultural autonomies to represent 
all persons belonging (or related) to a certain “nationality.” It is also necessary to remember 
that the collective rights of ethnocultural unities cannot be placed above the right of indi-
viduals to choose their form of expression of ethnocultural identity. 
It is important to note that migrant inflows in Russian cities today consist of labor mi-
grants who are integrated into neither the host society nor established national-cultural 
autonomies. This migrant population is discriminated against on phenotypic, ethnic, and 
religious grounds, which unites them around their ethnicities and faiths. Ethnic immigrant 
communities are also being isolated as a result of the distribution of migrants and local 
people across various labor professions. 
Russian experts Andrey Kazantsev and Leonid Gusev note that Islamic sentiment is 
spreading among migrants from post-Soviet Central Asian countries. This may be explained 
by severe labor conditions and low salaries, harassment by corrupt police, pressure of mass 
xenophobia, and reaction to widespread trivial Russian problems such as alcoholism. 
New immigrants are often organized into networks controlled by informal social lead-
ers, many of whom are considered religious and/or criminal bosses. Many Tajik and Uzbek 
workers are formed into jamaats, each headed by a leader who acts as a foreman, a familial 
elder, and a religious leader. Moreover, religious leaders come to Russia from Central Asia 
for short periods without registration in order to carry out various rituals and to preach. 
Both of these sources can serve to expand extremist sentiments (Kazantsev and Gusev 
2013).
At the same time, official discourse and actions by government authorities result in 
creating, in the eyes of the public, the image of monolithic ethnic communities (particu-
larly, those that consist of migrants belonging to visible minorities) that are responsible for 
the deterioration of economic conditions and pose a threat to social stability. As a result, 
migrants become the subjects of de facto segregation, and discrimination practices may 
be viewed as acceptable (to be employed as an instrument to prevent so-called ethnic con-
flicts). Various forms of direct discrimination against and segregation of “ethnic strangers” 
are now becoming widespread.
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Russian authorities and most Russian citizens have developed a stereotype of immigra-
tion and migrants that can be defined by the following assumptions:
•	 External migration leads to the deterioration of social and economic conditions 
by overloading the social infrastructure and the local budget, decreasing market 
availability of consumer goods, and intensifying competition for accommoda-
tions and employment. 
•	 Migrants contribute significantly to criminal activity; they either violate the law 
themselves or they create “support points” for the transportation of weapons and 
drugs and for other activities of their ethnically-related criminal networks.
•	 Migration leads to political instability; greater numbers of “strangers” provoke con-
flicts with and negative attitudes by locals. According to the Levada-Center, only 36 
percent of Russians think that migrant labor is favorable for the country, while 35 
percent find it unfavorable.
•	 In light of the perceived problems outlined above, authorities must take prohibi-
tive and repressive measures against new migrants entering the country; 52 percent 
respondents to the Levada-Center survey support the introduction of a strict visa 
regime for Transcaucasian and Central Asian countries (Gilmutdinova 2015).
This stereotyping is evident in the following excerpt from an interview with Moscow 
mayor Sergey Sobyanin: 
Journalist: Most migrants come to Moscow from Central Asia. There are lots of them—
one can observe that in the streets, in public transport. How do city authorities see them—as 
seasonal workers who come and leave or as people who are likely to stay here and need to 
be assimilated?
S. Sobyanin: I oppose to just letting everyone stay. If we allow someone to stay it should 
first and foremost be people who speak the Russian language and have similar cultural 
traditions (emphasis by the author)—so-called ‘compatriots.’ It is better for people who do 
not speak Russian, and who have radically different cultural backgrounds, to live in their 
countries of origin. This is why we don’t welcome their adaptation in Moscow. I think that 
it is probably better that seasonal workers who finish their duties should go back to their 
families, to their homes, to their countries.
This exchange serves to reinforce the understanding that the implementation of policies 
for dealing with immigration and ethnic issues in major cities can only be optimized if the 
emphasis of state activities is shifted. Instead of focusing on repression and deportation, 
interacting exclusively with leaders of national-cultural unities, and promoting cultural and 
folklore events, Russian authorities should be working to prevent spatial segregation as well 
as social and professional discrimination of immigrants (particularly migrants who belong 
to visible minorities).1 Efforts should be directed toward curbing the spread of xenopho-
bia, migrantophobia, and ethnocentrism in public discourse (including mass media) and 
addressing these problems in school and university educational programs; thus far this has 
not been the case.
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Some Effects of Russian Immigration Policies 
Studies carried out by the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences (led by 
Vladimir Mukomel) analyzing the situation of labor and housing markets clearly demon-
strate that labor migrants in major Russian cities are often caught in a vicious cycle. Rejection 
of migrants by authorities and members of the host society (along with other circumstances 
that limit access to some professions for migrants) leads migrants to develop special social 
practices in order to integrate into and function effectively in local labor markets. There are 
some indications that segregation of ethnic groups occurs in various employment sectors, 
most notably in construction, retail, food services, and public transportation. These sectors 
contain hierarchies of workers, in which certain minorities may have their own specific 
social niches. In these instances, neither workers of the majority (the host society) nor au-
thorities, nor other ethnic minorities support efforts to redefine or eliminate these niches 
(Mukomel 2004). The combination of being locked into a certain niche and having low 
professional status does not imply a positive adaptation strategy. Rather, these migrants are 
simply limited to a certain economic segment in which they can apply their skills. As a re-
sult, in Russian society social and economic stratification correlates with ethnic differences. 
Conflicts between migrants and the local population of Saint Petersburg have become 
the most acute since 2013 (two years later than in Moscow). In April 2008 only one-third of 
St. Petersburg residents believed that migrants bring troubles; this number has now grown 
to 62 percent. Thirty percent currently express neutrality with regard to this issue. 
The past few years have also seen a shift in the perceived nature of migrant-related 
problems. While issues with migrants were once considered to be cultural (disregard of 
local traditions), concerns eventually became economic (“guests” occupying jobs meant for 
Russian citizens). Now the dominant view of the problem is less clearly articulated (“there 
are too many of them”). Psychologists see this situation as very dangerous: when people 
cannot logically explain their hatred and discontent (which is the essence of resentment—
author’s comment), they become capable of deviant behavior. Fifty percent of survey re-
spondents now seem to be in that place, a statistic which deserves the attention of Russian 
authorities. To reinforce this point, consider that the survey question “Should we create 
camps for illegal migrants, as in Moscow?” elicited a positive response from 44 percent of 
city residents, while 37 percent responded in the negative, and the rest were indifferent or 
undecided (Protasenko 2013, 9).2 
A characteristic of Russian society is that ethnic conflicts are often “superimposed” on 
faith-based ones, creating a compound effect. Responding to the survey question “Which 
religion is the most inorganic for you?”, 26 percent answered “Islam” (Malashenko 2006b, 
48). Aleksey Malashenko, a prominent Russian expert on Islam, notes that “Migration flows 
from the Northern Caucasus bring tens of thousands of young Muslims to Russian cit-
ies. They do not develop good relationships with local people…. In such areas as Greater 
Moscow, Astrakhan and Volgograd, and the Stavropol and Krasnodar regions where the 
proportion of Muslims is soaring, local people are beginning to see the increase in migrant 
flow as an expansion, as a threat for the existing status-quo. … This leads to the escalation 
of social tension” (Malashenko 2006a, 78). It becomes particularly dangerous when immi-
grant groups are tight-knit, demonstrate superiority towards locals, and do not show any 
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efforts to integrate into the receiving society. Over three-quarters of Caucasian migrants 
are strongly oriented toward preserving their culture and complying with ethnic rituals and 
habits, and therefore do not plan to acculturate and accept new cultural values and behav-
ior models borrowed from contacts with another ethnic community (in this case, ethnic 
Russians) (Dyatlov 1999). 
However, it is worth noting that conflicts with migrants from Northern Caucasian re-
publics and Trans-Caucasian states often result from competition between old timers and 
newcomers for a profitable economic niche and rivalry for access to material resources, 
positions, and power.
The Tolerance Program of the St. Petersburg Administration
The grandiose celebration of St. Petersburg’s 300–year anniversary in 2003 served as a pow-
erful enticement for potential immigrants. Unofficial statistics indicate that in the two years 
following the event, between 800,000 and 1.2 million migrants came to the shores of the 
Neva River, mainly from the Caucuses and Central Asia. Combined with existing diasporas 
in the city, this increased the number of non-Slavic-speaking people in St. Petersburg to 
between 25 and 30 percent of the city’s total population (Terentiev 2006).
In order to address various problems related to this unprecedented growth in labor 
migration, in 2005 the administration of St. Petersburg developed the Tolerance Program 
(Program for the Harmonization of Inter-Ethnic and Cross-Cultural Relations, Prevention 
of Xenophobia and Strengthening in 2006–2010 and 2011–2015) which was implemented 
in two iterations (Tolerance–1 and Tolerance–2) over a period of eight years. 
The main objective of the program was to address the instrumental and cultural integra-
tion of migrants. In other words, to break the symbolic barriers which lead to alienation and 
opposition between the host society and the migrants This is evidenced in the program’s 
slogan, “St. Petersburg unites people!” It is no coincidence that the main beneficiaries of 
the program were the city’s school children. They were the target audience for the following 
components of the program: 
•	 the “St. Petersburg Ethno-Calendar” for all school children, and methodological 
guides for teachers of grades 1–4 and 4–8 for implementing Ethno-calendars, as well 
as a daily planner for senior students
•	 a museum program which included the Russian Museum, Russian Museum of 
Ethnography, Erarta Gallery, and others
•	 support for a Russian language course for the school-aged children of migrants, and 
the development of relevant textbooks
•	 extracurricular activities at schools for immigrant children
Moreover, the Tolerance program included such important activities as:
•	 transcripts of lectures on the problems of immigration politics made available for 
journalists and staff of local administrators
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•	 development of several brochures dedicated to the practices of immigration politics 
in countries in Europe and North America
•	 the utilization of social outreach campaigns during certain periods during the pro-
gram
•	 the significant work of the House of Nationalities, which facilitated relations be-
tween city administration and more than 70 national-cultural associations
Of course these efforts had a number of downfalls. The program was coordinated ex-
clusively by administration officials, while experts and civil society representatives had little 
influence on its implementation (the expert committee would meet no more than once 
every two months and usually discuss secondary issues). Many program components func-
tioned much like campaigns and were thus temporary in nature; events like lectures and 
social outreach efforts were short-term, and publication of materials such as program lit-
erature and other publications would be “packed up.” No key performance indicators were 
presented and no monitoring mechanisms were implemented to assess the effectiveness of 
the program, although this was recommended by the experts who developed the program. 
Conclusion: Recommendations for Migration Policy Improvement
Migration is necessary for growth in Russia cosmopolitan areas, particularly St. Petersburg. 
The racial and ethnic diversity of migrants naturally leads them to become a part of the 
most rights-deprived and non-integrated segment of the population. In order to correct this 
situation and transform migrants into fully-integrated members of Russian society there 
must be an increase in the effectiveness of migration, integration, and naturalization pol-
icies related to employment assistance at both the federal and city levels of government. 
There also must be a concerted effort to significantly change the cultural predispositions of 
existing members of Russian society.
According to Valery Tishkov, “the optimal strategy is to avoid drastic changes in the 
usual population proportions on the level of local communities and large metropoles as well 
as spatial ethnic segregation (ethnic quarters); encourage cultural, and social, and political 
integration of the population; decrease the relevance of ethnicity (and its politicization); 
acknowledge the existence of multiple identities (“multinational” on the level of individual); 
and give up practices of state interference in the sphere of ethnic identification. Censuses 
should be carried out based on more modern criteria, taking into account complex ethnic 
identities” (Tishkov 2005).
Experts have a clear vision of what can be done with respect to the harmonization of 
inter-national relations.
First, we need projects aimed at overcoming the institutionalization of ethnicity that 
underlies inter-ethnic and inter-national hostility. In 2008 two-thirds of survey respondents 
defined Russianness “by blood,” a fact which speaks to the significance of this problem. It 
implies the necessity of education activities not only for school children3 but also for their 
teachers, for the government officials who implement ethnic policies, and the journalists 
who report on them. 
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The following key ideas should be considered when developing and implementing these 
projects: 
•	 A person consists of a complex repertoire of identities; ethnicity is just one of them, 
and is not the most important.
•	 Identification is not a fact; it is a process. That is why it is possible to change eth-
nic belonging or to be of more than one (or mixed) ethnicity: for example, Russian 
Armenian or even Russian Tajik.
•	 There is a significant difference between national and ethnic identity. These two 
identities reflect the two most important forms of social grouping of people in the 
modern era—state and ethnic—and are interconnected in a complicated way. Each 
one is a multidimensional phenomenon. They sometimes overlap and sometimes 
exclude each other. The civil (national) and cultural (ethnic) components of any suc-
cessfully implemented national project are closely bound, with one being dominant.
•	 Multinationalism and multiethnicity are not problems, but rather assets for Russia, 
because the state of Russia is the state of all Russian (‘Rossiisky’) people. “Ideas on 
some kind of ‘state-forming nation’ that are wrong from the doctrine point of view, 
as well as debates on ‘Russianness’ (extinction, uniqueness, greatness, etc.), contrib-
ute to the emotional and political solidarity of the part of the population who see 
themselves as Russians, while radically splitting the country ethnically and cultural-
ly,” notes Valery Tishkov (Tishkov 2005).
•	 The project of creating a “Russian (Rossiiskoy) nation” does not interfere with 
ethnocultural identity of Russian “internal ethnocultural nations”, since Russian 
(Rossiiskaya) identity should be super-ethnical and civil, and Russia should be the 
“nation of nations.”
As a part of the Tolerance program these ideas had to be more actively implemented 
by spreading the ethnocalendar and the diary for high school students; preparing articles 
for mass media; delivering lectures to various target audiences (school children, teachers, 
officials, journalists); and publishing popular manuals devoted to these issues. 
It is crucial to educate 16- and 17-year-old adolescents who comprise an identified 
risk group that tends to blame all their problems on “strangers.” They often become the 
“political infantry” of extremist nationalist organizations and movements, they are incit-
ed against people of other ethnicities and races, and they commit the most crimes against 
foreigners. According to the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation, over 
70 percent of those accused of incitement of ethnic hatred are youngsters (President 
2011).
Second, we should selectively approach the question of supporting national-cultural 
autonomies and unities, keeping the following considerations in mind: 
•	 Some have already started promulgating the ideas of separatism; for example, radical 
leaders of “Ingrians” are striving to create the “Republic of Free Ingria” within the 
territory of the Leningrad region that will withdraw from the Russian Federation, 
since “Russia is not a state, but rather a Moscow Asian empire” (Ingria 2016).
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•	 As noted by Vasily Filippov, the basis of social activity of many national-cultural uni-
ties in Russia is “formed by the competition for funding the organization of various 
cultural events” (most often, traditional popular festivals or concerts of folklore am-
ateur collectives) as well as for offices, equipment etc. In the end, many “ethnic lead-
ers” strive to become public officials in the ‘ethnocultural sphere’” (Filippov 2001, 
190). This is why it is not right to confine their activities to cultural and folklore 
events, as well as turn a blind eye to the fact that some heads of national-cultural 
unities automatically assume the right to represent the interests of all members of 
their ethnic group. Instead, it is necessary to encourage those national-cultural uni-
ties with whom city authorities cooperate to actively support recent migrants who 
are the least adapted.
Third, in order to overcome ethnocentrism, it is necessary to actively cooperate with 
mass media outlets, some of which disseminate hate speech. According to the Pavel Gusev, 
chair of the Commission on Support of Mass Media as a Basis of Civil Society, Freedom 
of Speech and Access to Information of the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation, a 
number of mass media channels deliberately propagandize national hatred and hostility. He 
says that in Russia there are over 100 such newspapers and magazines and over 500 websites 
(Neryuev 2008, 307–308). 
It is necessary to concentrate resources and focus the efforts of the city’s administration 
around a common goal. For this reason, it was a questionable step for city officials to de-
velop a new Migration program with formally proclaimed goals of adapting labor migrants 
(understood exclusively as temporary workers) to urban environments. Instituted along-
side the Tolerance program, the new Migration program was actually a liability. It failed to 
take into account the near impossibility of distinguishing between immigrants who plan 
to become permanent residents (targets of the Tolerance program) and temporary labor 
migrants (targets of the Migration program), a fact that has been proven by the experience 
of Western European countries. 
As Swiss writer Max Frisch said, “We asked for a workforce, but we got human be-
ings” (Wir riefen Arbeitskrafte, aber es kamen Menschen) (Quoted in: UNESCO 2003, 6). 
They did not leave; on the contrary, their families began coming to Europe to join them. 
Moreover, judging by public statements issued in 2013 by Dmitry Cherneiko, Chair of the 
St. Petersburg Committee on Labor and Employment, and in charge of the Migration pro-
gram, officials do not perceive that their main task is to develop measures to aid in the ad-
aptation of migrants. Rather, their priorities lie in tightening control of immigration and 
substituting migrant labor with allegedly-existing internal labor resources. Cherneiko 
announced a possibility of employment of city resident workforce that could substitute 
half of the labor migrant’s jobs: about 300,000 students and up to 70,000 retired persons 
(Regnum 2013). But such optimism expressed by an official raised a lot of doubts among 
experts.
Fourth, it is necessary to establish a system of monitoring that would aid in understand-
ing the results of the Tolerance program as their developers originally intended. This is a 
difficult proposition, because the Tolerance–2 program was shut down halfway through, 
and there are currently no measures for immigrant adaptation on the agendas of commit-
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tees at the Government of Saint Petersburg (including the new Committee on Inter-Ethnic 
Relations and Migration Policy in St. Petersburg).
Finally, finding a solution for the social and economic problems of the city remains a 
high-priority task, as the real reasons for ethnosocial conflicts and phobias are not phe-
notypic or cultural differences of migrants from the North Caucasus Republics or Central 
Asia, but rather unfavorable social conditions: economic crisis, dramatic social polariza-
tion, breakdown of the previous system of socialization, and social support of the popula-
tion. In particular, creating a system of fair access to labor and housing markets for local 
and non-local people is necessary in order to prevent two significant problems that lead to 
territorial, social, and professional discrimination and segregation on ethnocultural and 
phenotypic grounds: the emergence of ethnic and immigrant enclaves, and the overlapping 
of social and economic stratification and ethnic differences.
Unfortunately, this process has gone too far, and in the minds of common men there are 
solid images of, on the one hand, a ‘Tajik’ that is in need of money and social status and, on 
the other hand, a ‘Caucasian’ (those who migrated from the North Caucasus Republics of 
Russia) and who enjoys welfare that a common Russian cannot afford. The former image is 
associated with an “unclear, but strong sense of superiority, the latter—with ressentiment” 
(Malakhov 2013, 123). According to surveys, “the major part of ethnic negativism is formed 
by anti-Caucasian sentiment and hostility towards gypsies (they account for around two 
thirds of all answers that expressed hostility or phobias towards other nationalities). These 
phobias are intensified after each new phase of social and political tension” (Gudkov 2004, 
183). Ressentiment generated through the combination of wealth disparity and ethnic dif-
ferences is intensified by malfunctioning institutes of social protection—the structures of 
the welfare state that provide citizens of most developed countries of Western Europe with 
an a priori advantage over immigrants. 
While in the countries belonging to the core of the global capitalistic system migrants 
almost invariably occupy lower steps of the social hierarchy than the host population, in 
Russia it is not the case (Malakhov 2013, 123–124). This explains why anti-immigration 
ethnic xenophobia and Russian nationalism is, above all, a materialized expression of pop-
ular indignation about the growth of social inequality and injustice, directed by ethnic en-
trepreneurs. Valery Tishkov notes, “The ethnonationalism cultivated by the Russians is due 
to reactions by people with rather low levels of living and civic culture to rapid changes in 
their country (during the post-Soviet era—author), including changes in ethnic composi-
tion of population” (Tishkov 2005, 171). However, even a mega-city does not have enough 
resources and potential to solve this problem. Rather, serious decisions and actions by fed-
eral authorities are needed to address these important issues.
Notes
1. It should be noted that the position expressed by G. Poltavchenko, the Governor of St. Petersburg, 
during a meeting with the participants of the Petersburg Social Youth Convention on October 24, 2013 on 
labor migration, was much more appropriate than the position of Moscow mayor Sergey Sobyanin: According 
to Poltavchenko, “City administration does not prevent inflows of qualified work force into St Petersburg, but 
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newcomers should be ready to fulfill our requirements. Moreover, I believe that no aggression against migrants 
can be considered acceptable and is a crime, as is illegal migration.” (Zemlyanikina 2013, 3). 
2. In 2014–2015, the level of xenophobia towards immigrants began to decrease, though not as a result of 
positive actions taken by federal and city authorities. To some extent, it may be explained by the shift of attention 
to the events in Ukraine. Also, a dramatic weakening of the value of the ruble against the dollar and the euro 
may account for a considerable decrease in number of labor migrants from countries of Central Asia and South 
Caucasus. According to Konstantin Romodanovsky, Head of the Federal Migration Service of Russia, in 2015 
the number of CIS citizens coming to Russia decreased by 20 percent compared to the previous year. He believes 
that is explained by the tightening of Russian migration legislation.
3. It is obvious that support for children of ethnic minorities should focus not only teaching these children 
the Russian language, but also on the formation of tolerant attitudes of native Russian-speaking children to-
wards the languages and cultures of children of different ethnicities. In St. Petersburg parents report that both 
schoolchildren and preschoolers belonging to ethnic minorities may experience intolerant and sometimes ag-
gressive attitudes by peers (a symbolic barrier) (Alexandrova and Khomenko 2011, 72–73). 
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Russia as an Emerging Immigration Country?  
Changing Approaches to Migrant Integration: 
From Tolerance to the “Migration Police” (The 
Case of St. Petersburg)
Marya S. Rozanova
Abstract
The chapter presents the factors, both internal and geopolitical, which are contributing to the emergence 
of Russia as a new immigration country. Focusing on regional migration and migrant integration policies 
and practices, it also provides an overview of the public governance responses to emerging challenges.
The author uses St. Petersburg, the second largest migrant magnet city in Russia, to exemplify the 
specific features of current migration processes in Russia as well as the dynamics of change in regional 
migration and migrant integration policy priorities and public governance style as a consequence of the 
shifts in Russia’s official political agenda. The author analyses the sequential transition in the sphere of 
migration and integration process regulation from the model of “liberal multiculturalism” (“Tolerance-1” 
program) to that of “communitarian multiculturalism” (“Tolerance-2” program) in the period from 2006 
through 2013, and the further, more discrete turn toward the restrictive practices of the “migration police” 
beginning in 2014.
Keywords: migration policy, migrants’ integration, regional policies, Russia, St. Petersburg
Introduction. Russia: A New Immigration Country?
Russia ranks high among countries with significant immigrant populations. According to 
the Russian Census of 2010, approximately 11.2 million immigrants live in the country 
on a permanent basis. Yet current patterns of immigration demonstrate that Russia is still 
not considered an immigration country per se. Of those immigrants recorded in the 2010 
census, 7.9 million can be considered “international migrants born in a foreign country” 
only in a formal sense (Table 1). A considerable number of “immigrants” who came to 
Russia after 1991 (often as a result of forced migration following the collapse of the USSR) 
may more accurately be termed “repatriates.” Among them, approximately 3.25 million are 
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ethnic Russians,1 and 316,000 represent other ethnic groups traditionally residing in Russia. 
Also part of this group of “immigrants” are natives of the former Soviet Union republics 
who “resettled to the former RSFSR [currently a part of the Russian Federation—M. R.] 
through 1991” (Abylkalikov 2016, 43–44).




Number of Migrants (thousands) Length of Residence (percent)
Total Resettled Though 1991
Resettled After 
1991
10 Years and 
Longer 3 Years and Less
Abkhazia 83 33 50 80 6
Armenia 500 102 398 58 14
Azerbaijan 724 278 446 72 9
Belarus 724 495 229 84 6
Estonia 55 28 27 80 7
Georgia 425 174 251 76 7
Kazakhstan 2,427 878 1,549 70 9
Kyrgyzstan 561 140 421 53 20
Latvia 84 41 43 79 7
Lithuania 67 41 26 84 5
Moldova 278 95 183 58 16
South Ossetia 28 14 15 77 6
Tajikistan 434 82 352 52 22
Turkmenistan 175 58 117 66 10
Ukraine 2,876 1,696 1,180 79 6
Uzbekistan 1,081 267 814 54 17
Total 10,523 4,422 6,101 70 10
Source: (Abylkalikov 2016, 43–44).
For approximately 3.1 million truly international (or, more precisely, ‘life-time’2) mi-
grants in Russia in 2010 (Abylkalikov 2016, 44), adaptation programs and integration policy 
have been seen as low priority and mostly informal. However, as described below, due to 
gradual changes in migration flow patterns and migrant stock in both Russia and around 
the world, it may become necessary for Russia to make migrant integration policies and 
practices a new high priority. 
In upcoming decades, Russia may face serious global and regional geopolitical challeng-
es. According to Anatoly Vishnevsky and Mikhail Denisenko, members of the expert com-
munity have yet to realize the full consequences of the global demographic explosion occur-
ring between 1950 and 2015. This explosion resulted in (1) an increase in world population 
to 4.8 billion people, (2) a demographic imbalance between the northern and southern 
regions of the planet that “has grown dramatically and continues to grow” (Vishnevsky and 
Denisenko, 2016), and (3) a strengthening south-to-north trend in the flow of international 
mass migration (more than 100 million people have migrated in this direction since 1950).
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At the regional geopolitical level, Russia’s proximity to developing countries in Asia—
the most populous continent on the planet—is growing in importance. In recent decades, 
a tremendous demographic imbalance has developed between nearly depopulated regions 
of the Russian Far East (including border areas) and rapidly growing populations in many 
Asian countries. In this context it is important to note the following pattern: contemporary 
migratory flows naturally flock to relatively nearby (usually more developed) regions to the 
north. According to the UN world population forecast (medium scenario), the population 
of Asia will continue to grow from 4.4 billion people by 2015 to 4.9 billion by 2030, and to 
5.3 billion by 2050 (World Population Prospects..., 2015, p. 1). It is logical, then, to assume 
that Russia will experience “a strong migration pressure from the countries of Asia, and not 
only Central Asia, as it was until now” (Vishnevsky and Denisenko, 2016).
In addition to the geopolitical situation, serious domestic issues are contributing to 
Russia becoming an “immigration country.” Considering the unfavorable trends in the cur-
rent labor market,3 in the coming years Russia “will have to face the most severe labor deficit 
in post-Soviet history <…> ranging from unqualified workers to high skilled specialists of 
international level” (Ivanov 2015). According to official medium scenario population pro-
jections, Russia’s working age population will decrease by approximately 5 million people in 
the period from 2016 to 2030 (Demographic Forecast until 2030, 2015). The recovery of the 
Russian economy from the recent economic downturn, followed by the end of its “self-iso-
lation” and the necessity of developing its remote regions, will result in gradual growth of 
the scale and geography of transnational labor migration and help it to become a natural 
process.
In the future, it may be necessary for Russia to become an active participant not only in 
currently prevailing regional (from the “near-abroad”) but also global migration processes. 
This increased involvement will be due to the following objective factors: (1) the flow of 
ethnic Russians from compatriotic communities abroad will become exhausted, and (2) the 
labor potential of Central Asia and the Transcaucasia region—both current major donors 
to the labor force—will be insufficient to cover the new labor deficit (Akopov and Rozanova 
2010, 217–218). This coming reality demonstrates the need for proven adaptation tools and 
for a comprehensive system for the integration of migrants into Russian society (Achkasov 
and Rozanova 2013, 6–7). Russian society must also be prepared for new migratory in-
flows and the increasing complexity of the ethnic and cultural composition of the country’s 
population. In this regard, the positions that governmental officials take on the migration 
phenomenon, as well as the opinions of the public, both play a tremendous role. 
One enduring legacy of Soviet (and to some extent post-Soviet) thinking has been the 
concept of essentialism (primordialism), which brings with it a belief in the immutable na-
ture of ethnic and cultural identities. As an echo of that deeply rooted belief, migrants’ val-
ues and traditions are generally perceived as being irreconcilable with those of the “Russian 
people.” Thus, the attitude towards migrants in modern Russia has remained predominantly 
negative. As a result of the complex geopolitical developments that occurred in 2014 and 
newly created “images of the enemy,” opinion in Russia has become less migrant-phobic. 
Experts at the Levada-Center note that contemporary Russian society is far less concerned 
with the issue of migration: “…while in 2013 this issue concerned about a third of the re-
spondents, in February 2015 only 8 percent mentioned this” (Pipiya 2015). One significant 
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factor is the development of a more tolerant attitude in Russian society towards illegal mi-
grants, who had previously been often ill-treated (Table 2).





















help them find 
a job and settle 
down in Russia
31 35 25 27 20 20 15 19 41
Expulse them 
from Russia
53 50 54 52 57 64 73 64 43
Not sure 17 16 21 21 22 15 13 17 16
Source: (Pipiya 2015).
The reduction of migrant-phobia in 2014–2015 resulted from the following:
•	 migration was perceived as a minor problem compared to more serious concerns 
(“fascists” in the Ukraine, “the American threat” and “foreign agents” in Russia, ISIS 
terrorists, etc.). By focusing on these issues, the media facilitated “the partial replac-
ing of the primary target of xenophobic attacks with new objects of hatred” (Pipiya 
2015).
•	 the “public deproblematization of the migration agenda” (Pipiya 2015). This refers to 
the absence of high-profile crimes related to racial hatred and a general decrease in 
media coverage of migrant issues.
This indifference to migrants is likely temporary and in the near future migrant-phobia 
may become stronger again. This “re-strengthening” scenario may be supported by such 
factors as (1) a future decrease in the public’s attention on “the external threat,” (2) a need to 
channel discontent to ‘internal enemies’ resulting from a faltering economy and further de-
terioration of the socio-economic situation for the Russian population, and (3) increased at-
tentiveness to both the ongoing migration crisis in EU countries as well as the strengthening 
of European right-wing parties and political movements that use anti-immigrant rhetoric. 
Since “integration happens at the local level,” regional and local authorities play a tre-
mendous role in the development of primary efforts aimed at preventing xenophobia (mi-
grant-phobia) and strengthening principles of tolerance among receiving society members, 
and implementing target programs and special policies to guide migrants in their initial 
adaptation and integration. 
In Russia, programs developed and implemented in the federal city of St. Petersburg, 
the second major migrant magnet city in Russia after Moscow, offer some of the best ex-
amples of the vital role that regional authorities can play in combatting xenophobia (mi-
grant-phobia), and implementing regional migration/integration policy. Examining migra-
tion and integration issues in St. Petersburg also gives insight into how these policies can 
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be transformed due to the influences of global trends and to political targeting by federal 
authorities. 
Dynamics of Change in the Demographic Composition and 
Migration Flows in St. Petersburg
St. Petersburg is a city with a history of migration: its population growth has always depend-
ed solely on migrant inflows. Today, the city hosts over 170 ethnic groups.
The collapse of the Soviet Union brought with it pressing issues characteristic of 
European mega-cities: low birth rates, predominance of single-child families, high popula-
tion of the elderly,4 and increased complexity of the ethnic composition of the population. 
In addition, a period of severe economic hardship followed the dissolution of the USSR 
and led to an increased mortality rate that contributed to a decline in the city’s population. 
Emigration of the city’s highly-qualified workers in the 1990s further contributed to this 
decline, as did a reduction in the influx of internal migrants into St. Petersburg. The popula-
tion growth that followed these demographic changes was mostly caused by an increase in 























Figure 1. Population Dynamics in St. Petersburg, 1991–2015 (thousands)
Source: Based on the database of the Federal State Statistics of Russia (Federal 2015).
Currently, migrant workers account for the largest part of the international migration 
flow into the city; their numbers have rapidly increased between 2006 and 2014. In 2014, the 
official statistics of St. Petersburg and neighboring region Leningrad Oblast listed the total 
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number of foreign labor migrants at around 320,000; in 2015, that number had decreased 
to 256,000. However, these figures may be much lower than the actual number of migrant 
workers due to visa-free regulations in the main donor countries. The countries of Central 
Asia (Uzbekistan, with 63.6 percent, and Tajikistan, with 20.9 percent) currently contribute 
the highest number of migrant workers to Russia. This is a change from previous periods, 
in which greater numbers of migrant workers came from the Ukraine (8.9 percent) and the 
Transcaucasian region. 
Overall, current flows of migrant workers have the following characteristics:
•	 About 70 percent of labor migrants come from smaller cities and rural areas, a change 
from earlier periods in which most came from major cities. There is an increase in 
cultural distance between migrants with mostly traditional and mono-ethnic social 
backgrounds and members of the deeply urbanized poly-ethnic mega-cities of the 
receiving society.
•	 About two thirds of labor migrants practice Islam or originate from Muslim coun-
tries, a gradual change from previous periods in which more migrants were either 
affiliated with Christianity—predominantly Orthodox—or were considered to be 
non-believers.
•	 There is a significant decline in educational levels and professional training of mi-
grants. Half of all recent migrants do not have formal professional qualifications.
•	 Newly migrated workers are less  well-versed in the Russian language than previous 
migrants who studied in the Soviet Union.
•	 The majority of labor migrants are less well-off than in previous years. This has be-
come especially evident with the devaluation of the Russian currency at the begin-
ning of 2014.
Results of multiple surveys have shown that most labor migrants (particularly from 
Central Asia) consider their migrant status to be temporary, for short-term employment 
only, and do not intend to stay in Russia. While there is no doubt that some are transna-
tional migrants who will return to their home country, Chudinovskikh notes an obvious 
trend in Russia, as in emerging immigration countries, in which “as time flows, temporary 
labor migrants settle down in the country where they have been working for several years, 
bring their families, change their status and receive citizenship in the residence country” 
(Chudinovskikh 2014, 36). A comparison of Russian Census results from 2002 and 2010 
confirms that there has been an increase in the number of Central Asian natives (from 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan) in the immigration flows to Russia, most of whom are 
working-aged men.
In the absence of efficient and comprehensive adaptation and integration measures for 
labor migrants and new immigrants, the aforementioned issues contribute to the further 
fragmentation and polarization of city communities and delay the closure of gaps between 
local populations and labor migrants/immigrants and their descendants.
Faced with similar migration challenges during the recent decade, St. Petersburg’s ap-
proaches to migration policy and migrant integration have shifted with changes in political 
priorities and the value paradigms pursued by the political elite. During ‘more liberal’ years 
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of governing (approximately 2006–2012), consecutive attempts were made to implement 
two models of regional policy: “liberal multiculturalism” and “communitarian multicultur-
alism.” More recently (since 2013–2014), a new conservative political agenda infused with 
elements of political traditionalism has caused officials to further reject contemporary effec-
tive means of social modeling in favor of the rigid enforcement practices of the “migration 
police.”
Conceptual Framework of Migration Policy and Approaches to 
Migrant Integration, 2006–2016
From Liberal Multiculturalism to Communitarianism (2006–2014)
In the early 2000s the concept of tolerance received official support at the federal level in 
Russia. At that time, President Vladimir Putin declared Russia to be a European country 
embracing dominant European values. In 2006 he stressed that “in modern Russia tolerance 
and religious pluralism constitute the basis of social harmony and play important roles in so-
ciety’s development” (President 2006).
During the same period the Government of St. Petersburg, led by Valentina Matvienko 
(current Speaker of the Federation Council), launched a new dimension of regional policy to 
combat ethno-national and religious extremism and harmonize inter-ethnic and cross-cul-
tural relations within St. Petersburg society. The cruel killing of Hursheda Sultonova, an 
eight-year-old girl of Tajik origin, by a group of young nationalists shocked both the people 
and the city’s leadership. Following this incident, St. Petersburg adopted the 2006–2010 
Program for the Harmonization of Inter-Ethnic and Cross-Cultural Relations, Prevention 
of Xenophobia and Strengthening Tolerance (the Tolerance-1 program), followed by the 
Tolerance-2 program (2011–2015). The Governor was also committed to enhancing the 
positive global image of St. Petersburg as Russia’s “most European city” and “the capital 
of European culture” (Buldakov 2008), as well as promoting the “culture of hospitality” 
(Heckmann 2014).
From 2006 onward, St. Petersburg began developing a regulatory and functional frame-
work by instituting a cooperative system across the entire administrative hierarchy, and by 
engaging NGOs, the academic and expert communities, and the media. The Tolerance-1 
program was based on the principles of liberal multiculturalism (based on the concept by W. 
Kymlicka), and focused on wide-scale cultural events as tools to promote cultural diversity 
and curb xenophobia in city society.5 During Tolerance-1, no consideration was given to 
the comprehensive adaptation and integration of migrants and their children, nor to any 
support through a system of relevant activities (Rozanova 2012, 63–69).
With a goal of effectively modeling social processes, St. Petersburg began working to-
ward implementing systematic monitoring of inter-ethnic and inter-faith relations and pro-
cesses of migrant integration6, as well as developing KPIs for the Tolerance-1 program. The 
activities of nationalist and extremist organizations, as well as media publications of a xe-
nophobic nature were put under special control and dealt with severely. In 2009, UNESCO 
awarded the Tolerance-1 program an honorary diploma “for its constructive efforts to in-
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culcate mutual respect and tolerance in a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic society and to 
prevent and eradicate all forms of discrimination; … The award… serves as an encourage-
ment for similar activities in other countries” (UNESCO 2009).
The concept of liberal multiculturalism faced strong criticism, both in Europe and 
in Russia, during the preparation of the Tolerance-2 program. It was believed that this 
model was inadequate because, for the most part, in European countries “it affected 
the sphere of public rhetoric, rather than administrative practice” (Malakhov 2014, 96), 
and that the policy that was actually implemented was not multiculturalism, but rather 
a policy of “multiple monoculturalism” (Achkasov 2013). The implementation of this 
model actually boosted the self-closure of some ethnic and cultural groups, generating 
artificial barriers among them (Pain 2012, 38). In short, it served to further accentuation 
migrants’ ethnic and religious identities. The “failure” of multiculturalism was related to 
both the lack of a comprehensive approach and to unforeseen gaps in the evolution of 
migration processes.7
As a response to the perceived shortcomings of Tolerance-1, the Tolerance-2 program 
was based on the concept of communitarian multiculturalism (based on key principles of the 
concept of A. Etzioni), which advocated setting cultural limits to preserve the foundation of 
civic solidarity. In accordance with European trends the program included a commitment 
to fostering the cultural as well as ‘instrumental’ integration of migrants (Achkasov and 
Rozanova 2013, 6–7), emphasizing knowledge of the host country’s language, understand-
ing of its social infrastructure, and awareness of available opportunities for migrants in the 
service sector. Tolerance-2 also focused on the social integration of migrants, especially 
their children.
Because the competence in the sphere of migration and migrant integration policy pro-
vided to St. Petersburg’s government by the federal center was quite limited, the integrative 
element of the Tolerance-2 program was not comprehensive and thus not highly effective. 
Still, the program served an important function. For the first time in years, the government 
of St. Petersburg assumed a leadership role in developing the civic identity of its people, 
based on the principles of tolerance and openness to the globalized world and on the centu-
ry-long tradition of identifying itself as “a city with a European destiny.”
From Migration Policy to the Practices of the “Migration Police”  
(2014—Present) 
Several factors contributed to the gradual changes in St. Petersburg. First, in 2011, when 
Vladimir Putin appointed as Governor of St. Petersburg former KGP officer and lieu-
tenant-general of the Tax Police, Georgiy Poltavchenko, a new regional elite was established, 
and ‘civvies’ holding key city government positions were gradually replaced with ‘siloviki’ 
(people who served in security, militia, and military agencies). 
Second, a shift in the political priorities of Russia’s federal leadership also affected city 
policies, and changes in federal migration legislation in 2013 were echoed at the region-
al level.8 St. Petersburg established a dedicated Committee on Inter-Ethnic Relations and 
Implementation of Migration Policy (the Committee). That the Committee’s authority and 
scope of work were very limited illustrated the reluctance of federal and regional authori-
ties to further institutionalize comprehensive regional migration and integration policies. 
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Within the city, the Committee was dubbed “the migration police,” a term coined as a reac-
tion to its specific policing functions9 and its public management style. This management 
style reflected the previous professional practices of Committee senior officials and staff 
members, many of whom had spent most of their careers in enforcement agencies. In gen-
eral, the Committee (as well as other entities involved in the public governance of migra-
tion processes, including the Directorate for Migration Affairs of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs10 and Federal Agency for Ethnic Affairs) demonstrated the following basic features 
of public administration style in contemporary Russia:
•	 the ongoing “militarization” of the political sphere of public governance11 (more 
than half of all key public government positions in Russia are held by representatives 
of security and law enforcement agencies, the elite of whom are former KGB/FSB 
officers (Kryshtanovskaya, 2006))
•	 the general “deintellectualization” of political and administrative elites and the sphere 
of public governance due to (1) a decrease in the educational levels of members of 
the administrative elite since 2002 (Kryshtanovskaya 2002, 161), and (2) a common 
practice not to hire (recruit) industry professionals with experience in specific areas 
of public governance (in this regard, migration policy)
•	 reluctance by officials to practice public accountability and information transparency
•	 low level of engagement with the expert community
•	 disregard for feedback channels
In late 2013, there was an officially proclaimed change in the stance of Russian lead-
ership on key issues of political agenda and public governance: stressing the uniqueness 
of Russia against the values of the Western world, Vladimir Putin mentioned in his annual 
message that such a situation “is absolutely objective and understandable for a state like 
Russia, with its great history and culture, with many centuries of experience, not so-called 
“tolerance”—genderless and barren, but the actual common, natural life of different peoples 
within the  framework of a single state” (President 2013). As a result of this newly form-
ing political paradigm, the Tolerance-2 program folded in July of 2014, without any public 
debate—as a manifestation of the growing trend of ‘militarization’ style in the sphere of 
administrative management in St. Petersburg. The prescheduled closure of the Tolerance-2 
program signaled a symbolic refusal of the development of St. Petersburg into a city of 
modern European culture, and of the principles of tolerance and openness as a foundation 
of St. Petersburg’s identity.
The new city program, Promotion of Public Accord in St. Petersburg for 2015–2020 (the 
Accord program), was prepared without wide participation by the expert community and 
is an inconsistent document containing internal mismatches. The fundamentals of its mi-
gration policy are contained in Subprogram-3 of the Accord program, Strengthening Public 
Integrity and Harmonization of Inter-Ethnic Relations (the Subprogram), which includes 
“a set of measures to prevent tense relationships among the citizens living in St. Petersburg 
and labor migrants.”
The content and rhetoric of this document contradict the declared and pursued toler-
ance policy of former Governor Valentina Matvienko. The priorities of benevolent attitudes 
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towards migrants embraced by the Tolerance programs were replaced in the Subprogram 
with ambiguous speculations about the role of labor migrants (allegedly, temporary mi-
grants) in economic growth.12
The Subprogram prioritizes measures to enforce rules of law and order. It also main-
streams the combating of illegal migration. The following objectives are listed first in the 
Subprogram, and thus represent its key priorities: 
(1) reducing the number of crimes committed by migrants 
(2) reducing the number of crimes against migrants
The same objectives were chosen as the only key performance indicators (KPI) for the 
Subprogram (Table 3). These KPIs are currently defining the success level of measures to 
harmonize inter-ethnic relations in the city.
Table 3. Subprogram KPIs
KPI
KPI Value (percent)
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Reduction of crimes committed by 
migrants, compared with 2013
11.40 21.50 30.45 38.38 45.40 51.63 
Reduction of crimes against mi-
grants compared with 2013
 9.10 17.38 24.90 31.74 37.95 43.60 
Source: Kodeks (electronic database of normative and legal acts of Russia).
Implementation Tools of the Subprogram: A Summary of Activities
The Subprogram contains easily identifiable gaps between declared goals and the tools used 
to reach those targets. The bulk of the program’s funding is channeled to festivals, expos, 
concerts, cultural tours, social advertising in the streets of St. Petersburg, video trailers on 
the Internet, etc. Most of the activities are focused on supporting the cultural legacy of 
Russia’s ethnic groups represented within the city, while a smaller number of projects are 
focused on the cultural adaptation and limited instrumental adaptation of migrants. Such 
priority-setting is based on the underlying logic of the Subprogram, which considers other 
vectors of integration policy inappropriate given that labor migrants are generally regarded 
as temporary workers. According to the Subprogram’s authors, cultural adaptation activities 
should suffice for the reduction of crimes committed both by and against migrants.
Some similarities between the Subprogram and Tolerance-2 program are apparent in 
the context of support for the cultural and instrumental adaptation of migrants. This is 
confirmed by ongoing hosting of cultural and educational activities, in particular for chil-
dren and students (although with much less frequency for this, the most important target 
group); presenting of lectures on the Russian language; and lending of informational sup-
port to labor migrants. The difference lies in the fact that, while most of the Subprogram’s 
cultural activities have a city-wide scale and are set up to embrace the maximum number of 
people possible, in practice transnational migrants as a specific target group are not entirely 
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covered by these activities. On top of that, there is hardly any focus on migrant children,13 
which means that the government clearly states through its actions that family migration as 
a demographic driver is not welcomed. This attitutude of neglect toward migrant children 
demonstrates the unpreparedness of authorities to implement integration policies in the 
city (and in Russia in general14), since “migrant children who went through school adapta-
tion, can speak the local language and are aware of local rules, are not only potential good 
employees, but also a powerful link to local culture and tradition for the family” (Poletayev 
2014, 18–19).
In terms of the efficiency of the Subprogram, it should be noted that there has been 
both a reduction in the quality of the current activities and insufficient expert support at 
the design phase. Due to the fact that the Committee’s work is predominantly of a closed 
character,15 the effectiveness of the Committee can be judged solely by the individual public 
events that it creates. The following projects most effectively illustrate these events (each 
will be briefly discussed below): (1) the park-museum ETHNOPARK; (2) the infrastructure 
cluster for migrant workers; (3) the foundation of Ethno-Press-Club; and (4) a campaign to 
strengthen the positive image of labor migrants in the media.
(1) In the framework of culture-specific projects, the planned construction of a 
permanent ethnographic museum, ETHNOPARK,16 in suburban St. Petersburg 
seems one of the most promising initiatives. The museum will present cultural 
traditions, lifestyles, crafts, and architectural methods of various ethnicities living 
in St. Petersburg (the Slavic ethnic groups, ethnic groups residing in the Russian 
North, and Turk and Caucasian ethnicities), representing the mulifaceted cultural 
diversity of different regions of Russia. 
(2) Of a more controversial nature is the Committee’s project to construct an 
infrastructure specifically for labor migrants: clusters of compact living spaces, 
along with eateries and activity centers (to attend basic language and legal courses). 
In undertaking this project, the Committee did not take into account the long-
term failure of similar migrant enclaves created in the cities of Western Europe. 
The formation of these enclaves was facilitated by social housing programs for 
labor migrants and refugees. The establishment of a so-called “buffer zone” and 
system of social support was instrumental in mitigating the initial adaptation phase 
for foreigners and in preventing possible “cultural shock” in the receiving society. 
However, these seemingly positive short-term effects later served to demotivate 
foreigners from adaptation and further integration into the larger society, and 
supported the emergence and institutionalization of migrant diasporas that often 
chose a strategy of parallel coexistence with the receiving society.
(3) The foundation of the Ethno-Press-Club is another useful initiative focused on 
building an interface for dialogue among journalists from ethnic and city media, 
representatives of ethnic and cultural associations in St. Petersburg, and the city’s 
administration.
(4) In March 2015, the Committee launched a new media campaign in St. Petersburg. 
District and municipal newspapers had an obligation to present episodes of labor 
migrants’ lives in order to instill in St. Petersburg’s population a positive image 
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of migrants. With proper focus, this initiative could become a reasonable effort 
carry out the goal originated by the Tolerance programs to eliminate the media’s 
rhetoric of hostility and hatred toward migrants. However, implementing this 
positive idea without expert support can lead to negative results.    
The Committee believes that “the press needs to publish positive stories about 
ordinary migrants whom city residents meet every day: street cleaners, builders, 
etc.” (Zmanovskaya 2015). By doing this, the Committee is emphasizing neither St. 
Petersburg specifics17 nor European (first of all, German) experience.18 Portrayal of 
migrant workers only as street cleaners, builders, or service workers contributes to 
further solidify public opinion within the city that society is divided into “ethnic 
classes” (in which specific sets of social and economic features are attributed to 
specific ethnic groups). This will only serve to strengthen existing stereotypes that 
people from Central Asia or other “donor regions” and their descendants can do only 
low-qualified work in non-prestigious sectors of the economy.    
On the contrary, adopting the positive practices of Germany, for instance, could 
aid in the more successful implementation of the media project. One such example 
is the German Integration Fund (Deutschlandstiftung Integration) that recently 
launched a project aimed at changing public opinion on migration outcomes by 
creating social advertising illustrating people with migrant backgrounds who 
have made significant contributions to the German economy, sports, culture, 
and education. Definitely, if properly focused, the media project in St. Petersburg 
could also lead to a slight shift in the negative perceptions about migrants and help 
to build a more positive image for future migration.     
It is worth noting that the beginning of the Committee’s media campaign coincided 
with St. Petersburg’s hosting of the International Russian Conservative Forum, the 
largest event to bring together representatives of far-right parties and nationalist 
movements from both the EU and Russia.19 The fact that the city hosted such a 
symbolic event served to damage the previously created image of “St. Petersburg, a 
City of Tolerance.” The Forum helps to illustrate that the overall Russian/European 
context has an ambivalent effect on the situation in St. Petersburg, with some groups 
affiliated with the Russian political elite building ties with European far-right parties 
and movements. 
As yet, a comprehensive expert evaluation of the current Subprogram cannot be un-
dertaken. Several conditions in St. Petersburg are preventing this from happening, most 
importantly, the lack (or rejection) of a comprehensive system for systematic monitoring 
migration and integration processes (like the integration monitoring model in Hessen, 
Germany). There is also a lack of regular, comprehensive interdisciplinary surveys on in-
ter-ethnic and cross-religious relations (conflicts), migrants’ values and life strategies, the 
dynamics of the territorial spread of migrants in an urban environment, etc. that has pre-
vented the reaching of research-based conclusions regarding the general results and effec-
tiveness of St. Petersburg migration and integration policy development. 
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Conclusion
Ideally, Russian migration and migrant integration policy should be developed based on 
long-term strategic plans of national growth, including considerations for sustainable eco-
nomic growth and demands for labor resources, demographic processes, and key national 
issues of territorial development. The increased probability of Russia becoming a new im-
migration country is based on complex internal factors and multifaceted geopolitical chal-
lenges that could engender a new global migration wave.
Current prevailing tactics to maximize economic profit involve the use of ‘temporary’ 
labor migrants to perform predominantly low-skilled work (in part, following the basic 
principles of the model of labor migration in Persian Gulf countries). When reinforced by 
a ‘militaristic’ public government style with regard to migration policies, these tactics can 
lead to negative consequences and limit Russia’s capabilities in an international arena in 
which there is increasing competition among developed countries for human capital. 
At the federal level the situation is aggravated by the fact that steadily inconsistent po-
litical changes taking place over the last decade in the sphere of migration policy (from 
liberalization towards restriction practices and vice versa)20 have often been of a reactionary 
nature and accompanied by obvious gaps between the declared objectives in the concep-
tual and legal frameworks of migration policies and their practical implementation. These 
changes also fail to contribute to the formation of a systematic approach to solving the 
deepening problems in Russia’s demographic, social, and economic sphere in the short- and 
long-term perspectives. 
In the example of St. Petersburg, analysis of the dynamics of conceptual frameworks 
and mechanisms for the implementation of city programs makes it possible to conclude 
that there are currently no strong institutionalized frameworks for the implementation of a 
comprehensive regional migration and integration policy for migrants and their children. 
Moreover, ongoing strengthening of the “militarization” trend in migration policy gover-
nance is reshaping the priorities of the regional migration policy towards restrictive prac-
tices and exclusive approaches to the integration of migrants, and gradually leading to the 
general devaluing of migrants’ lives.21
For Russia, as a potentially new emerging immigration country, the European (espe-
cially German) labor migration record-past and present-highlights the need for timely fore-
casting of migration processes and implementation of consistent migration and integration 
policies in Russia. Special focus should be placed on the establishment of effective, flexible 
mechanisms for regulating both high- and low-skilled foreign labor in the context of short- 
and long-term economic and national development strategies, together with the institution-
alization of migrant integration systems at the regional level.
Footnotes
1. A significant number of immigrants are ethnic Russians, having moved from one republic to another 
within the former USSR. After its demise they were not welcomed within the new independent states–for-
mer national Soviet Republics in which the nation-building process often involved ethnocentric rhetoric and 
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Russophobia. Ethnic Russians were often granted the status of stateless citizens with the complete loss of civil, 
social, cultural and political rights.
2. Life-time migrants in this context are persons residing outside the place of their birth at the time of the 
Census.
3. The “Crimean crisis” of 2014 and the economic uncertainty in Russia led to emigration of high-qualified 
workers including researchers and entrepreneurs (surpassing numbers seen in the early 2000s). Also, some 
negative demographic scenarios are possible due to the expected decline of birth rates and higher mortality.
4. The average age of city residents in 2014 was 41.2. The number of people beyond working age is projected 
to experience constant growth, from 25.7 percent of the total population in 2013 to 28.9 percent in 2020. At the 
same time, the number of people of working age is declining (from 63.4 percent in 2005 to 61.5 percent in 2013). 
Moreover, the base of the age pyramid is narrowing: from 13 percent in 2005 to 12.8 percent in 2013.
5. The studies by A. Aleinikoff and R. Rumbaut proved that a society’s openness to migrants is an import-
ant factor in their further adaptation. The way the receiving society treats migrants determines their behavior 
at a later stage; the same, in turn, has an effect on the attitude of the society to new migrants (Aleinikoff and 
Rumbaut 1998, 2). Therefore, strengthening the principles of tolerance in urban environments is essential.
6. Contrary to Germany, in which methods of migration and integration monitoring based on objective in-
dicators have been developed and successfully implemented, Russia still relies on ethnological surveys to moni-
tor migration and integration processes. The vast majority of these ethnological surveys are limited to questions 
about personal attitude of respondents towards migrants (likes or dislikes) and their preferences regarding one 
ethnic group or another.
Here are two main issues with these surveys. First, in the context of migration processes such ethnological 
surveys are not informative enough and do not provide the necessary data for scientific analysis and future fore-
casting of migration and integration processes in Russian society. Second, by focusing on ethnic differentiation 
(in line with the concept of primordialism), such surveys implicitly contribute to the further politicization of 
ethnicity and leave it wide open for populist interpretations of the far-right orientation.
7. For example, in the 1980s Germany “encouraged the parallel-yet-separate living of Turks and Germans 
with the expectation that the Turks would leave” (Malakhov 2015). This was done, in particular, by restricting 
foreigners from obtaining German citizenship and by introducing the teaching of certain subjects to children of 
migrants in the language of their parents’ origin. The purpose for such instruction was “not to encourage diver-
sity, but to give migrants’ children an opportunity to return to their parents’ home country” (Ibid.).
8. Federal Law No. 284 was adopted in response to anti-immigration claims and riots in 2013. It mandated 
strengthening of inter-ethnic and cross-religious consensus, as well as the prevention of open discrimination, 
and forced social and cultural adaptation (not integration) of migrants by the Russian regions, and imposed 
upon the latter responsibility for any conflicts in this sphere.
9. Committee officials are responsible for managing illegal migration, performing spot checks in old hous-
ing to catch illegal migrants, and combating closed ethnic enclaves.
10. Before 2016 it was a Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation. 
11. It is symptomatic that in 2016 Federal Migration Service was disbanded, and became a part of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation.
12. On one hand, the Subprogram acknowledges the positive “economic effect of using foreign labor mi-
grants,” while on the other, it states that migrants “stay in the way of innovative approaches… and job-creation 
for Russian citizens.” The term “migrants” is used in combination with such concepts as “criminal act,” “infec-
tious and parasitic diseases,” and “fatal accidents”. These characteristics of labor migrants as a social group are 
signs of the general hostile attitude and rhetoric.
13. Between 5 and 12.8 percent of school students in St. Petersburg are foreigners who have recently come 
to Russia with their parents. The uncertainty of these figures is explained by the fact that “no agency has the data” 
on the number of chidren migrants in St. Petersburg (Children’s Omdudsman 2015, 301).
14. According to Order No. 32 of the Ministry of Education and Science of Russia, dated 22 January 2014, 
the right to school education has been linked to parents’ registration as permanent residents, and to the legal sta-
tus of foreigners. The order violated the provision of the Russian Constitution (Article 43) on the entitlement of 
every person to an education and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Article 28) ratified by the Russian 
Federation, which made primary education compulsory and free to all children irrespective of their legal status 
or the legal status of their parents.
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Despite the cancellation of this Ministry order by the Court in 2015, many school principals are forced to 
deny enrollment to migrant children with no registration/legal status under pressure from the officials of the 
Federal Migration Service and the Prosecutor’s Office, both of which are committed to identifying migrants who 
have violated the migration law.
15. Since its establishment, the Committee has not published any public annual or quarterly report on its 
work and achieved indicators, nor the results of any substantial expert surveys related to the general situation 
in city’s diverse migrant communities, nor information regarding the dynamics of interethnic and interfaith 
relations in the complex urban environment.
16. This project will be a the latest addition to a list which already contains 49 ethnic parks opened in 
36 Russian regions, with Ethnomir (http://www.ethnomir.ru) near Moscow being the most significant of them. 
Ethnomir was conceived as an interactive model of the World, displaying architecture, national cuisine, tradi-
tions, and lifestyles of almost every nation.
17. First, St. Petersburg is Russia’s second major research and educational center. The human resource po-
tential of its research organizations and universities is 170,000, and approximately 70 percent of the total popu-
lation hold a university degree. The city’s distinctive feature is its focus on the training of qualified professionals. 
The influx of low-qualified workers negatively affects the general perception of labor migration. It contributes 
to the belief that this “substitutional” migration decreases the total research and cultural capacity of the city. 
Second, city residents have not developed a positive attitude to blue-collar professions in general, particularly 
with regard to low-qualified 3D jobs (in Russia the most popular “motivational” remark of parents for their 
children goes like this: “If you don’t do well at school, you will become a street cleaner!”).
18. A research effort by OECD in 2009–2010 showed that migrants and persons with a migration back-
ground have fewer opportunities for gainful employment in some EU countries, even if they received a degree 
in the same country and have qualifications similar to those of local workers. Thomas Liebig, the author of this 
research, believes this phenomenon is related to a general lack of employers’ trust for persons of a different eth-
nic origin or a widespread prejudice that all migrants have inferior professional skills.
19. The Freedom Party of Austria, the Serbian Radical Party, the Alliance for Peace and Freedom (Association 
of far-right European Parties closely involved in the European National Front and maintaining contacts with 
“conservative” circles in Russia), the New Force (Italy), the National Democratic Party of Germany, Golden 
Dawn (Greece), the Party of the Swedes (Sweden), The Danish People’s Party, the British National Party, the 
National Democracy (Spain), etc. (Dobbert 2015).
20. Adopted in 2013, the State Migration Policy Concept of  the  Russian Federation through 2025 was 
relatively liberal. Along with liberal shifts (cancellation of quotas to attract labor migrants; introduction of the 
patent system and a possibility be legally employed by private individuals), 2013–2014 saw over 30 amendments 
having a repressive manner. The toughening of entry and residence regulations in Russia and punishment for 
violations of these regulations led to an increase of expulsions of foreigners from 35 thousand in 2012 to 139 
thousand in 2014 (Gannushkina 2015, 123, 132). Despite the fact that the need to attract migrants has been 
officially endorsed, little has been done to improve their status. Russia did not accede to the following UN 
conventions: International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members 
of their Families, ILO Conventions No. 97: Migration for Employment Convention, and No. 143: Migrant 
Workers (Supplementary Provisions) (on Migrations in Abusive Conditions, and the Equality of Opportunity 
and Treatment) (Poletayev 2014, 17).
21. In this regard the tragic death of Umarali Nazarov, a 5–month old baby forcefully taken by migra-
tion servants and policemen from his Tajik mother during the anti “illegal” migrants raid in October 2015 
(Petlyanova 2015) is not just a tragic coincidence. Measures taken against the investigation of Umarali’s death 
and the absence of official government reaction to this tragedy were not unintentional.
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Media Influence on the Public Perception of 
Migrants and Migration in Germany
Ferry Pausch
Abstract
The media’s influence on the way in which migrants are perceived by the public is a crucial factor in man-
aging migrants’ integration, and contributes to voters’ decisions at the polls. Migrant virtues have been a 
controversial topic in the general public since at least 2010. In the winter of 2014/2015 anti-Islam dem-
onstrators in Dresden and other cities began calling the German media the “lying press,” implying that its 
coverage of integration and migration issues is not impartial. 
Today one in every five people in Germany has a migrant background. Due to new immigrant inflows 
and a relatively high rate of newborns with migrant parents, this percentage should increase steadily in the 
future. Yet, as usually happens with minorities, migrants are often portrayed in a negative manner. Over 
the past few years, this pattern has begun to change in an effort to see migrants more objectively. Germany 
is now an immigration country. Therefore, it is time for the media, civil society, and the government to 
acknowledge this fact and implement an approach that furthers integration rather than encumbers it.
Keywords: integration, migration, refugees, Islamization, PEGIDA, Germany, media
Introduction 
The success of immigrant integration at the national level depends primarily upon two fac-
tors: the self-reflection of the receiving population and the image that this self-reflection 
imposes on the migrants. For example, nations such as Canada, Australia, and the United 
States are immigrant-based societies, and migration has become a part of their national 
identity. In contrast, the peoples of old Europe mostly perceive themselves as deeply rooted 
in their nations and national cultures. Some European families cherish their roots and can 
trace them back centuries; for instance, state officials, lawyers, and other members of the 
Third Reich were required to obtain a document (Ariernachweis or Aryan Certificate) that 
proved their German ancestry back five generations. 
This deeply rooted German perception of a national identity is at odds with today’s 
reality. The population of Germany is approximately 80 million. As of 2014, 15.9 million 
148 FERRY PAUSCH
people in Germany (19.8 percent of the overall population) had a migration background 
(Statistisches Bundesamt 2015). Today one in five people living in Germany has a history 
of immigration.1 In major cities such as Frankfurt, Munich, and Berlin this percentage can 
reach 30 percent to 40 percent. More than 30 percent of the babies born in Germany have a 
migration background (Dernbach 2010). On average, migrants are younger than Germans 
(35.2 vs. 46.7 years) and have more children (1.6 births per migrant woman vs. 1.3 births 
per German woman) (Krings 2014). According to demographic estimates for 2020 the per-
centage of migrants in the German population could reach 23 percent (Ibid.). This number 
will grow steadily, and in the near future every third person in Germany will have a migra-
tion background. 
An ageing and shrinking society, the lack of qualified personnel, and shrinking funds 
for pensions are all factors in favor of immigration. So why do Germans have a hard time 
accepting the demographic changes in aging structure and the ethnic composition of the 
German society? Widely held stereotypes about migrants are preventing many Germans 
from acknowledging the necessity of immigration. These stereotypes include the belief 
that migrants are stealing jobs from German citizens, and that their presence leads to the 
Islamization of Germany and the degradation of such German virtues as high performance 
punctuality, and others. It seems as if immigration is mainly perceived as a threat rather 
than as an opportunity.2 Also, the pretensions Germans have towards immigration appear 
to be connected to factors such as the perception of national identity and self-esteem, as well 
as the image of certain religions, cultures, and ethnicities. Many public discussions have 
been held on topics related to leading culture (Leitkultur), national identity, and reaching a 
common understanding regarding integration.3 
The public and private media play a crucial role in shaping images and perceptions. In 
this way, the media can play a positive role in migrant integration by helping to dispel ste-
reotypes about migrants and strengthening societal cohesion.
Post-World War II Migration to Germany 
Instead of a culture of sustained immigration, Germany has experienced several waves of 
immigration since World War II. At the end of the war, millions of ethnic Germans fled 
from Eastern Europe to Germany. This tremendous influx of people into the war-torn 
country placed a strain on Germany’s resources and forced members of the receiving so-
ciety to share their property with the newly arrived immigrants. Once reconstruction was 
underway a thriving economy made the entire population wealthier. Even though this 
group of immigrants shared the same national identity, culture, and religion as German 
citizens, conflicts between the established members of society and newcomers occurred, 
a foreshadowing of some of the conflicts Germany would experience with later migration 
inflows.
Fifteen years after the end of World War II, the German economic miracle 
(Wirtschaftswunder) boosted the economy, and a lack of workers limited opportuni-
ties for further growth. At that time German politicians decided to invite workers from 
other countries to join the labor force, leading to the signing of recruitment agreements 
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(Anwerbeabkommen) with Italy, Turkey, Portugal, Spain, and other countries. Millions of 
“guest workers” (Gastarbeiter) accepted the invitation to work in Germany.
Both Germans and guest workers were under the impression that this influx was tem-
porary, and that the guest workers would return to their home countries when the German 
economy no longer needed them. It was the original intent of most guest workers to leave 
Germany after several years, having saved enough money to live comfortably at home. 
These assumptions led the German government to neglect developing integration mea-
sures. Why teach migrants more German than they needed for their jobs if they would 
be leaving Germany after a few years? Why educate Germans about foreign cultures if the 
members of those foreign cultures were not there to stay?
The reality was, however, that these guest workers were unable to make as much money 
as they thought they would, and many of them prolonged their stays, always with the intent 
that it would be for another short period and not permanently. Despite their intentions, 
many of them ended up staying all their lives in Germany.
As these “temporary” stays grew longer, guest workers began to bring their families 
from their home countries to live in Germany. In the 1980s family unification measures 
(Familiennachzug) were a widely discussed political topic, and the government started rais-
ing hurdles for families attempting to follow their relatives to Germany. Even as guest work-
ers expressed increasing desire for their families to follow them to Germany, the German 
government still held on to the idea that guest workers would eventually return home.
After the end of the Cold War, the opportunity to resettle in Germany was presented 
to many so-called Russian Germans (Russlanddeutsche)—the ethnic Germans residing in 
the territory of the former Soviet Union.  They were considered Germans and as such had 
a right to German citizenship. This large influx of migrants initially disturbed the gener-
al public. However, it did not take long for Russian Germans to become integrated into 
German society, after which period they were no longer perceived as a distinct immigrant 
group.
After Gerhard Schröder became German Chancellor in 1998, the topic of integration 
was returned to the political agenda. The revision of naturalization legislation was accom-
panied by a national debate on jus sanguinis (right of blood) and jus soli (right of soil) 
principles. In 1999 the Nationality Act (Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz, StAG), was amended to 
incorporate jus soli, which served to facilitate the immigration process. Access for skilled 
immigrants was mitigated, and the regulations for obtaining German citizenship were sim-
plified. Current German immigration regulations rank among the most liberal in Europe; 
however, few non-EU citizens arrive in Germany via legal channels. 
Economic crises in some European countries in 2007 and the financial meltdown in 
the United States in 2008 caused many Europeans to start looking for work in Germany. 
Countries with especially high youth unemployment rates, such as Spain and Portugal, con-
tributed significantly to the wave of migration to Germany. German professional training 
that prepares young people for non-academic professions was praised in crisis-ridden coun-
tries, as were many other initiatives started to bring young people to Germany for work. 
The events of the Arab Spring and the war in Syria triggered an immense wave of ref-
ugees into Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, and other countries in the region. A large number of 
refugees from countries in the Middle East and Northern Africa, as well as from Eritrea, 
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Nigeria, and other nations tried to make their way into Western Europe. Many people died 
attempting to cross the Mediterranean. In 2014 about 400,000 refugees arrived in Germany. 
The estimated number of refugees arriving in Germany 2015 has been put between 800,000 
and one million. Millions of Syrians and Iraqis are waiting in refugee camps outside their 
countries for an end to the conflicts or for a path to safe countries.
The number of people who are potentially willing and able to migrate is also increasing 
within the European Union and its neighboring states. Based upon these recent events, it 
appears that a new period of mass migration has begun. 
The Role of Mass Media and Civil Society Actors in the 
Integration Process 
Migrants in the Media
The media plays an important role in the process of integration (Geißler 2014). Media does 
more than merely inform about current events. It reflects reality, classifies occurrences, and 
presents heroes and villains. Most beliefs about integration and immigration stem from 
media sources which tend to represent migrants in a predominantly negative light. News 
reports about integration issues focus mostly on negative occurrences, and the entertain-
ment media portrays migrants as either victims or offenders. Only during the last few years 
have migrants received more “normal”—or rather realistic and undistorted—coverage in 
the media.
Some media outlets attribute to migrants the same stereotypes ascribed to them by 
Thilo Sarrazin in his best-selling book, Germany Abolishes Itself: poorly educated, having 
a high unemployment rate, predisposed to criminality, having questionable morals, and a 
threat to public security. These stereotypes are still widely shared by the public.4 
It should be noted that these days the media is searching for a more realistic angle, and 
its take on migration is changing. The German National Integration Plan initiated in 2006 
brought together key stakeholders of integration, including representatives. Many media 
stakeholders committed to voluntary agreements aiming at more objective representation 
of migrants in front of and behind the cameras. 
Even before the Federal Government’s stakeholder process, researchers had already ob-
served improvements in the media’s portrayal of migrants. In a 1996 sample of regional 
newspapers, 42 percent of articles with a referral to migrants contained a negative connota-
tion. In 2006 this percentage had shrunk to 30 percent (Geißler 2014). Over time, this im-
provement has occurred for almost all migrant groups; however, media coverage of Islamic 
topics remains overwhelmingly negative. 
The Contribution of Civil Society 
While government authorities and the media are important contributors to the public’s per-
ception of ethnicities, cultures, and religions, civil society is another strong and indepen-
dent influencer. Civil society organizations contribute to the public discourse that is help-
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ing to shape German perceptions of migration and to create an inclusive modern German 
identity. 
The German Foundation for Integration (The Foundation) is one such civic organiza-
tion. It was founded in 2008 by the Association of German Magazine Publishers, who felt 
the need for an entity that could contribute positively to the narrative of migration and in-
tegration. The Foundation is a private, independent organization whose mission is to active-
ly contribute to an open and plural society that encourages immigration and integration. 
Education and labor market integration measures are the main areas of activity. It specializ-
es in promoting best practices, presenting success stories, facilitating the dialogue between 
migrants and locals, and supporting migrants on their educational and professional paths.
The Foundation actively promotes the importance of language programs as an effective 
mechanism of integration measures. Before 2008 the importance of language as part of an 
integration effort had hardly been subject to discussion. At the time it was not a mainstream 
conviction that every migrant should be given the opportunity to learn German. 
In 2010, at the height of the public debate on language requirements, the Foundation 
launched a print media ad campaign aimed at enticing migrants to enroll in language cours-
es. It promoted the idea that sufficient language skills were indispensable for successful 
integration. In this case the Foundation’s efforts helped, making language acquisition man-
datory for migrants. The state now offers free language courses (Integrationskurse).
In 2012 the Foundation started a scholarship program for young migrants. Together 
with migrant fellows, the Foundation approaches media channels to present success stories 
of integration to the general public. The program gives 150 people annually the opportunity 
to participate in selected trainings and customized mentoring. Mentoring is a central aspect 
to the program’s success, and personalities such as government spokesperson Steffen Seibert 
and the Minister of State at the Foreign Office, Maria Böhmer, dedicate some of their time to 
mentoring PAVE THE WAY (GEH DEINEN WEG) fellows. The program also equips young 
people with a migrant background with an armament against discrimination.
 “I too am Germany” (Auch ich bin Deutschland) is a grassroots campaign conducted by 
the Foundation that was originally initiated by fellows in the Foundation’s programs. This 
contemporary social media campaign presents testimonials that illustrate both welcoming 
and discriminatory messages,5 with the goal of making discrimination recognizable in our 
everyday lives. 
Conclusion
Change is possible. The image of migrants in Germany has changed over the past few de-
cades. For the longest time integration was not on the public agenda, and so few integration 
measures were initiated. Migrants coming to Germany in the fifties, sixties, and seventies 
were poorly skilled, poorly paid, and had little opportunity to integrate themselves into 
German society. As Germany began to rethink its integration policy, it chose an open and 
comprehensive approach. It may be too late for first-generation migrants, but their children 
are able to reap the benefits of a welcoming integrative approach.   
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Notes
1. The largest group of migrants is rooted in Turkey (17.2 percent), followed by Poland (7.2 percent), Russia 
(7.5 percent), and Italy (4.9 percent). People of Turkish descent are the largest, and perhaps the most visible, 
group in Germany. The Turkish community has a relatively good representation on the level of interest groups 
and is visible in the streetscape. 
2. In 2013 a new populist party, Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland—AfD), was founded. 
Established as a Euro-critical party with the singular goal of returning to national currencies, the party quickly 
evolved into a forum for nationalist and patriotic messages. In the fall of 2014, in response to clashes between 
Kurds and Sunni Muslims in Dresden, Lutz Bachmann established the PEGIDA movement. PEGIDA demon-
strations took place on a weekly basis, grew significantly from week to week, and received wide media coverage 
nationally and internationally. The US State Department even issued a travel warning for some parts of East 
Germany. The phenomenon of PEGIDA quickly spread to other cities in Germany, where weekly anti-Islam 
demonstrations also began taking place. However, these demonstrations evoked a counter-movement for toler-
ance and plurality and against racism that outnumbered PEGIDA demonstrators by far in most places. 
3. These issues became especially evident after the unification of West and East Germany in 1990.
4. In 2010, the book Germany Abolishes Itself by Thilo Sarrazin (Sarrazin 2010) caused a stir by drastically 
pointing out challenges that are or seem to be connected to migrant communities. Among other things, Sarrazin 
noted that the majority of migrants are less educated, suffer from higher unemployment rates, and are more 
likely to commit crimes. While some of these statistics had been subject to discussion for years before this book 
was published, Sarrazin linked them exclusively to having a migrant background. His theses did not find much 
backing in the scientific community, but a large part of the public applauded his findings. 
5. For instance, a question “Where are you from originally?” posed to a non-German looking person some-
times reflects discrimination rather than a genuine interest.
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